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Abstract
 In this thesis, I explore the lived repercussions of dominant discourses around 
victimhood and survivorship, informed by rape myths, by focusing on interpersonal 
responses to victims of sexual violence and the consequences of these interactions. I 
explore these responses from my position as a victim/survivor, to address the shortage 
of victim/survivor accounts and several topical gaps, especially the construction of, and 
relationship between, the victim and survivor labels as they are colloquially used. I 
propose two research questions: (1) How are the discourses of victimhood and 
survivorship deployed in making sense of sexual victimization, and how are they 
related? and (2) How do these discourses affect social and interpersonal relationships, 
and how is this experienced by a victim/survivor over several years? 
 I take an autoethnographic approach to produce feminist theory and engage with 
my lived experiences after sexual violence, with an emphasis on interpersonal 
conversations. Autoethnography limits the scope and generalizability of the study, since 
it relies on the experience of a single person, but it also allows for depth of inquiry 
unavailable by other methods. For data, I work primarily from memoir drafts written 
between 2012 and 2014, following rape in 2012, and secondarily on memory. In 
analyzing these narrative fragments, I build upon a feminist theoretical framework, 
including Ahmed’s (2017) challenge to the theory experience divide and notion of 
“feminist snap”, Brison’s (2002) insights that post-rape processes are inherently 
relational and that victim epistemologies offer vital contributions to the field, and 
Stringer’s (2014) “neoliberal victim theory”. I also apply McKenzie-Mohr and 
Lafrance’s (2011) notion of “tightrope talk”, which accounts for how victim/survivors 
use dominant discourse in contradictory ways to generate novel articulations. 
 I find that the discourses of victimhood and survivorship contribute to the 
untenability of victim identity, which is fraught with contradictory imperatives: 
adhering to one set of expectations necessarily violates the other, inciting deleterious 
backlash. This untenability fosters the imperative to become a ‘survivor’ which is 
constructed as sitting at the opposite end of ‘journey’ of personal overcoming. I argue 
that discourses of survivorship have been heavily swayed by neoliberal discourse, 
valorising agency and strength, and construing it as an achievement to escape 
victimhood and its associated stigmas. I develop a feminist analyses to argue that these 
frameworks underscore individual coping and erase the social reality of sexual violence, 
and that this pattern is evident in discourse around posttraumatic growth, which I 
problematize. 
 In light of my analysis, I conclude that dominant discourses and constructions of 
the victim and survivor label infuse everyday conversation in a manner which can be 
counterproductive and harmful. One pernicious effect is the dissolution of relationships 
and reactive victim scapegoating of a victim/survivor. I also conclude that the 
overemphasis on personal responsibility is especially problematic in a context where no 
amount of individual agency or overcoming adversity addresses the reality that we all 
must navigate a world in which gender based violence remains a threat. 
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Introduction 
 The music begins with strings, and segues into a woman playing solo piano. She 
starts to sing, “You tell me it gets better; it gets better in time.” Lady Gaga’s mezzo-
soprano voice fills Dolby Theatre. The full orchestra joins in at the second verse, until 
the music breaks into a solo moment for Gaga and her piano. A screen lifts to reveal 
dozens of survivors, their silhouettes black against a blue screen. The band joins in 
again, and Gaga unleashes her signature roar as survivors come forward out of the blue 
to stand in solidarity, raising their arms together for a delicate finale. When the cameras 
pan the audience, they are on their feet, tears in their eyes. The moment goes viral. 
 In February 2016—the month I began my PhD studies—pop icon Lady Gaga 
performed ‘Til It Happens to You’ at the 88th Academy Awards. The song was composed 
for the documentary The Hunting Ground, which shed light on the pervasive issue of 
campus rape and the systemic silencing of victim/survivors by police and universities. 
In covering the performance, The Los Angeles Times, The Guardian, Rolling Stone, The 
Wall Street Journal, and others write about the dozens who joined Gaga on stage, arms 
emblazoned with words of hope, resistance, and resilience, as survivors. Both The Los 
Angeles Times and The Guardian include the word “survivor” in the headline. Many 
outlets avoid the victim label entirely. 
 What strikes me about the coverage is the fixation on the survivor label and the 
avoidance of the victim label. This pattern is at once a depiction of dominant discourse 
and a furtherance of that discourse. In other words, it is both constituted by and 
constitutive of the dominant discourse of survivorship, and resistance—even aversion—
to the victim label. In the coverage of Gaga’s performance, the ubiquitous use of the 
term survivor to describe those on stage coincides with highlighting these survivors for 
their brave and bold willingness to come forward. This pairing demonstrates social 
expectations about how those who endure sexual violence should be described and 
named by others: as survivors. It also implies how those of us of have been victimized 
ought to identify ourselves.  
 The content of Lady Gaga’s song, which has not been substantively engaged in 
media coverage, is remarkable for its resistance to dominant discourses of survivorship 
and overcoming. Her lyrics resist the directive to be strong and carry on following 
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sexual assault; she insists on the difficulties and harm done by sexual violence and the 
inability of others to understand the complexity of sexual violence from the outside. 
You tell me hold your head up 
Hold your head up and be strong  
‘Cause when you fall, you gotta get up  
You gotta get up and move on  
Tell me, how the hell could you talk  
How could you talk?  
‘Cause until you walk where I walk  
It’s just all talk  
’Til it happens to you, you don't know  
How it feels (Lady Gaga, 2016) 
Gaga suggests the ongoing threat and ubiquity of sexual violence—the way it seems to 
haunt its victims. In repeating the refrain “’Til it happens to you”, she strikes an 
ominous tone. She casts assault as commonplace, perhaps inevitable, nodding toward 
the persistence of sexual violence.  
 Lady Gaga’s outspoken advocacy for survivors has inspired the Fire Rose Unity 
Survivor Tattoo, which Gaga has on her left shoulder. In an article about the tattoo for 
Konbini, Jen Kipper (2017) writes that, “Although the Fire Rose tattoos are two years 
old now, women—and men—keep inking them on their bodies as a way to show their 
connection, their strength and their will to be something else than just victims.” The 
tattoo’s designer, Jacqueline Lin, associates the shape with strength and power. The 
tattoo and its framing offer an example of art at the broadest level of pop culture 
reifying the discourse of survivorship. 
 This type of coverage perpetuates the victim/survivor binary, which I 
problematize in Chapter 5. In many instances, individuals embrace, reject, or fluctuate 
between the categories, thus resisting their binary formulation. Others use the available 
victim/survivor categories to gesture toward possibilities beyond dominant discursive 
frames (McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance, 2011); this has been the case in my experience, 
and also appears as a pattern in other victim/survivor accounts. Negotiating these 
identities is not solely exercised in thought—victimhood and survivorship are 
articulated and enacted over time. Moreover, drawing from Susan Brison’s (2002) 
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insights about the aftermath of sexual violence, which I discuss in Chapter 2, these 
processes are always relational rather than isolated and individual. Furthermore, they 
take place in the wider social context of rape myths, the “cultural scaffolding of 
rape” (see Gavey, 2019), and contemporary cultural shifts around sexual violence and 
victimization. 
 In October 2017, as I began to transition from researching to writing this thesis, 
the #MeToo movement ignited on social media. Tarana Burke started “me too” as a 
grassroots movement aimed at ending sexual violence, as a way for victim/survivors to 
signal to other victim/survivors that they are not alone. According to Burke (Guerra, 
2017), “‘me too’ is a movement to, among other things, radicalize the notion of mass 
healing”. In The Washington Post, Burke (2017) specifies that the movement began to 
create spaces of healing for girls of color. Then, Alyssa Milano used the hashtag on 
Twitter. Soon, millions of women revealed stories of sexual harassment and assault. It 
was a watershed moment, for while the legacy of speak-outs and breaking silence had 
been ongoing for decades, the overwhelming numbers of those who came forward as 
part of #MeToo challenged the rape myth that sexual harm is rare.  
 Rape myths persist in making sense of sexual violence, as evidenced in personal 
and critical reactions to #MeToo. For example, Kunst et al. (2018) examine perceptions 
of #MeToo as harmful or beneficial, and find that “results showed that men’s more 
negative stance toward #MeToo could largely be explained by men being higher in 
hostile sexism, higher in rape myth acceptance, and lower in feminist identification 
compared to women”. Critics met this historical moment with a range of familiar 
arguments about the dangers of mass action and feminist discourse around sexual 
victimization. They hail #MeToo a moral panic (Gessen, 2017a), rail against casting 
women as victims (DeNeuve et al., 2018; Gessen, 2017b; Roiphe, 2018), and lament 
women’s sexual freedom and agency (Berlinski, 2017; Merkin, 2018; Sullivan, 2018). 
Many of these authors offer arguments steeped in victim blame. They also overlook the 
degree to which the emphasis in Burke’s initial “me too” was on women and girls of 
color. This erasure is the focus and title of Burke’s (2017) Washington Post piece. 
 These critical arguments from Gessen, Merkin, DeNeuve et al., Roiphe, Berlin, 
and Sullivan mirror the writings of Roiphe, Hoff-Sommers, Wolf, and others in the early 
1990s. As Stringer (2014) discusses, these authors were part of a “power feminist” 
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movement, which sought to resist “victim feminism”. Power feminists argue that victim 
feminists frame women as inherent victims, to the detriment of women; they contend 
that talking about women’s victimization is victimizing to women, that such talk 
perpetuates women as weak, passive, submissive, and prone to harm. Further, power 
feminists suggest that the harm done by victim feminists is greater than the harm done 
by the sexual violence that victim feminists seek to expose and challenge. They draw on 
rape myths about women exaggerating the consequences of rape, and suggest that 
women ask for rape, claiming that those who want to resist are capable of doing so. This 
debate continues in the #MeToo context, and I address the discourses informing these 
arguments throughout this thesis, since the #MeToo movement and its backlash are the 
backdrop for my research. 
 Throughout the process of research and writing, I was sensitized to the manner 
in which decades-old arguments and resistance to feminist progress have resurfaced in 
response to the #MeToo movement. Many contemporary arguments against #MeToo 
denigrate the victim label, which I examine in Chapter 4. These backlash arguments 
hinge on what Stinger (2014) terms neoliberal victim theory, which I outline in Chapter 
2. While the backlash refrains are well worn, the field of feminist rape research has 
advanced significantly since the 1990s power feminist backlash: feminist researchers 
have produced an array of quantitative and qualitative data in recent decades, and 
developed theory to resist the logics of the backlash. However, little has been done to 
advance theorizations of victimhood vis-à-vis survivorship. This is a striking gap, since 
the discourse of survivorship is so widespread in popular rhetoric. Further, the backlash 
draws on the logics that render the victim label untenable and promulgate discourses of 
survivorship. My consideration of the tensions between victim and survivor identities 
and the discursive constructions of the terms in a neoliberal context are at the core of 
this thesis. The gap in theorisations of victimhood and survivorship is one of several 
gaps in literature on sexual violence that I expand upon below. 
The wider context of neoliberalism 
 Neoliberal hegemony is the wider context of this project. Harvey (2005, p2) 
notes that “There has everywhere been an emphatic turn toward neoliberalism in 
political-economic practices and thinking since the 1970s.” Harvey (2005, p3) contends 
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that neoliberalism has “become hegemonic as a mode of discourse” and has become 
“the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world.” This 
marks the ideological, values, and sense making aspects of neoliberalism. Harvey 
(2005, p5) goes on to argue that those who developed neoliberal ideology leveraged 
“compelling and seductive ideals” of “human dignity and individual freedom.” These 
ideals have supported the seepage of neoliberal thinking into many facets of our social 
world and cultural values. 
 For example, Garrett’s (2016) notes the proliferation of ‘resilience research’ in 
social work research as stemming from neoliberalism and positive psychology. I discuss 
posttraumatic growth, which is an area of positive psychology, further in Chapter 6. 
Garret’s insights point toward the importance of foregrounding the wider context of 
neoliberalism at the outset of this thesis, since neoliberalism has become ‘common 
sense’ and hegemonic. According to Garrett (2016, p1911): 
  
‘resilience’ discourse is permeated with frequently unacknowledged value 
judgements and unquestioned assumptions; the excessive emphasis placed 
on individuals at the expense of social structure and social forces; and the 
apparent affinity between ‘resilience’ and key neo-liberal tenets.
He argues that current framings of resilience reify neoliberal hegemony. He defines 
resilience as the ability of individuals to respond positively to adversity or even 
mobilise adversity for improvement. He also notes the 1980s shift from research into 
risk and external risk management to resilience, individual behaviour, and internal states 
of mind. His definition and critique of resilience parallels my engagement with 
neoliberalism and resilience in Chapters 5 and 6, and in my introduction of 
neoliberalism and NVT in Chapter 2. 
 The specific shapes and contours of neoliberalism are diverse and varied in 
different places. However, its core ideals, which, according to Harvey (2005, p5) 
“appeal to anyone who values the ability to make decisions for themselves,” foster 
neoliberal common sense, ideology, and social discourses in various neoliberal states 
(including NZ, where this thesis was written, and the USA, where many of the events 
and conversations herein took place). Garrett (2016, p1921) points out the “cultural and 
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affective components of neo-liberalism” are linked to self-help and positive psychology, 
urging people to up their capacity to cope and succeed under neoliberalism. 
Neoliberalism is the larger context to which I understand my research applies.  
 In the following section, I outline my research questions. Then, I discuss the 
methodological gaps, topical gaps, and disciplinary gaps that necessitate this research 
project, and also inform my selection of autoethnography as the method by which to 
address these gaps. Finally, I provide a chapter overview and some consideration on 
terminology. 
Overview and research questions 
 This thesis is an autoethnographic work of feminist theory. I engage with my 
lived experiences after sexual violence, which is based primarily on contemporaneous 
records (2012–2014) and secondarily on memory. At the center of this thesis, I analyze 
relational—social and interpersonal—processes that impact identity negotiation after 
sexual violence, especially applications of the victim and survivor labels. By examining 
conversations about my victim status, I find that discourses around victimhood and 
survivorship have shaped others’ responses to my victimization in deleterious ways in 
the years following rapes I experienced in 2012. I consider secondary victimization in 
its most everyday forms, manifest in interpersonal responses to victims of sexual 
violence, and the consequences of these interactions. 
 Throughout this thesis, I engage with and explore two main questions: (1) How 
are the discourses of victimhood and survivorship deployed in making sense of sexual 
victimization, and how are they related? (2) How do these discourses affect social and 
interpersonal relationships, and how is this experienced by a victim/survivor over 
several years? 
 I consider these questions using autoethnography. I introduce the narrative 
component in Chapter 2, where I consider feminist theory. I elect this placement to 
enact and illustrate Ahmed’s (2017) arguments for dragging theory back to life, and her 
case that there is theoretical value in the lived experience of becoming a feminist and 
living a feminist life. I also include minimal autoethnographic fragments in Chapter 3 to 
demonstrate my methodology. I then use longer autoethnographic narratives in Part II as 
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the basis for my analysis. In Chapter 7, I provide autoethnographic accounts and 
reflections, based in events which occurred during the writing of this thesis. 
 I build my responses to my research questions in Part II. In Chapter 4, I examine 
the history and construction of the victim label. I argue that contradictory expectations 
about victim behavior and the consequences of deviating from those expectations render 
victimhood an untenable identity category. In Chapter 5, I consider the survivor label, 
which is often championed as an alternative to the victim label. I challenge the notion of 
a linear arc connecting the two, thus framing survivorship as the path by which one 
escapes victim status. I argue that discourses of survivorship blame the process of 
labeling for harm, rather than situating harm in sexually violent events. Further, current 
permutations of survivorship build on neoliberal demands to evade victimhood and 
individually overcome trauma based in oppression. In Chapter 6, I apply these 
arguments and considerations to provide a feminist critique of posttraumatic growth, 
which I argue epitomizes personal resilience in the face of adversity at the expense of 
addressing its social roots.  
 I develop these arguments with an autoethnographic approach to address several 
gaps in research, which I outline below. 
Gaps in research 
 Since the 1970s, a great deal of research (feminist and otherwise) has engaged 
the topic of sexual violence and its consequences for victim/survivors. Sexual violence 
is a social problem with multiple contributing factors and a range of deleterious 
consequences, which I elaborate on in Chapter 1. There is a large body of research on 
sexual violence generally (see Gavey and Senn, 2014). Some key topics include: 
prevalence and incidence data (see Koss et al., 1987; 1993), measurements of rape myth 
acceptance (see Burt, 1980; Payne et al., 1999), interviews with victims and survivors 
(see Thompson 2000; Wood and Rennie, 1994; Young and Maguire, 2003), explorations 
of the effects of sexual violence (Burgess, 1983; Koss et al., 1994), recovery from 
sexual trauma (Herman, 1992), as well as many feminist theorizations, a range of 
nonacademic mass market memoirs, and political essays. In addition, there is a range of 
work on child sexual abuse, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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 Although vast and wide ranging, the research on sexual violence has some gaps. 
I aim to address methodological, topical, and disciplinary gaps in this thesis. By 
elucidating several different types of gaps, I hope to make clear the novel contributions 
of this thesis at several valences of sexual violence research. 
Disciplinary Gaps
 In carrying out reading and research, I noticed some studies on sexual violence 
and sexual trauma in the discipline of psychology by authors who do not situate the 
works as feminist or as critical social psychology (see Joseph, 2011; Joseph and Linley, 
2006, 2012a, 2012b; Hockett et al., 2014; Hockett and Saucier, 2015; Thompson, 2000). 
These authors fail to engage with feminist research—especially feminist theorizations 
of sexual violence—or sociological analyses of systemic oppression. Psychological 
frameworks often omit important social and political dimensions from their analyses, 
and researchers in psychology are predominantly concerned with individual pathology 
(see Armstrong 1994; Mardorossian, 2002; Burstow, 2003; McKenzie Mohr, 2004; 
Tseris, 2013). Overlooking the social generates serious and problematic omissions and 
errors in their analyses and approaches, which are especially significant in a context 
where psychological understandings bear heavily on self-understandings. 
 The disciplines of psychology and psychiatry have power and influence over 
conceptualisations of the self and interiority; according to Rose (1996, p. 11), these 
disciplines shape  
our conceptions of what persons are and how we should understand and act 
toward them, and our notions of what each of us is in ourselves, and how we 
can become what we want to be.  
Rose’s work sets out the role of what he terms the “psy” disciplines in shaping current 
modes of life, meaning, thinking, and subjectivity. His arguments elucidate the 
importance of considering narratives and assumptions in psy disciplines as they infuse 
and shape self-understanding and identification. 
 Simultaneously, social pathologies and oppression—and their psychological, 
individualistic remedies—are constructed in pseudo-feminist terms; they are framed as 
sympathetic to feminist aims for women’s liberation. According to Kelly et al. (1996 p. 
80), “The growth in therapy, self-improvement, and self-help is also evident, with many 
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elements of it drawing explicitly or implicitly on feminism for insight, theory, method 
and purpose.” In other words, self-help authors construct personal improvement by 
psychotherapeutic means in feminist terms; therapy becomes the primary avenue for 
surviving in an oppressive context. This construction contributes to the depoliticization 
of sexual violence in favor of personal resilience and heroic overcoming. The language 
of overcoming is common in posttraumatic growth literature, where one key theorist, 
Joseph (2011), links trauma survival to superhero stories. 
 Therefore, in early chapters, I build toward a feminist analysis of posttraumatic 
growth research (in Chapter 6), especially as it pertains to what I term the survivor 
imperative. I suggest that a feminist approach offers a partial remedy to the over-
individualization of many psychological analyses. 
Topical Gaps 
Our understanding and awareness of what victimisation means and how 
victims survive is in its comparative infancy.  
– Jordan, 2013, p. 48 
 In the 1990s and 2000s, numerous feminist researchers took up the dichotomy of 
victimhood and survivorship, albeit briefly and sparsely (see Dunn 2004, 2005; Kelly et 
al., 1996; Leisenring, 2006; Minow, 1992; Proffit, 1996; Schneider, 1993; Thompson, 
2000; Wasco, 2003; Wood and Rennie, 1994; Young and Maguire, 2003). I review this 
material in Chapter 1 as background. While these works offer valuable insights, they do 
not address questions about how rape myths impact the day-to-day, lived experiences of 
victim/survivors. Many of these researchers discuss the victim/survivor dichotomy, and 
the positioning of these terms as binary, oppositional, and mutually exclusive. These 
authors gesture toward complexity and ambiguity in the terms, but do not drill deep into 
the roots and manifestations of these complexities; they sidestep the terms’ genealogies, 
historic uses, and social construction. 
 Several of these researchers develop survivorship in the context of “battered 
women”, rather than victims of sexual violence (see Dunn, 2004, 2005; Leisenring, 
2006; Proffit, 1996; Schneider, 1993). While their insights are useful, they are not 
wholly applicable to the context of sexual assault, leaving survival in the context of 
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sexual violence under-theorized; theoretical preoccupations with agency for victims of 
ongoing domestic violence differ from those victimized in a singular event. These 
authors point out that a dominant preoccupation regarding agency and “battered 
women” is the question of why they remain in an abusive relationship; in sexual 
violence, the question of agency has more to do with risk management or aversion (see 
Stringer, 2014). The agency discussion in gender-based violence varies across different 
types of violence. 
 In most of the research carried out in the 1990s and early 2000s, the authors 
handle survivorship vis-à-vis victimhood in brief sections, as portions of larger 
arguments (see Dunn 2004, 2005; Kelly et al., 1996; Leisenring, 2006; Minow, 1992; 
Proffit, 1996; Schneider, 1993; Thompson, 2000; Wasco, 2003; Wood and Rennie, 
1994; Young and Maguire, 2003). They note victim and survivor qualities while 
avoiding deep, prolonged, and substantive engagement with the construction of the 
categories. In light of this sporadic engagement, I aim to develop a comprehensive 
theorization of victimhood vis-à-vis survivorship. I explore and critique their 
construction, both separately and in relation to one another. Many of these authors argue 
for challenging or eschewing the victim label. I depart from these researchers by 
challenging the formulation of victimhood and survivorship as mutually exclusive. 
 I focus on the discourse of survivorship, rather than agency, because the survivor 
label is a common term in colloquial language. In terms of lived experiences and social 
responses to sexual violence, agency is not a common term in everyday speech, and I 
have never encountered someone sexually victimized, in person or in writing, who 
identifies as an ‘agent’. Agency, more broadly, refers to “[a]ction or intervention, 
especially such as to produce a particular effect”, which supposes the willful ability to 
act; an agent is a person who “takes an active role or produces a specified 
effect” (Oxford, 2020). I engage in the concept of agency, as it is important to an 
analysis of survivorship, and there are overlaps. However, I foreground survivorship. 
 Another significant topical gap involves research regarding rape myths. Rape 
myth research emphasizes the measurement of and correlates to rape myth acceptance 
(see Burt, 1980; Hinck and Thomas, 1999; Payne et al., 1999). Burt (1980) introduced 
the Rape Myth Acceptance (RMA) scale, which was further refined and developed by 
Payne et al. (1999) into the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale (IRMA). The IRMA 
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has since been advanced by McMahon and Farmer (2011) to reflect the nuance and 
subtlety involved in rape myths and their measurement. Each of these studies focuses on 
attitudinal measures and correlates regarding rape myth acceptance. 
 Various researchers seek to develop theory in conjunction with these attitude 
measures. Lonsway and Fitzgerald (1994) develop a theory-based definition of rape 
myths. Buddie and Miller (2001) explore the connection between stereotypes and rape 
myths. Ryan (2011) link rape myth acceptance to rape scripts. Edwards et al. (2011) 
review rape myth literature, explore the history of rape myths as a manifestation of 
patriarchal order, and examine their current permutations in U.S. culture. 
 However, few researchers engage with how rape myths shape the experiences of 
victim/survivors. Moor (2007) recognizes the compounding impacts of internalized rape 
myths on victim/survivor experience and sense of self after violence, and develops 
treatment guidelines based on this insight. Peterson and Muehlenhard (2004) explore 
the possible role of rape myths in unacknowledged rape by delivering the IRMA to 
women who reported experiences that were consistent with the legal definition of rape, 
while also analyzing these women’s written accounts of the events. Women who agreed 
with the rape myth that rape requires women to have fought back were less likely to 
label their experience as rape. 
 Burt (1980 p. 217) writes that rape myths function in “creating a climate that is 
hostile to rape victims”. In Part II, I provide specific examples in which rape myths  and 
victim hostility came to bear heavily on interpersonal interactions. This is an area 
overlooked in existing research, but vital to understanding the nuances and 
consequences of rape myths in lived reality. 
 I have found that the literature on secondary victimization overlooks the 
interpersonal facets of sexual trauma. I outline secondary victimization and its 
oversights in the following chapter. Institutional responses to victims of violence, and 
personal psychological consequences have been widely discussed in the literature on 
secondary victimization (Campbell and Raja, 1999; Campbell, 2005; Campbell et al., 
2009; Freyd, 2013; Smith and Freyd, 2013; Walsh et al., 2010). However, in reviewing 
this literature, I find that it overlooks the shape of social interactions and conversations 
with victims on a day-to-day basis, which is influenced by dominant discourse. The 
necessity of inquiring into these informal interactions is bolstered by research indicating 
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that victim/survivors disclose to friends or family first (Banyard et al., 2010; Paul et al., 
2013). Literature on disclosure suggests the need to attend closely to the specifics of 
these interpersonal exchanges, especially since disclosure recipients report distress and 
anger in response to hearing disclosures (Banyard et al., 2010; Ullman, 2010). The 
literature shows that friends and family are the first port of call, and indicates that the 
quality of their response is correlated to further help seeking (Borja et al., 2006). 
However, inquiries in help-seeking focus on disclosures and exchanges in institutional, 
medical, and law enforcement contexts. Therefore, I consider these interpersonal 
interactions as they are shaped by dominant discourse, and I deal with the relational 
development of victim/survivor identity following experiences of sexual violence, as 
informed by rape myths. To answer my research questions, I synthesize 
autoethnographic methods with feminist theoretical approaches and link theory to the 
lived experience of encountering rape myths. 
Methodological gaps 
Understanding trauma, including that of rape, requires one to take survivor’s 
first-person narratives seriously as an essential epistemological tool.  
– Brison, 2002, p. 87 
 There is a shortage of autoethnographies on sexual violence generally, and more 
specifically on secondary victimization. In this section, I discuss the difference between 
autoethnography and memoir or autobiography. I also account for several key factors 
that inhibit the production of autoethnographies in secondary victimization following 
sexual violence, and provide evidence of the shortage.  
 Broadly speaking, autobiography and memoir remain the most common genres 
for first-person narratives of sexual violence. Brison (2002, p. 110) points out that many 
rape memoirs follow a “reverse-conversion narrative” in which all is well until it’ is 
destroyed, and then reassembled. Memoir as a form of testimony and resistance is an 
important part of the feminist legacy of making sexual violence visible. In light of 
Ahmed’s (2017) argument for rejecting the theory/experience divide (which I discuss in 
Chapter 2), it is important to take these memoir accounts seriously and reiterate their 
value and resistive potential. However, while memoirs often engage with social critique 
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and commentary, their methodology, style, and goals are different from academic 
writing: arguments are more embedded, less overt and less systematic. Crucially, they 
are not based in formal research, data, theory, and analysis. The style is personal, 
reflective, and narrative-based, without expressed links to other works. The goal, which 
may be both informed and political, is to reach a different market than the target 
audience of academic research.  
 The distinction between memoir and academic theory using narrative became 
strikingly clear to me in working with my literary agent on a crossover, research-based 
memoir on my rape experience and social responses to my victimization. The most 
prevalent feedback was to omit dense or difficult writing and limit references. My 
review of feedback from over 20 editors who work at mainstream publishing houses 
suggests that the straddling of memoir and research-based writing was unfathomable: 
they were confused about the genre, and struggled to comprehend how personal 
narrative and reflection might interface with research, especially on the topic of sexual 
violence. These editors’ feedback offered insight into the publishing industry, and 
helped me understand important distinctions between academic writing and memoir.  
 Autoethnography bridges memoir with traditional academic approaches. 
However, autoethnographies on sexual violence are rare, indicating a crucial gap in 
research. I have located only a few such autoethnographies in extensive searches across 
several databases. The comprehensive list of what I found includes: two PhD theses that 
focus on adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse (Downing, 2016; Melnyk, 2015), 
one Masters thesis considering military sexual trauma (Ward, 2015), and three Masters 
dissertations documenting the researchers’ healing journeys following acquaintance 
sexual assault (Curry, 2010; Moll, 2005; O’Donnell, 2010). In addition a, handful of 
autoethnographic articles and books deal with sexual violence (Brison, 2002; Cojocaru, 
2015; Le Grice, 2017; Mackie, 2009; Mahmood, 2008; Minge, 2007; Ronai, 1992, 
1995, 1996; Spry, 2011). Of these, Brison (2002) deals explicitly with the ongoing 
consequences of sexual violence. I consider her work in depth in Chapter 2. Further, 
Fletcher (2018) writes about domestic violence, not sexual assault, where she explicates 
her efforts to resist the victim/survivor binary. Approximately half of these postgraduate 
and published projects are partially or fully comprised of creative endeavors, including 
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poetry, performances, plays, songs, and journal writing. The level of academic rigor 
varies widely. 
 Melnyk (2015) identifies calls from numerous scholars for explorations of 
women’s lived experience of sexual violence and its consequences (see Akoto, 2013; 
Corrigan, 2013; Gil 2007; Gunne and Thompson, 2010; Mollen and Stabb, 2010; Ronai, 
1995; Ullman, 2010). While these calls for further research do not explicitly name 
autoethnography as a method, they point toward both a topical and methodological gap 
that is well suited to autoethnography. As I discuss in Chapter 3, autoethnography is an 
effective approach to exploring women’s lived experiences with depth and nuance; it is 
equipped to handle the complexity and fluidity of lived experience, and implicitly 
values victim knowledge in a manner that potentially surpasses other methods. 
 In addition to a lack of autoethnographies, I have also found that there are only a 
few rigorous qualitative studies regarding aspects of secondary victimization based on 
interviews that take the accounts of victim/survivors as the basis for analysis (see 
Thompson, 2000; Wood and Rennie, 1994; Young and Maguire, 2003). The scarcity of 
such accounts suggests a need to consider methods that privilege and legitimize victim/
survivor perspectives. The delegitimization of victim knowledge has deep roots in the 
field of victimology. Miers (1989) discusses positivist victimology and the intentional 
omission of victim accounts from research; foundational victimological research 
privileged statistical accounts and police records on the basis that victim accounts are 
impure and overly subjective. However, these subjective accounts are vital sources of 
knowledge that are laden with potential for subversions of dominant discourse. 
 The few articles that do take victim/survivors’ in-depth accounts seriously are 
qualitative works based on in-depth interviews with small samples of participants. 
Interviews are a valuable method for tracking patterns in sense-making and elucidating 
themes by researchers who are not situated as victim/survivors. However, like all cross-
sectional methods, interview-based studies are limited in that they neglect the changes 
over time that occur in sense-making and identity negotiation. Examining interpersonal 
conversations with victims and those close to them is beyond the scope of what 
interviews may achieve. Interviews are temporally bound, and inevitably shaped by the 
attitude and interests of the researcher. Interviewees may feel obliged to perform 
victimhood or survivorship in ways that are consistent with dominant discourse. How 
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these interviews are analyzed may subsume novel articulations into dominant 
understandings (see Alcoff and Gray, 1993; McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance, 2011; Page, 
2017). These limitations do not negate the value of such research. However, it does 
present the case for additional methods to augment and expand the field.  
 In addition to considering novel articulations in existing language there is scope 
for exploring novel subjectivities vis-à-vis experiences of sexual violence. Gunne and 
Thompson (2010) explore the aesthetics and tellings of sexual violence narratives, and 
their potential to “establish new spaces for the subjectivity of the women who either 
have been raped or have been threatened with rape.” Melnyk (2015 p. 20) argues that 
researchers have a responsibility “to create the space for women to discuss 
their experiences of sexual violence”. Melnyk (2015) and Gunne and Thompson (2010) 
view the creation of this space as an avenue for developing new subjectivities among 
victims of sexual violence. Central to the enterprise of developing new subjectivities is 
enabling victims to assume power and claim authority over their narratives (Spry, 
1995). While there is need and space to develop new subjectivities and maintain 
narrative control in further qualitative inquiry (i.e., interviews), autoethnography allows 
for unparalleled control in storytelling. New subjectivities are powerfully developed in 
accounts where the speaker has control over what is said and how it is presented. 
Autoethnography allows for a more detailed, sustained, and holistic engagement than 
the limited data provided by qualitative researchers. Telling stories of sexual violence is 
a risky and fraught enterprise, and further harm can be done to the victim/survivors if 
their accounts are misrepresented or misused.  
 There are valuable contributions to be made by researchers who are situated 
both as victims and scholars; however, there are few scholars who use their data 
autoethnographically (see Ahmed, 2017; Alcoff, 2018; Brison, 2002; Ronai, 1995). 
Ronai (1995) notes the dearth of writings by those whose identity spans both researcher 
and victim/survivor. There is a tendency among researchers to avoid acknowledging the 
personal experiences that fuel scholarly inquiries into sexual violence (Melnyk, 2015; 
Nash and Viray, 2014; Ronai, 1995). Ronai (1995, p. 402) elucidates the dynamics that 
inhibit some researchers from disclosing: 
Several people told me not to talk about these experiences. When I 
suggested my own experiences with child sexual abuse as a research topic, 
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one sociologist advised me to investigate the general topic, using my own 
story as one of my interviews. In other words he told me to bury it in other 
data. “Why” I asked. “Because it might harm your professional career if it 
were known, and your work may not be taken seriously,” was his response. 
Other sociologists had similar responses… 
This form of discouragement reflects dominant notions about victim identity, which I 
explore in Chapter 4. 
 Stigma plays a crucial role in these dynamics. When researchers’ credibility to 
research personally relevant topics is impeded by stigma, it perpetuates the notion that 
victim knowledge is illegitimate and suspect, thus bolstering harmful stigmas. For 
example, a recent article authored by eighteen scholars (Hall-Clifford et al., 2019) 
addresses the need for those working in public health to incorporate the insights of the 
#MeToo movement to increase safety for workers, students, and researchers in the field: 
For so long, women who report gender-based violence have been 
disregarded or discredited. The stigma of gender-based violence means that 
these uninvited experiences become a woman’s defining identity, and their 
other work, achievements, and professional identities fade away. (Hall-
Clifford et al., 2019, p. 136) 
Here, Hall-Clifford et al. (2019) elucidate the real risks and stigma of disclosing sexual 
victimization in a professional context, and note one clinician working in public health 
and sexual violence who engages in reputational management to establish a non-victim 
identity. This sort of reputational management demonstrates a perceived need to prevent 
victim stigma from undermining the value and credibility of one’s work.  
 These examples suggest that sexual victimization leaks into, and potentially 
sullies, the academic work that victim/survivors/scholars may produce. For example, 
Melnyk (2015) opens her thesis by explicating her desire to keep her experience and the 
messy emotional realities of her victimization out of her research; she notes her wish to 
keep her academic life objective and separate from her private self and concerns. She 
also notes how she was unable to realize this desire in the process of her research: her 
personal experience bled through. 
 These examples highlight barriers to researchers disclosing relevant personal 
experiences. As a consequence, works where researchers have the potential to disclose 
 16
but do not may lose a valuable interpretive lens. The value of these disclosures is made 
evident by those researchers who do disclose (see Ahmed, 2017; Alcoff, 2018; Brison, 
2002; Cojocaru, 2015; Curry, 2010; Downing, 2014; Fletcher, 2018; Le Grice, 2018; 
Mackie, 2009; Mahmood, 2008; Melnyk, 2015; Minge, 2007; Moll, 2005; O’Donnell, 
2010; Ronai, 1995, 1996; Spry, 2011; Ward, 2015). 
 This is not to say that those who do not wish to disclose should be pressured to 
do so: silence is a legitimate choice, and the social pressure to speak out as a 
demonstration of strength merits critique (see Orgad, 2009). I am not arguing that all 
researchers should be mandated to disclose personal experiences of sexual 
victimization. Rather, I am suggesting that the conditions that discourage those who 
wish to disclose merit scrutiny, and that autoethnographic work is valuable for 
facilitating such scrutiny. I argue that these conditions are fostered by dominant 
discourse around victims and victimhood, which I explore further in Chapter 4. 
 With these insights in mind, I suggest that autoethnographic work on sexual 
violence is restricted by some of the phenomena under investigation throughout this 
thesis, especially the legitimacy of victim knowledge. The stigmatization of the victim 
label, the delegitimization of victim knowledge, and social taboos around the topic of 
sexual violence make it difficult to embody both researcher and victim/survivor 
identities in a single work. Such barriers to disclosuree link back to topical gaps while 
simultaneously demonstrating a gap in methodology. 
 The challenges I discuss above have limited the availability of victim self-
narratives in the academic sphere. An intimate understanding of the landscape, as 
afforded by autoethnography, is vital to the development of theory of secondary 
victimization after sexual violence. Ellis (1991, p. 30–31) argues it well: 
Who knows better the right questions to ask than a social scientist who has 
lived through the experience? Who would make a better subject than a 
researcher consumed by wanting to figure it all out? That there are problems 
in this technique is a given; that we have to take precautions in interpreting, 
generalizing, and eliminating bias here the same as we do with any data we 
collect is assumed. But the understanding to be gained makes working out 
the problems worthwhile. 
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Any research, especially when the participant sample is small (as in authoethnography 
where n = 1), demands care in drawing conclusions, and generalizing on the basis of 
results. There are limits to autoethnography as a method, especially in terms of scope. I 
consider these limitations in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
 Autoethnography also has unique strengths: the depth and intimacy of access are 
unparalleled. According to Chang (2008, p.50), taboo topics “fit autoethnographic 
inquiries well because researchers have direct access to intimate information and can 
investigate the subjects in depth”. Furthermore, Chang (2008) suggests that the data 
available to autoethnographers gives rise to more holistic perspectives. Many of the 
situations that I investigate in this thesis would prove nearly impossible to access via 
other means, including memoir, since it lacks academic analysis. 
 As I discuss in Chapters 2 and 3, autoethnography synthesizes well with 
feminist theoretical approaches. Autoethnography is a seedbed for further exploration 
and insight into the lived ramifications of commonsense discourses; it is also a viable 
testing site for the application of theory to lived experience. Lived experience is where 
theory is tested and put to use, and is itself a source of theory (Ahmed, 2017). Although 
autoethnographies dealing with sexual violence and its sequelae may be sparse in the 
academic domain, I argue that autoethnography has a great deal to add to our 
understandings of sexual violence. 
Introducing myself
 My identity and experience inform my research, so it is important to briefly 
introduce myself at the outset of the project. I delve into more of my backstory and 
identity, and the events giving rise to this project, in Chapter 2. I am a cis, queer, white 
woman with PTSD from the American middle class, in my early thirties and an 
immigrant to New Zealand. This project was undertaken in New Zealand, but covers 
experiences which transpired in various parts of the USA between 2012 and 2015. 
Specific details about the geographic location and community context of these 
experiences is omitted from the thesis to maintain compliance with the ethical approval 
I obtained from my institution to carry out this research.  
 How I conceptualize my role in this research project has been informed by 
Ronai’s (1995) work on autoethnography, which I discuss in depth in Chapter 3. I am a 
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narrator, author, subject, protagonist, and analyst of this text. The knowledge I produce 
is limited by the lens of my experience, and I therefore endeavour to maintain 
perspective on the limitations of my findings.  
 For example, as I discuss in Chapter 1, I have had the privilege to access 
resources and support which are unique to my race, class, and social position. I discuss 
other issues pertaining to race in Chapter 2, where I outline my upbringing in a mixed 
race home, and the race of the man who raped me. I am limited in considerations of race 
with regard to the others featured in my data for this thesis, since I am ethically 
obligated to conceal their identity. Furthermore, an analysis of how race comes to bear 
on interpersonal responses to sexual violence is beyond the methodological scope of 
this project. This is one example of how autoethnography as a method is not conducive 
to generalized findings. 
 I view autoethnography as an exploratory method, with the potential to open up 
new avenues of inquiry. According to Brison (2002), those who write about experiences 
of sexual victimization must be cautious to avoid over- or under-generalizing based on 
their singular experiences. I discuss this further in Chapter 3. I attempt to situate my 
findings throughout the project as based on my own experiences, and as building upon 
existing theorization. I suggest that my analysis applies to a neoliberal context, which I 
introduce further in Chapters 2 and 4. It also applies to the community in which these 
experiences occurred, although I cannot explicate what community that is due to ethical 
considerations. I also believe my experiences add to the historical record of tactics by 
which victim/survivors of sexual violence may be silenced, especially prior to the 
#MeToo movement. In developing my theoretical framework throughout this thesis—
which is situated as a work of feminist theory, in the discipline of gender studies—I 
hope to advance experience-based ideas which can be examined and tested for their 
utility and applicability by other victim/survivors in neoliberal societies. 
Chapter Overview 
 This thesis is organized in three parts. Part I includes the background, theory, 
and methods chapters. Part II encompasses three chapters that address constructions and 
applications of the victim and survivor labels, the implications of their mutually 
exclusive formulation as a journey away from victimhood, and how this is evident in 
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the literature on posttraumatic growth. I attend closely to how these take shape in lived 
experience. I also consider the personal impact of rape myths as sense-making tools, 
and how dominant discourse and rape myths can render everyday social interactions as 
forms of secondary victimization.  
 Part III includes autoethnographic reflections on events that transpired in the 
later stages of my PhD. As I carried out the research and writing of this thesis, the story 
continued to unfold. Several events prompted renewed consideration of my own identity 
as a victim or survivor in various settings and clarified one of the most significant and 
deleterious long-term impacts of rape myths and victim/survivor discourse: the 
dissolution of meaningful relationships. I then transition to my final discussion and 
conclusion, where I lay out the central findings of this thesis. 
 In Chapter 1, I review the literature pertaining to the wider social context around 
sexual violence. I summarize how Gavey’s (2019) “cultural scaffolding of rape” 
illuminates social norms and expectations around heterosexuality and presents a 
compelling case for how and why sexual violence is a logical extension of heterosex. I 
examine rape myths: what they are, the other myths or beliefs about heterosex to which 
they are related, and how they are studied. I also consider the literature on secondary 
victimization. By considering rape prevalence, rape myths, secondary victimization, and 
the cultural scaffolding of rape, I aim to describe the social and research context in 
which this thesis is situated. 
 The inclusion of autoethnographic data begins in Chapter 2, where I introduce 
feminist theoretical frameworks to explore the experiences of sexual violence and 
secondary victimization. I draw from Ahmed’s (2017) dismantling of the theory/
experience divide, as well as her conceptualizations of fragility, brokenness, and 
feminist snap. I build upon Brison’s (2002) claims about the value of victim’s 
epistemological stance and insights, and the relational aspects of life after sexual 
violence. I outline Stringer’s (2014) neoliberal victim theory, which is foundational to 
my analysis. The thesis—and my own life—are also rooted in Lorde (2007a, 2007b) 
and Anzaldúa (1987, 2002), whose works not only integrate theory with living, but also 
address hidden, internal sources of power in women from a feminist perspective. In 
particular, Lorde (2007a) addresses the transformative power and political necessity of 
 20
overcoming the fear to speak. I use these bodies of work to build the case for an 
autoethnographic approach, and in my analysis in Part II. 
 In Chapter 3, I set out the method for this thesis, including the scope and limits 
of autoethnography which I elaborate on in a section entitled “Cautions and critiques.” I 
draw from and adapt an autoethnographic layered account, and augment evocative 
autoethnography with insights from analytic autoethnography. I consider how 
autoethnography is conducive to answering my research questions and the topic gaps 
discussed above. I explore how an adapted version of the layered account allows for a 
greater emphasis on analysis. I also address the methodical approaches set out by 
McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance (2011), who discuss “tightrope talk”, and Page (2017), 
who develops vulnerable writing as a feminist methodology. These approaches 
synthesize well with the feminist theoretical perspectives set out in Chapter 2. 
 Chapter 4 details the untenability of victim identity. I take up the history, 
etymology, and social construction of the victim label, and the social expectations that 
bear upon it. My main emphasis here is on the contradictory imperatives that victims 
face: be meek, passive, and forgiving; be strong, capable and heroic. The web of 
contradictions regarding acceptable victim behavior is further complicated by the 
consequences of failing to comply with these expectations. Adhering to one set of 
norms means failing at another, to deleterious effect. Victims risk disbelief, the 
withdrawal of support, and reactive victim scapegoating (van Dijk, 2009) based on how 
they present themselves after victimization. I consider research on the victim label, and 
how discourses of victimhood synergize with rape myths to foster victim hostility, 
which negatively shaped the conversations that I had after sexual violence. 
 If the victim label is untenable, the survivor label offers an escape hatch. I argue 
that it is constructed as a viable alternative to the untenable victim label. Chapter 5 
addresses the survivor imperative, the social directive a victim faces to ‘pull herself up 
by her bootstraps’ and become a survivor. Survivorship is positioned as mutually 
exclusive with victimhood (see Dunn, 2004, 2005; Kelly et al., 1996; Leisenring, 2006; 
Minow, 1993; Proffit, 1996; Schneider, 1993; Thompson, 2000; Wood and Rennie, 
1994; Young and Maguire, 2003). The victim/survivor binary is also framed within a 
journey metaphor, in which a person is figured as getting away from victim status by 
moving toward survivor status (see Curry, 2010; Jordan, 2013; Kelly et al., 1996; Moll, 
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2005; O’Donnell, 2010; Young and Maguire, 2003). These discourses overemphasize 
individual and personal responsibility in the wake of sexual violence, at the expense of 
examining social and political possibilities for change and resistance. 
 Building on the arguments made in Chapters 4 and 5, I critique posttraumatic 
growth (PTG) research. I provide an overview of the field and some prominent 
criticisms of the methods used to study PTG, which rely heavily on self-reported 
measures of personal growth after trauma. I also consider how PTG outcomes privilege 
personal “gains” over social or political resistance. For example, proponents of PTG 
suggest that the act of women exercising more care and caution after sexual violence is 
a positive growth outcome. I problematize these sorts of outcomes as overly 
individualistic, depoliticizing, and contributing to the erasure of gender based violence 
as a social problem.  
 Chapter 7 contains autoethnographic narrative and reflection. This project draws 
from personal experience, and hinges on dismantling the theory/experience divide. 
Thus, I devote a chapter to considering how the theory I develop on in the thesis comes 
to bear on my feminist life. I take up my current relationship to the victim and survivor 
labels and how these labels fluctuate and shift across various relationship contexts. 
 I address major findings and conclusions in Chapter 8, where I draw from 
insights and arguments developed throughout the thesis to explicitly answer my two 
research questions. I find that discourses of victimhood and survivorship manifest in 
everyday conversations, and that people deploy dominant conceptualizations to inform 
their reactions to victim/survivors. I also find that a strong tenor of these interactions 
involves burdening victim/survivors with pressures to heroically overcome, perform 
‘recovery’ in a specific way, and bear the burden of responsibility for mitigating the 
harm done by sexual violence. I suggest that responsibility ought to be dispersed across 
the social world; collective efforts to create a victim-compassionate social world and 
curtail victim-hostile behaviors form an important step in curtailing sexual violence. 
Notes on terminology 
 In this thesis, I set out to take language, especially everyday, conversational 
language, as a site of analysis. Therefore, it seems fitting to elucidate certain 
terminological choices from the outset.  
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 I avoid distinguishing between rape and sexual violence. The terms are not 
readily organised into a continuum, since the effects of different forms of violence vary 
so broadly across a wide range of individual experiences. According to (Muehlenhard 
1998 p41), 
There is no one-to-one correspondence between a sexual act and its meaning 
or consequences… consequences of sexual aggression are affected by the 
complex meanings that people bring to it. 
I use sexual violence as an umbrella term which encompasses but also extends beyond 
rape. 
 Throughout this thesis, I use “victim/survivor” to indicate individuals who have 
experienced sexual violence. I use this dual term to try and encompass and acknowledge 
the diverse identities that various people claim after sexual violence. I have set out to 
examine these labels. However, I do not wish to challenge individual victims or 
survivors who use these terms. My emphasis in on broader discourse, not individual 
choice, and I intend to examine the conditions and constructs that give rise to 
identification as victim, survivor, both, or neither.  
 I refer to victim and survivor interchangeably as terms, labels, and categories. 
When discussing them as ‘terms’, I am referring to them in the broadest sense. When I 
use the words ‘label’ or ‘category’, I am using them synonymously to connote an 
individual’s identification with the term. For example, I might place myself into victim 
or survivor categories alongside others with a similar experience, or they may be labels 
that I claim to suggest my belonging in that category. 
 I also discuss identity negotiation and the use of the victim and survivor labels to 
examine the ramifications of secondary victimization on individual selves and identities. 
According to Brison (2002, p. 4): 
The disintegration of the self experienced by victims of violence challenges 
our notions of personal identity over time, a major preoccupation of 
metaphysics. A victim’s seemingly justified skepticism about everyone and 
everything is pertinent to epistemology, especially if the goal of 
epistemology is… that of feeling at home in the world. 
Victim and survivor are often figured as identity categories. Throughout this thesis, I 
explore the degree to which victim and survivor identities are developed  relationally, 
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and are  discursively constructed. The social nature of identity negotiation gestures 
toward the shared meanings that imbue the terms victim and survivor, while the manner 
in which they are taken up and deployed in turn changes the meaning of the terms over 
time. It is not the case that one is a victim or is a survivor; rather, one does victimhood 
or survivorship, and does them in and through relationships. 
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Part I 
Chapter One: Rape myths, rape culture and secondary victimization 
Chapter Two: Feminist theorizations 
Chapter Three: Autoethnographic methods 
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Chapter One 
Rape myths, rape culture, and secondary victimization 
 In this chapter, I outline the background to my research and review the literature 
that informs my approach, analysis, and scope. I offer a preliminary literature review of 
the core studies pertinent to the entire thesis. Other literature is introduced in later 
chapters, and appears when relevant to the topic under discussion. In this chapter, I 
introduce interdisciplinary feminist research and perspectives around sexual violence 
spanning the last half-century. In discussing the background literature, I focus on the 
prevalence, qualities, and impacts of sexual violence, specifically adult victimization, as 
a social problem. I consider the role that rape myths play in creating a cultural climate 
that fosters sexual violence as well as victim hostility, and the notion of rape discourse. I 
discuss secondary victimization, disclosure, and social support, as well as their effects 
on victim/survivors. I also consider the historical debates that dichotomize the victim 
and survivor categories.  
Rape as a social problem 
 Sexual violence as a social problem has been subject to sustained attention and 
analysis since the second wave of the feminist movement. Beginning in the 1960s, 
consciousness-raising groups and public speak-outs shifted the terrain of sexual 
violence narratives and understandings: what had been considered a personal problem 
was recognized and reconceptualized as a widespread social issue (Griffin, 1979). In 
this section, I open with a brief summary of statistics before moving onto the underlying 
logics—including the “cultural scaffolding of rape” (Gavey, 2019)—that support the 
promulgation of rape and what Sanday (1996) calls “rape-prone cultures”. These 
underlying logics, which draw on a range of corroborating discourses, include: male 
dominance, heteronormativity, rape myths, media representations, and the myth of “real 
rape”. This list is by no means exhaustive, but it sketches the terrain of rape as a social 
issue. 
 I rely on incidence and prevalence data from the United States, since I am an 
American citizen, and since it was my place of residence at the time of the rape and 
during secondary victimization. At the turn of the 21st century, between 18–25% of 
women in the U.S. had experienced some form of attempted or completed rape (Fisher 
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et al., 2000; Tjaden and Thoennes, 1998). According to the National Intimate Partner 
and Sexual Violence Survey (2015 p. 3), 43.5% of women in the U.S. “experienced 
some form of contact sexual violence in their lifetime”. The same study also found one 
in five women survived rape or attempted rape, one in six endured sexual coercion, and 
one in three reported unwanted sexual contact (National Center for Injury Prevention 
and Control, 2015).  
 Race is a significant factor, according to a CDC study conducted by Breinding et 
al. (2011), who carried out a phone survey in 2011 with 12,727 participants. According 
to Breinding et al. (2011), “In the United States, an estimated 32.3% of multiracial 
women, 27.5% of American Indian/Alaska Native women, 21.2% of non-Hispanic 
black women, 20.5% of non-Hispanic white women, and 13.6% of Hispanic women 
were raped during their lifetimes.” 
 Rape is a widespread social issue impacting on the lives of millions of women. 
It is an intersectional issue. Broadly speaking, intersectionality deals with the complex 
and compounding interactions between different forms of oppression. Crenshaw’s (1991 
p. 1245) delineation of structural and political intersectionality are especially relevant to 
this thesis. Structural intersectionality accounts for the lived experiences of gender-
based violence among black women, and the unique barriers to obtaining formal support 
and justice. Political intersectionality accounts for how black women fall through the 
cracks of the feminist movement, which privileges white women, and of the black 
movement, which privileges men. According to Crenshaw (1991 p. 1251–1252), 
“Women of color are situated within at least two subordinated groups that frequently 
pursue conflicting political agendas.” These conflicts form barriers to rendering black 
women’s concerns visible and adequately addressing them. 
 Sexual violence has different manifestations and implications based on 
intersecting oppressions. Gender, race, ethnicity, religion, class, and ability all come to 
bear in sexual violence, which disproportionately impacts persons of color, members of 
the rainbow community, persons with disabilities, and women in poverty (Senn, 2015). 
For example, The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey (James et al., 2015) 
found that 46% of respondents reported some form of sexual violence in their lifetime. 
In the same survey, 22% of trans people also reported being denied access to rape crisis 
treatment or services. Sexual assault by police was reported by 27% of respondents, and 
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those who were incarcerated experienced sexual violence at five times the rate of non-
transgender prisoners. 
 Intersectionality also accounts for limitations regarding formal support and 
access to resources for coping with, responding to, or reporting sexual violence for 
women who are not white, able, middle class, and heterosexual. For example, women 
with intellectual disabilities may struggle to conceptualize and speak about sexual 
violence. Trans women may be subject to further violence by the institutions from 
which they seek support, especially the criminal justice system. Black women and girls 
may feel that services are not meant for them, and therefore require their own spaces for 
healing and support (Burke, 2017; Guerra, 2017). 
 Statistics on rape prevalence and barriers to support and justice are underpinned 
by dominant social norms. Rape myths and the myth of “real rape” partially constitute 
these norms. These myths foster environments that condone rape, erase the agency of 
rapists, and blame victims in a climate of general victim hostility. 
 The myth of “real rape” evokes the image of the stranger in a dark alleyway, 
who uses physical strength, threats of violence, or a weapon to force a woman to have 
sex (Gavey, 2019). These out-of-the-blue experiences of brutality by a stranger 
dominate common conceptualizations of rape, with several consequences. The first is 
what Koss (1985) identifies as the “hidden rape victim”, whose experience is consistent 
with the legal definition of rape, but who has not named their experience as such. This 
hesitation to name experiences as rape is echoed by Wood and Rennie (1994), whose 
interview subjects (all victim/survivors of sexual violence) report taking months or 
years to name their experiences as rape. There is also extensive literature on rape under-
reporting, and the role of reform in reporting practices (Clay-Warner and Burt, 2005; 
Koss, 1985, 1993). 
 The second consequence deals with how people respond to victim/survivors of 
rape: when the experience reported is inconsistent with the myth of “real” rape (Gavey 
and Senn, 2014), it puts the legitimacy of the claim at stake. The delegitimization of 
claims compromises potential access to emotional support and resources for the person 
claiming victim status. Simultaneously, the disclosure itself may result in victim blame. 
The myth of real rape has been developed independently of rape myth research, and I 
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attempt here to handle it as a separate, overlapping issue to rape myths, which I address 
below. 
 Understandings about “real” rape have shifted significantly since the late 1970s. 
Research into sexual violence gained momentum through the 1980s, and elucidated the 
lived experiences of women who had endured rape. Political efforts to tell victim/
survivor stories persisted through that time until today. Awareness of marital and date 
rape, and the grim fact that the vast majority of rapes are committed by men known to 
their victims, have helped shift the landscape of how rape is understood and discussed. 
Gavey (2019, p. 1) summarizes it thus:  
New terms began to enter the vocabulary, drawing attention to the 
possibilities of other forms of rape: acquaintance rape, marital rape, date 
rape. Attention to the problem of date rape had grown to such an extent by 
the 1990s that it had replaced stranger rape as the main focus for rape 
prevention. Date rape has always been a contested and highly controversial 
concept. But, it has weathered the controversy to become an unquestioned 
part of what we now mean by rape. The divide between rape and what was 
once “just sex” has well and truly begun to crumble. Rape is no longer rare. 
It is almost ordinary. 
Feminist activists and researchers have succeeded in making visible the complex roots 
and outcomes of the widespread prevalence of rape and the normalization of gendered 
violence. Dominant understandings of rape seem to have achieved a kind of split 
consciousness: date rape, marital rape, and even the rhetoric of “rape culture” have 
become mainstream. However, rape myths—and the myth of “real rape”—continue to 
hold purchase. Further, rape myths are especially prevalent in communities that hold to 
traditional gender norms, which persist (Burt, 1980; Edwards et al., 2011; Payne et al., 
1999).  
 Heterosexual norms and what Gavey (2019) calls the “cultural scaffolding of 
rape” are also crucial facets in the perpetuation of sexual violence. A core tenet of 
Gavey’s (2019) argument is that the discourses underpinning heterosex rationalize and 
normalize sexual violence. In other words, sexual violence is not an abhorrent, 
abnormal abomination to society: it is a logical extension of what society takes to be 
normal, heterosexual sex. Anderson and Doherty (2007, p. 7) state that: 
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Heterosexual norms therefore provide the discursive building blocks from 
which to construct a denial of rape victim status. A rape victim role claimant 
may be told that her experience was perfectly ‘normal’ and nothing out of 
the ordinary. The alleged perpetrator's behaviour, it may be concluded, was 
unproblematic—he was merely treating the woman’s resistance as part of 
‘natural’ courtship behaviour, and as such he has nothing to account for. 
Not only is rape an extension of heterosex, but male aggression and dominance are also 
considered ordinary. Evolutionary psychological approaches—nurtured by the tendency 
toward biological determinism in a society that privileges scientific knowledge—
maintain that men are biologically aggressive and dominant. This biological perspective 
manifests in media rhetoric, which takes male sexual aggression as given: “boys will be 
boys” (see Berlinski, 2017; Deneuve et al, 2018; Merkin, 2018). 
 Analyses by Anderson and Doherty (2007) and Gavey (2019) draw upon theory 
developed by Hollway (1984, 1989). Hollway proposes a framework of heterosexual 
discourses: the male sexual drive discourse, the have/hold discourse, and the permissive 
discourse. The male sexual drive discourse encapsulates the idea that men always desire 
sex, are always ready for it, and are unable to stop or control themselves when aroused. 
The have/hold discourse upholds the notion that women are motivated by relationships, 
and have sex in order to obtain and maintain a heterosexual male partner. Together, 
these discourses fosters the myth that women deploy a token “no”, men are expected to 
push past that no, and that this constitutes normal heterosexual sex. The permissive 
discourse allows for female sexual desire and initiation of sex, based on a sex drive that 
is comparable to men. Hollway’s framework is useful in outlining dominant 
understandings of normal herterosex, and how they contribute to sexual victimization. 
 Finally, the media represents rape in a manner that contributes to the 
normalization of rape and victim blame, while actively erasing male agency in the 
commission of rape. This erasure is, in part, accomplished by the use of the passive 
voice in reporting on rape, which keeps the alleged perpetrator out of view (Barca, 
2018). Media depictions tend to focus on female behavior and victim blame, rather than 
a rapist’s choices or possible consequences for their actions (Barca, 2018). Augmenting 
Barca’s findings, I noticed that the Stanford rape case provided disturbing examples of 
media preoccupations with the negative impact that rape charges might have on the 
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male perpetrators. Brock Turner, a Stanford undergraduate student and champion 
swimmer, was found guilty of three counts of sexual assault in 2015. Some media 
tended to offer little consideration to the effects of violence on his victim. Later, the 
viral dissemination of the victim’s impact statement subverted prevailing norms and 
drew attention to the harm she had endured. However, disconcerting norms still stand. 
Many of the outlets from which people source their news continue to propagate rape 
myths.  
Rape myths 
 Research regarding cultural attitudes related to sexual violence has focused on 
rape myths, and such studies will be the topic of this section. From the outset, however, 
itis important to note that there are critiques and tensions regarding rape myth related 
work. According to Sanday, “The term rape myth is problematic because it implies a 
disconnected, unreal, ancient attitude” (1993, p. 1415). Instead, she suggests the term 
rape discourse, because it gestures toward common sense, meaning making, and 
representation, and because “discourse is not a single attitude, but a coherent system of 
thought” (1992, p. 1415). She organizes themes within this discourse, and notes how 
they play out in varying contexts, and how better understandings might be applied to 
media coverage of sexual violence cases. While many of these themes bear similarity to 
the categories assessed in rape myth research, her framing them as discursive themes 
and her analysis of media and legal contexts differentiates them from positivistic 
approaches to rape myths. Rape myth research has emphasized quantitative studies to 
assess adherence to rape myths and is based on the supposition that rape myths are 
stable attitudes which have cultural significance if endorsed by a sufficient number of 
people. This positivist approach is somewhat limited, even if it offers some useful 
measures regarding the typologies of, and subscription to, rape related beliefs. 
 Rape myths are endemic to an underlying structure of beliefs that perpetuates 
the cultural scaffolding of rape, and have been a topic of study for four decades. Burt 
(1980) published the first study in rape myth acceptance, building in part on the insights 
developed by Brownmiller (1975) in her seminal text, Against Our Will. Burt (1980) set 
several crucial trends in rape myth research: she linked rape myths to a complex 
structure of other, related beliefs (similar to Sanday’s insight about rape discourse); she 
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introduced rape myth acceptance scales, which formulate the dominant form of study of 
rape myths; and she was the first to define rape myths and stereotypes.  
 I want to linger for a moment on Burt’s groundbreaking definition of rape 
myths. Her definition is foundational, yet later researchers often omit a crucial element 
of her original writing. The portion that later scholars reference emphasizes rape myths 
“as prejudicial, stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists” (see 
Buddie and Miller, 2001; Edwards et al., 2011; Hinck and Thomas, 1999; Lonsway and 
Fitzgerald, 1994; McMahon, 2010; Peterson and Muehlenhard, 1994). However, the full 
quotation reads as follows: 
The burgeoning popular literature on rape (e.g., Brownmiller, 1975; Clark 
and Lewis, 1977) all points to the importance of stereotypes and myths—
defined as prejudicial, stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, 
and rapists—in creating a climate hostile to rape victims. 
Burt’s suggests that a complex belief structure fosters a cultural atmosphere that 
perpetuates rape. Further, Burt highlights the impact these beliefs have in “creating a 
climate hostile to rape victims”. Payne et al. (1999 p. 28) cite this portion of the 
definition, but other researchers omit it. The victim-hostile social world, in which 
victim/survivors seek to recover and reconnect to others, is a central feature in my 
analysis. The synthesis of rape myths with a failure to comply with victim stereotypes 
and notions about what constitutes “real rape” have grave consequences for victims 
(Buddie and Miller, 2001). Buddie and Miller (2001) put forth the notion that beliefs 
about how rape victims ought to react to rape constitutes another domain of rape myths. 
Jordan (2005) addresses these beliefs in her work on mental resistance, I explore victim 
expectations further in Chapter 4, where I consider my experience of the untenability of 
the victim label. 
 I contend that it is vital to keep the final phrase of Burt’s writing in view: that 
the consequence of these ideas and beliefs includes fostering a social reality that is 
hostile to victim/survivors of sexual violence. These consequences are material, and nod 
toward the ways made myths may function as rape discourses, constituting the social 
world. They inflect social interactions with victim/survivors who are endeavoring to 
name their experiences, negotiate victim and survivor labels, and seek support from 
others. Rape myths permeate the assumptions of victim/survivors (Gavey, 1999) as well 
 32
as the attitudes of those from whom they seek support (Ullman, 2010). Therefore, I seek 
to explore the impacts of rape myths and stereotypes on my lived experience of the 
secondary victimization. My method involves analyzing interpersonal interactions in 
Part II. Here, I discuss how rape myths have been defined since Burt’s initial definition, 
and provide a brief overview of the research into rape myths and stereotypes.  
 Rape myths are structured into the assumptions that people—laypeople, 
professionals, and practitioners—use to make sense of sexual violence (Burt, 1980). 
So, too of Sanday’s (1993) rape discourses. Lonsway and Fitzgerald (1994, p. 133) 
provide another, often-cited, theory-based definition of rape myths as “attitudes and 
generally false beliefs about rape that are widely and persistently held, and that serve to 
deny or justify male sexual aggression against women”. Importantly, rape myth 
acceptance has also been linked to rape proclivity (Edwards et al., 2011). 
 The definitions provided by Burt (1980)—and later, Lonsway and Fitzgerald 
(1994)—are the most frequently cited. Lonsway and Fitzgerald (1994) emphasize the 
justification of male violence, while Burt (1980) emphasizes the consequences for 
victims (i.e., hostility toward victims). Suarez and Gadalla (2010, p. 2010), who 
published a meta-analysis of rape myth acceptance research, state that rape myths are 
“false beliefs used mainly to shift the blame for rape from perpetrators to victims”. 
Their definition echoes the others in its emphasis of false beliefs but neglects the impact 
on victims’ lived experience. 
 Rape discourses, myths and stereotypes do not exist in isolation: they are 
inextricably linked to a range of troubling attitudes and beliefs, rendering them robust, 
and therefore difficult to challenge and change. Suarez and Gadalla (2010) suggest that 
rape myths are tied to sexism and correlated with other forms of prejudice. Burt (1980) 
identifies and measures correlates to rape myth acceptance, including sexual 
conservatism, adherence to traditional sex role stereotypes, a general acceptance of 
interpersonal violence, and “adversarial sexual beliefs”—in which men and women are 
viewed as engaging in a sexual battle of mutual exploitation (see also Payne et al., 
1999). 
 The concept of the myth is also worth consideration. According to Payne et al. 
(1999 p. 29), building on Lonsway and Fitzgerald (1994),  
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Within the traditions of psychology, sociology, anthropology, and 
philosophy, the concept of myth is theorized to constitute (1) false or 
apocryphal beliefs that (2) explain some cultural phenomenon and (3) 
whose importance lies in maintaining existing cultural arrangements. 
This framing, specific to rape myth research, is a crucial component to understanding 
rape myths and how they function. They are false. They have an explanatory value that 
is readily available since they are widespread, but the explanations they readily provide 
are inaccurate and harmful. Additionally, they uphold the status quo and reinscribe 
normative understandings of gender and violence. Rape myths serve to normalize 
gendered violence as natural and inevitable. They have a symbiotic relationship with 
stereotypes about male aggression and ‘natural male behavior’. They also dovetail with 
the framing of women as deceptive and manipulative agents who lie about rape having 
occurred or exaggerate its consequences (Burt, 1980; Mardorossian, 2002; Payne et al., 
1999). 
 Sanday (1993) offers a different approach to myths and mythologies, drawing on 
Barthes. She advances the notion of 
mythologies as stories that transform half-truths and speculation into full-
truths with the status of the natural, eternal, and universal. Like discourses, 
mythologies constitute a system of symbols supporting a political agenda 
that guarantees certain social relationships by reference to the eternal 
(Sanday, 1993, p. 1415) 
This definition is suitable to constructivist analysis because it underscores how these 
discourses influence meaning making, and frame certain ideas as common sense. It 
allows for additional nuance in considering how rape related beliefs influence meaning 
making and social interaction. This is a different aim than classic rape myth research. 
While I draw on both in this thesis, my analysis advances Sanday’s discursive approach, 
while drawing on and applying the categories developed in rape myth research. I use the 
term rape myths in this thesis because I am referencing the categories set out by rape 
myth research. I seek to examine these myths and how they function discursively.  
 The main emphasis of rape myth research has been to assess and measure Rape 
Myth Acceptance (RMA) and identify some of its correlates. The Illinois Rape Myth 
Acceptance Scale (IRMA), which refined Burt’s (1980) RMA, involves seven 
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subscales: “(1) She Asked for It, (2) It Wasn’t Really Rape, (3) He Didn’t Mean To, (4) 
She Wanted It, (5) She Lied, (6) Rape Is a Trivial Event, and (7) Rape Is a Deviant 
Event” (McMahon and Farmer, 2011, p. 72; Payne et al., 1999). The IRMA was further 
updated by McMahon and Farmer (2011), who work to detect subtle rape myths, based 
on research suggesting that sexism has become increasingly covert and hidden as social 
acceptability and political correctness gain purchase. They contend that the underlying 
logics of sexism and subtle rape myths remain prevalent, but that measuring the 
phenomena requires updating the language used in RMA scales to reflect the “colloquial 
phrases and sexual slang” of the populations being studied (McMahon and Farmer, 
2011, p. 73). Refining the IRMA in to emphasise colloquial language gestures toward 
one of the preliminary critiques of rape myth research: that the definitions and scales 
vary, rendering it difficult to measure changes over time (Edwards et al., 2011).  
 Rape myth acceptance research demonstrates that large swathes of Americans 
adhere to rape myths to varying degrees. Burt (1980 p. 229) reported two core findings:  
First, many Americans do indeed believe many rape myths. Second, their 
rape attitudes are strongly connected to their deeply held and pervasive 
attitudes such as sex role stereotyping, distrust of the opposite sex 
(adversarial sexual beliefs), and acceptance of interpersonal violence. 
Many rape myths are endorsed by over half of respondents, leading Burt (1980, p. 229) 
to conclude that “the world is indeed not a safe place for rape victims”. Edwards et al. 
(2011, p. 762) succinctly summarize Lonsway and Fitzgerald’s (1994) findings that 
“between 25% and 35% of respondents (both male and female) agree with the majority 
of these rape myths”, and that men are more likely to endorse rape myths than women. 
Buddie and Miller (2001) measured rape myth acceptance, perceptions of rape victims, 
and participants’ perceptions of cultural stereotypes. They found that 57% of 
participants cited “some combination of rape myths and emotional/behavioral reactions 
of victims for their personal beliefs about rape victims” (Buddie and Miller, 2001, p. 
153). McMahon’s (2010) findings suggest that earlier research may underestimate levels 
of RMA; she found that, while overt blame is unlikely, over half of college age 
respondents said the rape was caused by the victims’ behavior. This finding directs 
attention to the need to examine covert and subtle forms of rape myths. As I will explore 
in later chapters, overt blame was not something I often encountered in the period after 
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my assaults. However, subtle rape myths permeated various interactions and caused 
pain and harm, in part by agitating and nurturing self-blame. 
 Edwards et al. (2011) provide a particularly rich analysis of rape myths, which is 
conducive to developing theory around rape myths and their consequences. They set out 
to explore the history, origins, and current permutations of rape myths in American 
culture, while also reviewing the literature. They also engage with the role of the media 
in crafting understandings of rape. Their conclusions provide a crucial basis for this 
thesis. Edwards et al. (2011) note that the main emphasis of RMA studies is to measure 
with Likert scales and written responses, in order to explore how people make sense of 
sexually violent events. In contrast, Edwards et al. (2011) suggest that research should 
include standardized measures, clear definitions, further theorization, clarification of 
what myths are under examination, specification of how many people must endorse a 
myth for it to matter, and implicit versus explicit belief. This is a notably positivist 
approach and overlooks how rape myths are discursively constituted and how complex 
and pervasive they are as a sense making apparatus. Perhaps the merits of these 
positivist approaches are in offering some sense of the scope of adherence to beliefs 
and the scale of their impact, and in advancing definitions of myths. Further attention is 
needed to address the cultural life of rape myths. Those answering the call by Edwards 
et al. (2011) for more theorization may do well to consider social construction and how 
rape discourse constitutes sense making of, and social responses to, rape. This is the 
type of theroization I have set out to do in this thesis. 
 I would add that there is a lack of research into lived implications of rape myths 
for victim/survivors working to endure, ‘recover,’ or ‘survive’ in a victim-hostile social 
climate. In this thesis, I begin to address concerns about implicit versus explicit myths. 
Many responses to my claims of victimhood or disclosing the rapes were met with 
subtle victim blame. As I discuss in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, many people did not 
explicitly state that it was my fault, or that I was to blame. Rather, they insinuated 
blame by inquiring how I could have avoided the rapes, or by suggesting I would only 
recover by taking positive responsibility for having created such a thorough opportunity 
to grow through adversity. Veiled and implicit forms of victim blame were especially 
pernicious, because they were difficult to identify and resist in moments of interpersonal 
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vulnerability. Therefore, I endeavor to explore how rape myths and victim blame play a 
significant role in interpersonal, everyday conversations around victimization. 
Secondary victimization, disclosure, and social support 
 The aftermath of sexual violence may be a time of ongoing injury, which is often 
referred to as secondary victimization. According to Wasco (2003, p. 312), rape is not a 
single event; it is a process that includes survival strategies, “coping, disclosure, and 
help-seeking”, and identity negotiation in the context of “society’s responses to the 
assault”. According to Campbell and Raja (1999, p. 262), “When rape victims’ needs 
are ignored at an organizational level, the treatment survivors receive from individual 
system personnel can be quite devastating.” Campbell and Raja  (1999) elucidate how, 
in organizations and systems, the harm often manifests in interpersonal interactions; it is 
carried out through people mirroring the attitude and policies (or lack thereof) of the 
institution within which they work. They also nod toward the severity of harm done by 
secondary victimization, noting that it can be “devastating”. It may even be referred to 
as a “second rape” (Stringer, 2014, p. 12–13; Campbell et al., 2009, p. 234). 
 Secondary victimization can occur following any type of violent crime, and is 
not limited to rape; however, it has been greatly developed in rape research. According 
to Stringer (2014, p. 12–13),  
prevailing definitions of victims, victimhood, and victimization shape 
social, cultural, scholarly and legal responses to victims, and can do so in 
ways that are profoundly harmful and inequitable, thus constituting 
‘secondary victimization’—a further harm ‘added’ to the original harm, 
which takes place when recognition as a ‘legitimate victim’ is unjustly 
denied, or granted in a marginalizing way. Perhaps the most salient example 
of secondary victimization in feminist accounts is the way criminal justice 
responses to rape, from police responses through rape trials, can stage 
a ‘second rape’, notably by permitting attacks on a complainant’s credibility 
that frame them as the guilty party, eroding their authority and thereby 
neutralizing their complaint. 
The literature on secondary victimization tends to emphasize the legal system, medical 
system, mental health support, and advocacy services (Campbell et al., 2009). In 
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general, the dominant focus of secondary victimization research is on these larger 
systems. 
 For example, legal systems demand that victim/survivors recount the assault, 
and often that they respond to victim-blaming questions. According to Campbell et al. 
(2009, p.234),  
as a result of their contact with legal system personnel, they felt bad about 
themselves (87%), guilty/self-blaming (73%), depressed (71%), violated 
(89%), distrustful of others (53%), and reluctant to seek further help (80%) 
(Campbell, 2005). 
These are stark figures. Courtroom proceedings also create problems by attacking 
victims’ credibility (Stringer, 2014), as well as by failing to prosecute or case attrition 
(Campbell et al., 2009). Studies on secondary victimization found even higher rates of 
these negative feelings for those victim/survivors who encountered the medical system, 
where they were asked intrusive and blaming questions (Campbell et al., 2009; 
Campbell, 2005). Campbell et al. (2009 p. 234) note that problematic treatment of 
victims within systems “can magnify victims’ feelings of powerlessness, shame, and 
guilt”, thus earning the label of secondary victimization.  
 Secondary victimization is also associated with social and institutional harms 
(Campbell and Raja, 1999; van Dijk, 2009) and, in some cases, institutional betrayal 
(Freyd, 2013; Smith and Freyd, 2013); upon having to retell their story, victims are 
subject to misguided and blaming responses from professionals, institutions, and service 
providers. Professionals may deny of help, or offer help that further victimizes 
(Campbell and Raja, 1999). In defining secondary victimization, Campbell and Raja 
(1999, p. 261) write that: 
Rape victims may turn to the legal, medical, and mental health systems for 
assistance, but there is a growing body of literature indicating that many 
survivors are denied help by these agencies. What help victims do receive 
often leaves them revictimized. 
Harm, in these instances, may take a range of forms, including subtle or overt victim 
blame and a reluctance to believe a victim, compounding the stress already faced by the 
victim (Campbell and Raja, 1999). Further harm may occur through institutions lacking 
recourse for victim/survivors, including a lack of confidential services and bureaucratic 
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barricades to seeking support or reporting events (Postmus et al., 2009). Further, word 
gets around about poor institutional responses. According to Walsh et al. (2010 p. 137–
138), “survivors who through social networks become aware of such negative 
experiences may themselves be less likely to seek formal services if they experience a 
sexual assault.” 
 The literature on secondary victimization focuses on failures within social 
services, criminal justice, and police responses to those who have experienced sexual 
trauma. However, research overlooks more intimate realities, including how rape myths 
and dominant discourses around sexual violence permeate interpersonal relationships. 
Consideration of the interpersonal is also relevant to institutional betrayal and secondary 
victimization, because revictimizing responses are enacted by individuals within those 
contexts. Yet these formal environments are different in type and in consequences from 
the responses of friends, family, and community members. According to Jordan (2013, 
p. 53), “On occasions the women felt their family members’ lack of understanding led 
to them acting in ways that felt disempowering and revictimising.” The people who 
make up the day-to-day social world of victim/survivors have a powerful role to play, 
and the harms that occur at home can create an environment in which nowhere feels 
safe. 
 The majority of victims disclose to friends and family before seeking formal 
help (Banyard et al., 2010; Paul et al., 2013). Interactions and conversations about 
victim/survivor experiences extend beyond formal settings, into everyday interactions 
with non-professionals outside institutions. According to Draucker at al., (2009, p. 376), 
“Negative social reactions to disclosures of sexual violences, such as disbelief or blame, 
however, have deleterious effects on recovery.” Friends and family constitute the social 
world of the victim/survivor, and form the social climate of a victim’s post-rape 
experience. My aim in Chapters 4 and 5 is to elucidate the complex ramifications of 
microsocial, everyday responses to me as a victim.  
 Disclosures of sexual violence are sensitive matters. Paul et al. (2013) find that 
two-thirds of university-aged rape victims will tell someone, usually a friend or family 
member. Ahrens et al. (2007, p. 45) find that, “Nearly 70% of the sample first disclosed 
to friends, partners, or family members.” According to Banyard et al. (2010), 80% of 
those who tell anyone will tell a friend first, and fears around how they will be 
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responded to or that the experience won’t be seen as “real rape” influence the choice to 
come forward. Negative responses, based in stigma, blame, and rape myths can silence 
victim/survivors, halt further help-seeking, and incite more severe posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) reactions, whereas positive responses could be comforting (Banyard et 
al., 2010; Ullman, 2010).  
 Banyard et al. (2010) and Paul et al. (2013) also consider how those who hear a 
disclosure feel about receiving it. Paul et al. (2013) find that receiving a disclosure can 
cause anger—at society or the perpetrator—as well as safety concerns. Banyard et al. 
(2010, p. 252) find that “participants felt anger and distress related to a disclosure, 
[reminding] us that unwanted sexual experiences have consequences for people beyond 
individual survivors…” The difficulties faced those who hear disclosures come to bear 
on the victims to whom they respond. Orchowski et al. (2013) suggest that responses to 
disclosures are linked to outcomes: attempts to control the course of action of victim/
survivors are correlated with increased PTSD symptoms, greater self-blame, 
diminished self-esteem, and poor coping. Emotional support increases coping and 
emotional support-seeking (Orchowski et al., 2013). Borja et al. (2006) also find that 
negative informal support is linked to greater PTSD symptomatology.  
 According to Ullman (1999), there is a dilemma around disclosing. Victim/
survivors do not know how others will react and fear poor responses, which creates a 
barrier. According to Ullman (1999), most victims get a mix of positive and negative 
responses: the good reactions are negligible or helpful, while the bad are harmful. 
However, informal support may actually be more helpful than formal support (Ullman, 
1999; Ahrens et al., 2007); the increased benefit of informal support track with findings 
discussed above: medical, legal, and institutional responses are often harmful. 
Furthermore, Ullman and Filipas (2001, p. 1030) note that there is a need for research 
“looking at the correlates of support-seeking from both formal and informal sources”, 
including how social support and positive or negative informal social responses are 
linked to seeking formal support. Ahrens et al. (2007, p. 42) note briefly that informal 
supporters can “mobilize support” by contacting, referring to, or even accompanying 
victim/survivors to formal support providers. However, the link between formal and 
informal support remains unclear. 
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 Ullman (1999) offers a review of literature regarding social supports and their 
influence on victim/survivors of sexual violence. According to Ullman (1999, p. 343): 
Evidence is mixed with regard to the effect of social support, with some 
studies showing no significant effect and others showing positive effects of 
support on postassault recovery. Negative aspects of social relations (e.g., 
negative social reactions), while less studied, show consistent and 
strong negative effects on sexual assault victims. 
She finds that friends are a main source of support, and seem to be most helpful. 
However, they can also be a source of “second injury”, due to the “rejection and lack of 
support from the community, society, and family and friends experienced by many 
victims” (Ullman, 1999, p. 346). Having unsupportive members of a social network is 
linked to worse symptoms. Ullman (1999) also points out that withdrawal may not be 
entirely negative, since it mitigates or prevents the harm done by negative reactions, 
such as blaming, not believing, trying to take control, or trying to distract the victim.  
 These bodies of research on secondary victimization, social support, and 
disclosure responses suggest a need for more research into the interpersonal, everyday, 
social dynamics at play following sexual violence. Secondary victimization research 
tends to focus on institutions and formal responses. I suggest that social support and 
interpersonal responses can be a site of secondary victimization, and that the 
interpersonal requires further consideration in research. I consider much of my own 
experience as a form of secondary victimization, in its more intimate permutations. I 
was subject to blaming questions, asked repeatedly to recount the story, and responded 
to in ways that were heavily informed by rape myths. While most of these settings were 
not formal, they transpired as ordinary interactions in my day-to-day life: secondary 
victimization was, for me, inescapable. In this thesis, I aim to shed light on the intimate 
and everyday dimensions of secondary victimization. 
Victim and Survivor 
 In developing the foundation for this thesis, I reviewed the literature pertaining 
to the dichotomization of the victim and survivor labels. Victim and survivor literature 
raises important questions about identity negotiation vis-à-vis sexual violence and its 
sequelae. In addition, it provides insight into dominant assumptions about the victim 
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and survivor labels. The victim/survivor binary is related to the victim/agent binary—
they are distinct, but they also overlap. While feminist scholars have done little to 
advance theorizations of the victim/survivor dichotomy, they have advanced 
theorizations of the victim/agent binary (see Baker, 2010a; Bay-Chang, 2015; 
Mardorossian, 2002; Stringer, 2014). In establishing the background to this thesis, I 
emphasized the victim/survivor binary, since public vernacular is dominated by the term 
“survivor” rather than “agent”. I attended closely to how the victim/survivor binary has 
been written about and conceptualized in earlier work; early literature perpetuates 
dominant assumptions and norms about the victim and survivor categories that persist 
today, and which are a focus of Part II. I also engage with Jordan’s (2013) recent work 
on “reconceptualising the survivor journey”, which challenges dominant formulations 
by taking the words of victim/survivors seriously. 
 From the 1960s until the early 1980s, second-wave feminism brought gender-
based violence and rape to the foreground of the feminist movement, and illuminated 
the realities of sexual violence in public consciousness. Second wave emphasis on 
sexual victimization formed the groundwork of the third wave in the early 1990s. A 
primary concern in the third wave was with feminist ‘victimism’ (see Stringer, 2014). 
Writers including Wolf, Roiphe, and others, alongside anti-feminists Hoff-Sommers and 
Paglia, lamented the feminist preoccupation with victimization. These critiques included 
the argument that women were prefigured as victims, thus detracting from women’s 
agency. Stringer (2014) elucidates the manner in which these authors criticized ‘victim 
feminists’ and terms the phenomenon, “reverse victimology”. In reverse victimology, 
feminism and candid discussions of victimization are deemed more pernicious sources 
of harm than sexual violence. I explore this theorization in Chapter 2. 
 It was within a largely anti-victim context that initial analysis about victimhood 
vis-à-vis survivorship first unfolded, drawing from Barry’s (1979) insight that women in 
abusive situations are, in fact, enacting agency through the creative strategies they 
deploy to survive violence. In the last two decades, these conceptualizations of the 
victim/survivor binary have gained purchase in dominant vernacular pertaining to 
sexual violence. For example, at the rape crisis center where I obtained counseling (in 
Boston), and in subsequent sexual violence response spaces where I have worked (in 
New Zealand), the term victim has been explicitly sidelined, even forbidden, in favor of 
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the survivor label. When I delivered a lecture on the untenability of the victim category 
in 2019, one student—who volunteers at the campus sexual violence response center—
suggested that the term victim was not acceptable, as it deprives people of agency. The 
student’s statement offers a clear example of how the meaning of survivorship in the 
context of sexual violence and rape crisis feminism has changed in recent decades; 
Stringer (2014) handles this in her discussion of survivorship, which I expand upon 
below. Further, I consider conceptualizations of the label as the source of harm, rather 
than violent events, in Part II. To track these changes in meaning, I examine and analyze 
the origins, as well as the consequences, of the victim/survivor binary throughout this 
thesis.  
 Contributing to the anti-victim work of the early 1990s, Minow (1993) delivered 
a “Surviving Victim Talk” at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA). Minow 
(1993) is concerned about the overuse of the term “victim”, the potential harm done by 
the label, and the quest for alternative language around victimization. Her argument 
emphasizes personal choice and agency, and chastizes the image of the powerless and 
submissive victim. She argues that claiming victim status does little to challenge 
oppression, trivializes violence, and blurs distinctions between degrees of suffering. She 
suggests that victim rhetoric undermines personal strength and responsibility. Minow 
reinforces the notion that victimhood is a pathetic core identity, and that victimhood 
legitimates bad habits and “can have a kind of self-fulfilling quality” (1992, p. 1430). 
Minow echoes the notion of the “victim mentality”, and early victimological 
frameworks that hold that victimization stems from characteristics inherent in 
individuals. Minow  (1992) argues that victim identity is cast as totalizing, and that it 
undermines holistic, multidimensional views of women. In seeking an alternative 
language, Minow (1992) engages the rhetoric of survivorship to discuss the 
transcendence of the victim label. 
 The framework presented by Minow (1992) is a cornerstone to later discussions 
around victimhood and survivorship. She suggests that survivorship may be an 
alternative to the trouble with victim language. Further, Minow (1992, p. 1442) argues 
that:  
we would all be better off if we replaced “either/or” thinking with 
acceptance of “both/and” understandings. A person who is raped and robbed 
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is neither just a victim nor just a multifaceted person who happens to have 
had those experiences.  
This statement sits in tension with her arguments for getting away from the victim label. 
Such tension and complexity is generative, and is reiterated by later scholars, who build 
on her work. 
 Schneider (1993) examines victimhood and agency before introducing the term 
survivor. She challenges feminist work that reiterates “an incomplete and static view of 
women as either victims or agents”, with regard to battered women (1993, p. 387, 
emphasis in original). Similar to Minow, Schneider (1993) criticizes work in which 
victimhood and agency are framed as mutually exclusive and opposing, highlighting 
their overlaps and the resources used by victims to survive and resist on a daily basis. 
Schneider (1993, p. 390) goes on to discuss the term survivor, which was developed to 
“emphasize the human strengths and capacities of battered women who struggle to 
survive, protect themselves and their children, and keep their families functioning”. In 
exploring the victim/agent binary, she argues that agency is too focused on individual 
wi l l and choice , and tha t c la ims of v ic t imiza t ion are “ inevi tab ly 
contradictory” (Schneider, 1993, p. 395). In appealing for “sympathy, solidarity, 
compassion, and attention”, victims become suspect of evading responsibility, of giving 
up on personal strength. Schneider notes that the perils of the victim label are especially 
pertinent with regard to gendered victimization, since victim characteristics overlap 
with traditional ideas about women. She concludes with a call for increased tolerance 
for “contradiction, ambiguity, and ambivalence in women’s lives” (Schneider, 1993, p. 
397). Schneider’s useful insight is reiterated by several feminists writing about the 
victim and survivor label, but she does little to explore the details of these 
contradictions. 
 Proffit (1996) takes up the tensions between victim and survivor identity as 
opposing identity categories. She discusses victim and survivor as mutually exclusive 
labels, in which “survivor appears as the mirror image of victim, the other end of the 
victim–survivor dichotomy” (Proffit, 1996, p. 25). She challenges the dichotomoy, and 
critiques the one-dimensionality of both victim and survivor identity categories. 
Drawing on Barry’s notion of victimism, Proffit (1996) argues that any label, including 
the term survivor, persists in prioritizing violence with regard to identity formulation, 
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and strips complexity and whole personhood from those who survive violence; whether 
called victims and survivors, those signified are still defined in relation to violence and 
oppression. Proffit examines the implications of violence on identity in social work 
practice, where social workers’ responses to spousal abuse are rife with preconceived 
notions about battered women’s agency. Proffit (1996) criticizes experts who fail to 
realize how their work with battered women, and the assumptions they bring to that 
work, are actively constructing battered women as a category, and thus shaping battered 
women’s lived experiences. Proffit’s insights dovetail well with Alcoff and Gray’s 
(1994) assertion that expert responses to victims risk reshaping transgressive speech in a 
manner that recuperates dominant discourse.  
 Wood and Rennie (1994) add to the chorus of researchers calling for a more 
complex view of victims and survivors to challenge the binary formulation of victim 
and survivor. They interview eight subjects and discuss two prevalent themes: the 
challenging process of naming or identifying the rape event (and subsequently 
identifying themselves in relation to rape over time), and the role of male perpetrators in 
these formulations. They find that there are tensions in the discourses and narratives 
deployed by victim/survivors, who struggle to cast themselves as agents while 
attempting to convey the experience as real rape. Theirs is the first study that actively 
and demonstrably complicates the binary. They illuminate the ambiguity of victimhood 
and survivorship by analyzing qualitative data from victims and survivors. Wood and 
Rennie (1994, p. 127) also note that:  
Feminist researchers often use the term rape survivor in order to avoid some 
of the negative connotations of the term victim. But the construction of yet 
another category is an unsatisfactory solution to the complex issue of victim 
identity, blame and control. (emphasis in original) 
They discuss how their participants use various discourses, including feedback from 
professionals, to convey victim or non-victim identities. On the whole, the responses 
provided by their participants challenge simplistic views of victimhood or survivorship 
as mutually exclusive, and demonstrate the limits, tensions, and overlaps of the 
categories. 
 Wood and Rennie (1994) mark a pivot toward greater nuance in debates about 
victimhood and survivorship. They are the first to give shape to calls by previous 
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researchers for complex and nonbinary formulations of victimhood and survivorship. 
Kelly et al. (1996) advance efforts to examine the complexity of the terms. Their work 
responds to a wave of anti-victim writing in what they term “commercialized 
feminism”, or popular, mass-market feminism. Kelly et al. (1996) are concerned with 
the oversimplification of the terms victim and survivor. They advocate for the 
coexistence of victim and survivor identities, and argue that attempts to dichotomize 
victimhood and survivorship negate active forms of resistance deployed to survive 
victimization. They discuss the “victim/survivor dichotomy” to refer to the mutually 
exclusive use of the terms. This dichotomy positions victim and survivor 
as oppositional, where the term victim is negative, and survivor is positive. According 
to Kelly et al. (1996, p. 92), 
Rather than challenge the stigmatizing meaning of ‘victim’ as initially 
intended, it is, in fact, reinforced, with the only route out being an 
identification with, or attribution of, the alternative of ‘survivor’. 
They argue that while some individuals may benefit from the survivor identity to “move 
forward”, others benefit from lingering with the victim label and the harm done by 
violence.  
 Kelly et al. (1996) also criticize the therapeutic and self-help turn 
in conceptualizations of sexual victimization and its effects. They cite the popularity of 
the journey metaphor, especially in therapeutic settings, and the ways in which victim 
and survivor are often framed as stages or phases in a longer process. They offer 
an alternative conceptualization in which victimization is a statement of fact regarding 
an event, and survivorship pertains to what is done in response to that event, either 
immediately or over the long term. Furthermore, they warn that frameworks espousing 
healing or recovery are unrealistic and potentially harmful. Kelly et al. (1996) were the 
first to identify some of the patterns and themes I explore in this thesis. In Chapter 5, I 
advance their theorization through substantive engagement with how victim and 
survivor came to be configured as a narrative arc. I build on my own examination of the 
discursive roots of each term in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 Thompson (2000, p. 325) attempts to build upon, and complicate, these 
frameworks by arguing that research into sexual violence overlooks the long-term 
‘“positive outcomes” that survivors identify as being related to the experience of sexual 
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harm. These ‘positive’ impacts are personally positive rather than socially positive: they 
involve personal growth rather than political resistance or social change. Thompson 
perpetuates the victim–survivor dichotomy, positioning the negative valence of the 
former against the positive connotations of the latter. She also uncritically emphasizes 
the linear narrative arc by which one flees victimhood and claims survivorship. On the 
whole, Thompson’s (2000) analysis maintains consistency with dominant discourse. She 
analyzes participant comments in a manner consistent with those norms, rather than 
looking beyond them to explore novel meanings articulated by participants. 
 Young and Maguire (2003, p. 40) seek to expand on Wood and Rennie’s (1994) 
work, particularly how norms around naming and labeling force victim/survivors to fit 
their experience into dominant discursive frameworks. Echoing Kelly et al. (1996), they 
discuss the term victim as stating what occurred, while the term survivor emphasizes the 
response, and possible recovery or moving on; they conceive of these meanings within 
the narrative arc of moving from victim to survivor. Young and Maguire (2003, p. 49) 
discuss the continuum and journey metaphors by which one transcends victimhood, 
stating that participant responses suggest that, “It’s not that you are a victim or you are 
a survivor. Instead, you move from one end where something was done to you (victim) 
to where you do something about it (survivor)” (emphasis in original). Their approach 
suggests that the discourse of survivorship overlaps with notions of agency. In 
concluding, they suggest reconceptualizing the aftermath of sexual violence in terms of 
“prevailing”—they seek a new term to open up linguistic possibilities for making sense 
of and labeling oneself in relationship to sexual violence. Their suggestion runs counter 
to the critique offered by Kelly et al. (1996) and Wood and Rennie (1994), who contend 
that new labels fail to destigmatize victim status. 
 Dunn (2004) reviews the literature regarding the emergence of the survivor label 
and its application to battered women, accounting for shifts toward the discourse of 
survivorship and exploring its effects. She discusses frameworks in which survivorship 
is positioned as a remedy to the stigma of victimization, since survivorship is 
constructed as agentic in comparison to the innocence, blamelessness, and weakness 
associated with victims. Echoing Thompson (2002), Kelly et al. (1996), and Proffit 
(1996), Dunn (2004, p. 2) critiques how the two labels are “at opposite poles of an 
agency continuum”, creating a “discursive dichotomy” privileging survivorship. 
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 Dunn (2004) also engages with survivorship, victimhood, and agency. She 
considers Barry’s (1979) critique of feminist emphasis on the victim label, Lamb’s 
(1996, 1999) claim that victims have been over-purified in a manner that erases agency, 
and Kelly et al.’s (1996) contention that feminists have historically overlooked women’s 
resistance and positive, creative coping. She questions why victim identity continues to 
have purchase when it is “inherently stigmatizing” (Dunn, 2004, p. 22). Further, she 
argues that victim/survivors are a mixed, heterogeneous, and complex group, whose 
identities and stories do not fit into tidy categorizations. She also suggests that the 
stigma of victim identity can undermine victims’ goals for obtaining support, while 
survivor identity may limit help-seeking, and shifts responsibility to individuals in 
counterproductive ways. 
 In a separate article, Dunn (2005, p. 235) engages “the politics of empathy” and 
constructions of victims in activism. Dunn charts the shift among activists 
and storytellers from an early focus on “emotionality and their victimization” toward 
emphasizing “rationality and their agency” (2005, p. 1). She explores how narratives are 
developed to garner emotional investment, by delivering characters and arcs that are 
recognizable within dominant discourse. Dunn is interested in how political 
mobilization happens through storytelling—how stories are told, what is presented as 
the real issue, and the manner in which causes and solutions are framed.  
 Dunn (2005) further explores the dichotomy between victimhood and agency, 
and how playing to the cultural privileging of agency is strategic for activists: it draws 
on shared cultural repertoires to craft narratives that evoke emotions which propel 
action. According to Dunn (2005, p. 238), brokering sympathy involves rendering 
victimization in recognizable narratives. As I will argue in later chapters, defaulting to 
recogn izab le na r ra t ives does l i t t l e to cha l l enge norms o r change 
dominant understanding. 
 Following Dunn, Leisenring (2006) discusses wife battering and the negotiation 
of victim and survivor categories. Leisenring (2006) argues that there are complex, 
multiple, and conflicting discourses around victimhood. Those who experience 
victimization draw on many available discourses to reject or claim victim identity after 
an event. The manner in which individuals negotiate victim discourse can signal to 
friends or law enforcement that one was harmed, wronged, or mistreated, and can help 
 48
individuals obtain support and assert rights; however, they can also prompt blaming 
responses. Citing Dunn (2005), Leisenring notes that survivorship is one means by 
which people circumnavigate the minefield of victimhood, since it foregrounds personal 
strength and survival. Leisenring (2006) also cites Proffit (1996, p. 29), who argues that 
survivorship prioritizes “victimization, pain, and loss”, as a central feature in identity. 
According to Leisenring (2006), the victim label is limited, but also potentially fosters 
sympathy; battered women draw from dominant discourse, while engaging in creative 
ways with agency and survivorship. While victimhood is negative, Leisenring (2006, p. 
312) suggests that the term survivor has a positive valence, and “implies qualities such 
as agency, coping, resistance, decision making, recovery and survival”. 
 The literature on victimhood and survivorship, and the relationship between the 
categories, tapers after Leisenring with two notable exceptions: Stringer’s (2014) 
comments on survivorship in her discussion of victim politics and rape crisis feminism, 
and Jordan’s (2013, p. 49) work that “challenges the concept of a journey ‘from victim 
to survivor’”. Jordan (2013) considers survival strategies during a rape event, and also 
in engagement with law enforcement and institutions. Jordan (2013) frames rape 
survival as ongoing, and challenges the dominant frame that holds therapy as essential 
to progressing from the negative valences of victimhood to the “positive state” of 
survivorship. Jordan (2013, p. 49) claims that we need “a more complex and nuanced 
understanding of how victims survive, and how such a view might hold practical 
implications for those subsequently engaging with victim/survivors of sexual violence”. 
She emphasizes survival in formal settings, which is consistent with existing literature 
on secondary victimization; yet, Jordan also gestures toward everyday interactions with 
friends and family. These are important considerations regarding the history of the 
survivor label and the role of social relationships in recovery. 
 Stringer (2014) makes important distinctions about survivor discourse in the 
contexts of rape crisis feminism and anti-victimism, She attends to shifts in the meaning 
of the survivor label as it relates to the victim label. One crucial difference is that, in the 
rape crisis context, the survivor label challenges victim blame, while in the anti-victim 
context, it bolsters it (Stringer, 2014). Further, according to Stringer (2014, p. 78), 
claims of the survivor label in a rape crisis context do not eschew the victim label or 
deny that victimization occurred: “Instead, ‘survivor’ is used because it incorporates 
 49
acknowledgement that victimization took place.”  Understanding the survivor label in a 
manner that upholds claims of victimization opens possibilities for nuanced 
articulations of the victim and survivor labels in a rape crisis context.  
 Stringer (2014) also accounts for the uses and connotations of the victim label in 
rape crisis settings. For example, according to Stringer (2014, p. 30), 
Rape crisis feminists distinguish between victimization as an experience and 
victim as a social identity arising out of experience, encouraging victims to 
ensure victimization does not define who they are. 
In Chapter 4, I examine my own delineation between victim as an identity versus as a 
description of events that occurred. In later chapters, I problematize the notion that 
victim identity or experience is totalizing. Stringer (2014, p. 30) also discuses how the 
“ethos of survivorship” was intended to resist the stigma of the victim label and 
highlight “their capacities for self-definition, strength and resistance”. I take up these 
characteristics of survivorship, and the manner they are used to distance from the victim 
label, in Chapter 5. 
 Aside from Jordan (2013) and Stringer (2014), researchers since Leisenring have 
tended to label their subjects as either ‘victim’ or ‘survivor’. Two common threads in 
victim and survivor literature are worth noting. The first, which Leisenring (2006, p. 
313) summarizes well, is that, “One cannot simultaneously be a passive victim and an 
agentic survivor.” This quotation is a summation of the dominant discourse either 
challenged or championed within scholarly discussions of victimhood and survivorship. 
While Kelly et al. (1996), Wood and Rennie (1994), and Dunn (2004, 2005) most 
directly challenge a binary formation of vicim and survivor, Minow (1993), Schneider 
(1993), Proffit (1996), Thompson (2000), Young and Maguire (2003), and Leisenring 
(2006) identify and critique their binary formulation while reinscribing it. These 
tensions will be explored in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
 Second, Kelly et al. (1996), Minow (1993), Proffit (1996), Schneider (1993), 
and Leisenring (2006) each caution about the limiting potential of basing identity off 
victimizing events. Victimhood is framed as a dominating identity, which becomes a 
core facet of the self, leaking into and pervading all aspects of a victim’s life. Emphasis 
on the risks of the victim label as a dominant, encompassing, and eternal identity lacks 
real-world substantiation, and propagates anti-victimist myths about the eternal nature 
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of victim identity more than it elucidates a lived reality. This framing of victimhood 
seems to build on the anti-victim rhetoric of the early 1990s, and is a common refrain in 
early literature on victimhood and survivorship. As I will explore in later chapters, 
scholarly framings of victimhood are often based on assumptions, rather than critical 
analysis, and risks promulgating dominant discourses rather than challenging ideas 
about victims that may do further harm. 
Conclusion  
 In this chapter, I have provided an overview of rape myths, the cultural 
scaffolding of rape, and the discourses of victimhood and survivorship in literature on 
gender-based violence. I have done so to provide some groundwork for later analysis. In 
Chapters 4 and 5, I explore the construction of the victim category and how it is situated 
in opposition to survivorship in everyday discourse around sexual violence. By 
providing an outline of the debate around victimhood and survivorship since Barry 
(1979), I hope to advance theorizations of the victim and survivor labels and their 
relationship.  
 Throughout this thesis, I consider the lived impacts of rape myths and the 
cultural scaffolding of rape. Rape myths are a significant contributing factor to rape as a 
social problem, supporting its proliferation and supporting victim-hostile sense-making 
and responses. However, their personal impact on victims has been largely unexamined.  
 In the next two chapters, I consider feminist theorists who have contributed to 
my approach to this thesis, and outline the autoethnographic method I used in this 
research. Taken together, these theoretical and methodological underpinnings provided 





The quality of light by which we scrutinize our lives has direct bearing upon 
the product which we live, and upon the changes which we hope to bring 
about through those lives. 
– Audre Lorde (2007a) 
Living/Theorizing  
 I derive much of the content of this thesis from the fifteen year process by which 
I became a feminist. The theorizations I develop here are wrested from harsh realities in 
my own life. I came to understand these realities in light of feminist theory, which forms 
not only the basis for this thesis, but also the basis for how I approached and responded 
to my lived experience. Feminist theory shaped my reality in tangible ways. It is a sense 
of the stakes in feminist work that has motivated my desire to do this project. In the 
current chapter, I elucidate and articulate these feminist foundations, and consider how 
my thesis advances feminist theory. 
 I have constructed this chapter to enact what Ahmed (2017) describes as 
dragging theory back to life. Ahmed (2017) challenges the division of theory and 
experience, and advances the notion that feminist theory also consists of the work that 
we do at home and in everyday life. Ahmed’s approach blurs distinctions between life 
and work, between the personal, political, and professional, in meaningful and creative 
ways. Feminist theoretical work has lived ramifications, and I wish to foreground praxis 
and the knowledge that derives from it in this thesis. This is not to say that I privilege 
experience over theory. Rather, following from Ahmed (2017), I show how they are 
interwoven and mutually generative. I begin this chapter with considerations of 
Ahmed’s (2017) Living a Feminist Life, which is a poetic and accessible work of theory 
based in the realities of living as a feminist. 
 Next, I consider Brison’s (2002) Aftermath, which afforded me a valuable 
perspective and approach to writing theory related to lived experiences of sexual 
victimization and its consequences. Brison’s (2002) work bolsters the argument for 
taking an autoethnographic approach that avoids overgeneralization, but still treats a 
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singular victim perspective as valuable. She asserts the need to take a victim’s 
knowledge and epistemological perspective seriously, thereby bolstering both 
autoethnographic and feminist theoretical approaches to theorizing sexual violence. 
 Later in this chapter, I tell some of my feminist story, and the role of several 
feminist thinkers in fostering my ability to endure and understand the events that form 
the raw material of this thesis. Audre Lorde and Gloria Anzaldúa were among the first 
feminists who had an influence on my work. I read Lorde for the first time in 2006, 
during my second year as an undergraduate, and Anzaldúa in my first year of my 
Masters program, in 2010. Their ideas gave me strength and courage to resist victim 
hostility on an almost daily basis, and to treat my own life as a source of knowledge. 
Emboldened by their writing, I theorized, analyzed, and worked on my life as it 
unfolded—both the realities of rape, and of living in a context of victim hostility and 
secondary victimization.  
 In early 2015, a year after receiving my Masters of Divinity degree, I 
encountered Rebecca Stringer’s work. Reading her book Knowing Victims was an ‘aha!’ 
moment: it validated some of my own intimations, deepened my understandings, and 
gave me new language to theorize and analyze lived experience. Stringer (2014) 
provided new insights and frameworks that advanced my understanding of the 
conditions of the post-rape reality I had lived. In a construct she terms “neoliberal 
victim theory”, Stringer (2014, p. 9) illuminates several key discourses that shaped my 
social world and inflected how others responded to the sexual violence I endured. I 
discuss these in depth below. 
 My relationship to these authors formulates what I call feminist company (see 
Ahmed, 2017), which is an intimate, intellectual collectivity that thrives through shared 
ideas. Long before encountering sexual assault and victim hostility, I began to conceive 
of certain theorists as companions. Their work provided a sense of solidarity and 
companionship across time and space, and induced a sense of solidarity in my 
intuitions, inclinations, and observations about dynamics of marginalization. Ahmed 
(2017) discusses companionship texts and their emboldening potential—their vital role 
in living a feminist life. My use of the language of companionship predates my 
encounter with Ahmed, and yet her work offers me new language for a long-held 
understanding, and an awareness that it is shared by other feminists: it is part of the 
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legacy of feminist writing. The theorists I discuss below have enhanced my language 
for writing and thinking as a feminist and autoethnographer. In this chapter, I set out the 
formative role that feminist company has had in the development of my own ideas and 
arguments, and begin to consider how this thesis advances their theoretical frames. 
Feminist living and learning 
 Ahmed’s Living a Feminist Life (2017) is a work of theory. In it, she unpacks 
stories and insights gleaned in real life, in a feminist life. Ahmed (2017) deals 
extensively with the manner in which living a feminist life entails theorizing and 
learning through living, through ongoing confrontations with “what comes up” when 
attempting to inhabit and exist in a world that marginalizes and excludes people on the 
basis of gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, and ability.  
 Ahmed’s (2017) theoretical approach is one of form as much as content: she 
works ideas from multiple angles, meandering through stories and analysis, playing 
with language to refashion it as a tool that can be used to dismantle oppression as it is 
lived through, endured, and resisted. She weaves complex narratives and insights, 
reflecting the manner in which theory gained from life is applied to life in process. We 
learn as we go. Early in the text, she explicates the logic underpinning her approach, 
writing that: 
The personal is theoretical. Theory itself is often assumed to be abstract: 
something is more theoretical the more abstract it is, the more it is 
abstracted from everyday life. To abstract is to drag away, detach, pull away, 
or divert. We might then have to drag theory back, to bring theory back to 
life. (Ahmed, 2017, p. 10) 
Her book puts this idea into practice, bringing theory into living, bringing theory to life, 
doing and developing theory in living as a tool for persisting in contexts of oppression 
and marginalization. Ahmed (2017) elucidates how our understandings of the familiar 
limp—how, in living a feminist life, we run up against what we cannot thoroughly 
understand, and stumble headlong into questions we cannot answer and things we 
struggle to resolve (Ahmed, 2017). Theorizing is not an abstract process; it is lived. 
Those things we attempt to grasp are embedded within the fabric of our daily lives, and 
have material consequences. 
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 Ahmed also writes about “sweaty concepts”, which are those ideas we develop 
from sitting with what is not immediately graspable, needs to be worked on, and is 
developed through difficulty. She frames it as “another way of being pulled out from a 
shattering experience” (Ahmed, 2017, p. 12). Sweaty concepts are the pearls agitated 
into being by a marginal body that is not at home, is at work to inhabit the world. 
According to Ahmed (2017, p. 12), “The task is to stay with the difficulty, to keep 
exploring and exposing this difficulty.” In my experience of developing sweaty 
concepts, there are points where intellectual efforts to appraise and comprehend the 
matter at hand falter and fail. In such moments, I need new frameworks. 
 At the points where intellect and ideas failed, I often give over to ‘not knowing’, 
to a more embodied process of feeling my way through unknown terrain. I explore how 
such an approach infused my methodological approach to this thesis, in Chapter 3, 
where I discuss Page’s (2017) use of vulnerable writing as a feminist methodology. 
Ahmed (2017, p. 12) writes that, “Ideas might be how we work with as well as on our 
hunches, those senses that something is amiss, not quite right…” Adding to this, I 
suggest that feeling in the dark is a useful tool to augment thinking. 
 In her “Killjoy Survival Kit”, Ahmed (2017) discusses how survival can be 
about maintaining hope for change and how “Survival here refers not only to living on, 
but to keeping going in the more profound sense of keeping going with one’s 
commitments” (Ahmed, 2017, p. 235). Her text is an exploration of the personal, 
professional, political, and intellectual ramifications of living by those commitments, 
and of the learning that happens when one lives in such a way. She uses personal 
narrative and experience as sites of inquiry and insight throughout her book. 
 As I struggled to conceptualize the underlying theoretical framework for this 
thesis, Ahmed’s work forced me to grapple with how, in living a feminist life, in 
responding to my life in a feminist way, I was doing feminist theory. I had long been 
“learn[ing] from how the same things keep coming up” (Ahmed, 2017, p. 9). In the 
years after my rapes, I struggled against victim hostility and rape myths among those 
whom I trusted in a distinctly feminist manner: I resisted; I theorized; I built solidarity 
with others who had been victimized. I was working constantly to understand my own 
life as it unfolded, to consider why people responded to me in ways that felt distancing, 
isolating, othering, and marginalizing. I wanted to understand the wider social context 
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feeding into these dynamics that caused further harm, which I later began to 
conceptualize as secondary victimization.  
 In the years immediate after the rapes, I knew that something was amiss in my 
social world, that it was exacerbating my suffering, but I did not have a name for it. 
Further, my attempts to name these dynamics as harmful were met with denial. If the 
rape itself was a deep wound, the social realities of victim hostility were salt that was 
rubbed into it daily. I was trying to understand what had happened to me at the hands of 
my rapist, and what was continuing to happen to me after the escape. Meanwhile, 
people around me continued to insist that there was nothing to understand or fight 
against: the problem was in my head, it was me; the events of the Amazon were 
something I had brought on myself. If there was a problem in the real world (in this 
case, sexual violence), it wasn’t one that could be addressed—often, when I raised the 
issue, I was met with the adage that “this isn’t the place for this conversation”. It 
seemed that those around me were ill-equipped to listen, or to make sense of my life’s 
events without blaming me, the victim. 
 Sara Ahmed’s work was a revelatory addition to my PhD research and writing, 
and settled the foundations of the work. Engaging with her work brought me back to my 
earliest encounters with writings by radical women of color, who offered me a 
foundational conceptual approach to living and theorizing my life and experience. 
Therefore, I turn to Ahmed’s engagement with the work of Audre Lorde (who, she says, 
offered her a lifeline), bell hooks, and Gloria Anzaldúa: 
Here was writing in which an embodied experience of power provides the 
basis for knowledge. Here was writing animated by the everyday: the detail 
of an encounter, an incident, a happening, flashing like insight. Reading 
black feminist and feminist of color scholarship was life changing: I began 
to appreciate that theory can do more the closer it gets to the skin. (Ahmed, 
2017, p. 10) 
I explore Lorde and Anzaldúa’s role in the theoretical basis for this thesis below. 
 Ahmed (2017, p. 162) discusses some of the ramifications of living a feminist 
life in the later chapters of her book, where she says feminism is “what we need to 
handle the consequences of being feminist.” She explores the fatigue and exhaustion of 
coming up against walls, of being marked as the problem by naming the problem, of 
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being embattled in a fight that we did not choose, and of being blamed for reaching a 
break point as if we do it to ourselves. In response, she writes about breaking or 
brokenness: 
Perhaps we need to develop a different orientation to breaking. We can 
value what is deemed broken; we can appreciate those bodies, those things, 
that are deemed to have bits and pieces missing. Breaking need not be 
understood only as the loss of integrity of something, but as the acquisition 
of something else, whatever that else might be. (Ahmed, 2017, p. 180) 
Ahmed’s reframing of breaks and broken things is useful in considering 
conceptualizations of victimhood, and of the possibility of a shattered self after sexual 
trauma (which I discuss in Chapter 6). Embracing brokenness allows for a gathering of 
broken pieces to create something new, something powerful and potentially political. 
 According to Ahmed (2017, p. 185), her framing of brokenness gives rise to 
possibilities for a queer crip politics: “A queer crip politics might involve a refusal to 
cover over what is missing, a refusal to aspire to be whole.” Victimhood, as I discuss in 
Chapter 4, is a broken category, and encompasses those who are ruined by sexual 
violence or else deemed to have a victim mentality—and thus, an inherent fault. The 
victim label is disavowed in part to eschew perceptions of brokenness. However, I 
suggest that there is liberatory potential in claiming brokenness, and that doing so in the 
context of victimhood may be politicizing. 
 Ahmed (2017) also addresses the “feminist snap”: the point at which bonds, 
relationships, and ties are snapped, when a feminist reaches her breaking point. She 
offers a critique of resilience, arguing that it is a discourse that encourages individuals 
to toughen up in the face of immense pressure and oppression and “keep taking 
it” (Ahmed 2017, p. 189). The snap happens when feminists stop taking it: it is an 
ending and a beginning. It may seem to happen in an instant, but it has a history, has 
built up to over time. The snap can generate relief and open new possibilities for living 
a feminist life, even if doing so requires resignations, or rupturing bonds.  
 I think of Ahmed’s (2017) writing about “good company”, “companion texts”, 
and “feminist collectivity” as an antidote to the feminist snap. In the early days of my 
feminist awakening, Lorde and Anzaldúa were my first companions. Stringer was a vital 
addition, years down the track. Brison added new styles and insights to the process. 
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More recently, Ahmed joins the gang. I carry these women’s ideas in my work and my 
life. They offer insight and a sense of solidarity in resistance. Their ideas permeate my 
own thinking and this thesis, harkening what Ahmed (2017) refers to as the practice of 
feminist citation. According to Ahmed (2017, p. 16): 
Citation is feminist memory. Citation is how we acknowledge our debt to 
those who came before us; those who helped us find our way when the way 
was obscured because we deviated from the paths we were told to follow. 
Citation is an intimate form of interlocution and intellectual companionship. The theory 
we do as feminists creates new contexts and concepts that are critical to our own 
survival. It was feminist companionship that enabled me to endure, to live, to snap. It 
helped me weather multiple storms; it made me staunch. It is this type of relationship to 
feminist theory that propelled my thesis, even before I could name its impact or role in 
the work. 
Learning in the aftermath 
 Susan Brison’s (2002) Aftermath: Violence and the remaking of a self deals with 
various sequelae of sexual violence and attempted murder, and weaves together feminist 
philosophy and theory with personal narrative and reflection. Encountering her work 
provided me with the theoretical bedrock and insight to augment what I had found in 
Lorde, Anzaldúa, and Stringer, whom I discuss below. Of the theorists who have most 
strongly informed the basis of my research, Brison is the only one who dedicates an 
entire work to her experienced sexual victimization. In doing so, she creates scope for 
valuing victims’ perspective in feminist philosophy and research. 
 Brison positions the necessity of the victim perspective in various fields from 
the outset of her book. She argues against the notion that scholarly writing about the self 
is self-indulgent, instead positing self-narrative and insight as “a welcome antidote to 
scholarship that, in the guise of universality, tends to silence those who most need to be 
heard” (Brison, 2002, p. 6). Brison (2002, p. 25) points out the “risk of overgeneralising 
(as well as under-generalizing).” Building on her advice about overgeneralizing, I wish 
to state explicitly that I am not speaking for all victim/survivors; I hope my inclusion of 
backstory has helped in outline the position from which I write. In the chapters ahead, I 
aim to phrase my findings in a manner that resists overgeneralization by explicitly 
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restating how findings stem from personal experience. This is to “refrain from 
overgeneralising in [my] conclusions” (Brison, 2002, p. 30). 
  Brison is careful and cautious in her privileging of marginal voices and 
centering of victims’ perspectives: she suggests speaking together, which can elicit 
cautious insights and understandings that are useful, if limited in their generalizability. 
This ties in well with an intersectional approach, since each victim’s perspective is 
reflective of their interlocking experiences of race, class, gender, access to resources, 
ability, and so on. The value of recognizing limited scope is echoed by Page (2017), 
whose work on vulnerable writing I discuss in the following chapter.  
 Writing about the self is, according to Brison (2002), useful to other forms of 
scholarship: it is a necessary augmentation and addition. Self-based writing offers a lens 
into lived experience in a manner similar to Ahmed’s challenge to the division between 
theory and experience: in living, we learn, we see things that can only be seen from 
within experience, and we are able to apply academic tools that enable us to understand 
and analyze our experiences as they are lived. According to Brison, 
the discussion of sexual violence in—or as—art could use the illumination 
provided by a victim’s perspective. Perhaps the most important issues posed 
by sexual violence are in the areas of social, political, and legal philosophy, 
and insight into these, as well, requires an understanding of what it’s like to 
be a victim of such violence. (2002, p. 4) 
Emphasis on lived experience, on what it’s like to endure victimization and its 
aftermath, is the foundation of her book. She goes further, challenging philosophers to 
admit the value of diverse voices, to resist abstraction and universalization; she argues 
that, “Some topics, however, such as the impact of racial and sexual violence on 
victims, cannot even be broached unless those affected by such crimes can tell of their 
experiences in their own words” (Brison, 2002 p. 6).  
 Brison is concerned with the aftermath: with accounts of how social realities 
impinge on human lives, from a victim’s perspective. She constructs Aftermath based on 
the claim that a victim’s perspectives have value; she values victim voices and affords 
them credibility, even as she recognizes that any individual voice is necessarily limited 
in scope and not universal. This is important in light of the insight that “survivor’s 
views on sexual violence will often enjoy less credibility than anyone else’s” (Alcoff 
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and Gray, 1993). Brison extends this credibility without valorizing victim’s voices, 
which would champion victim perspectives as more legitimate or important than others. 
She also avoids distilling the victim voice to a singular voice. 
 Among the insights in the book, and among the larger foundational elements of 
this thesis, is Brison’s insight that the aftermath, the reconstruction of the self, and the 
processes following sexual violence are relational. Memories are formed and 
constructed in a social context. Individual stories are laden with history and social 
meaning. She discusses how relationships to others in the aftermath impact upon 
survival and reconstructing a traumatized self. According to Brison (2002, p. 62), 
Trauma survivors are dependent on empathic others who are willing to 
listen to their narratives. Given that the language in which such narratives 
are conveyed and are understood is itself a social phenomenon, this aspect 
of recovery from trauma also underscores the extent to which autonomy is a 
fundamentally relational notion. 
She emphasizes that the process by which trauma survivors come to grips with their 
situation is predicated on how others respond to them. She also notes some of the 
factors that limit these responses: how many people lack opportunities to learn the skills 
to empathize, listen to, and speak with victims; how victim blame is at the ready when 
listeners reach for clues regarding how to respond to victims; how our vocabulary for 
discussing sexual violence and its consequences is limited. 
 Brison also builds on Minow (1992) and Herman (1992), noting the need for a 
woman who has suffered sexual victimization to “reconnect with humanity”, and the 
extent to which this possibility “depends, to a large extent, on other people”. (Brison, 
2002, p. 60). She likens enduring after sexual violence to a kind of disability, insofar as 
one’s ability to navigate and function in the world “depends largely on how one’s social 
and physical environments are set up” (Brison, 2002, p. 60). Furthermore, Brison (2002, 
p. 64) suggests that, “These aspects of trauma and recovery reveal the deeply social 
nature of one’s sense of self and underscore the limits of the individual’s capacity to 
control her own self-definition.” Emphasis on the relational is vital. She challenges the 
notion that individual agency is oppositional to victim identity by emphasizing the 
social. It also gives primacy to relationships, and centralizes how identity negotiation 
and self-reconstruction after sexual violence happens in interactions with and 
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relationships to others. In this thesis, I explore interpersonal interactions and 
conversations that influenced my identity negotiation. These conversations with others 
offered useful insight, or else inflicted pain and incited resistance. In many instances, it 
seemed that others were unable to hear the burdens I carried every day after my escape. 
Brison, too, nods to the inability of others to bear the realties of such violence. 
 Misguided responses, even if well-intentioned, can incite further pain and cause 
feelings of isolation. Brison (2002) acknowledges the difficulty others have in 
understanding, conceptualizing, and speaking about trauma, how this renders some 
unable to hear about the trauma, and thus barricades possibilities for victims to tell their 
stories and be empathetically heard. Not being heard, for Brison, seemed to thrust her 
back into the ravine that was the site of her attack. It left her feeling alone and without 
help. Her account resonates with a number of my own experiences after the Amazon, 
and highlights the urgency with which I sought to understand not only what had 
happened to me at the hands of my rapist, but what was happening to me afterwards.  
 Brison deals extensively with the shattering and dissolution of the self, which I 
explore in the latter portion of Part II. Her style of writing weaves story, insight, and 
scholarship. She has a particular skill for ending chapters without forcing resolution or 
tidy, uplifting conclusions, yet manages to end on a note that brims with possibility, 
undistorted by ‘positive thinking’. She questions the language of ‘recovery’ throughout 
the book, noting how she can never get back the person she was before the attack. Her 
approach to recovery is tentative and inquisitive, rather than solid and definitive: 
“Perhaps the goal of recovery is, simply, to go on. But—go on with what?” (2002, p. 
116). Her approach offers a gentle hope reminiscent of Janoff-Bulman’s (1992) insights, 
which I take up in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Janoff-Bulman discusses the altered 
worldview available to those who have accommodated traumatic experience: cautious 
and aware of possibilities for trauma, loss, and pain, but also willing to go on.  
 These insights offer analytic tools, not only for my thesis, but for my continued 
ability to endure after rape, in a victim-hostile environment. I draw upon Brison 
throughout this thesis, but I also draw on Brison in continuing to live my own life. In 
writing this thesis, I continue to live a story shaped by the events of the Amazon, and to 
theorize based on these experiences. Brison’s (2002) work has given me numerous 
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insights and tools to continue the ongoing, vulnerable intellectual work of developing 
an autoethnographic account of secondary victimization after sexual violence.  
Backstory 
 In the first half of this chapter on theory, I have outlined the role of Brison 
(2002) and Ahmed (2017) in formulating the theoretical foundation for this thesis. Now, 
I will outline some of the personal backstory that gives rise to this thesis. At the outset 
of writing, I had not intended to include my backstory at all. Upon engaging with 
Ahmed’s (2017) work, including my backstory became important in challenging the 
bifurcation of theory from lived experience. According to Ahmed (2017, p. 19),  
I explore the process of becoming feminist. Reflecting on this process can 
offer a way of doing feminist theory, a way of generating new insights into 
how gender works, as a social system, or as machinery that tends to spit 
some bodies out. Insights into gender as well as race are wordly. Becoming 
feminist involves coming up against the world. 
The addition to change my approach was further bolstered by Page (2017) and her 
argument for the value of hesitation, tentativeness, and vulnerability in feminist writing, 
which I address in Chapter 3.  Brison’s (2002) clear articulation of the relational aspects 
of life after sexual violence also made it vital to classify and contextualize my 
relationships both to theorists and to people in my social world. Therefore, I place the 
backstory here in an effort to apply the insights of Ahmed (2017) and Brison (2002). 
 I spent the bulk of my early adult life—through my undergraduate studies and 
my first years of my Masters in Divinity program—working diligently to address the 
psychological ramifications of complex trauma and unresolved grief. It took seven years 
of dedicated labor to address the suffering caused by the violent death of my mother in a 
car crash in 1990. A known symptom of PTSD is disassociation. I had lived in a 
disassociated state for most of my life; I was forced outside my own skin by pain. 
Feminist theorists Audre Lorde and Gloria Anzaldúa, whose work I discuss in the next 
section, offered me a map for returning to my body, for putting myself back together. 
They gave me language to articulate what I was coming to know through the process of 
confronting PTSD, and they offered companionship and a map along the way. 
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 I consider my experience of trauma as marginalizing for two reasons: (1) it 
fractured my sense of self, and (2) it inhibited my connection to others due to the social 
consequences of my mother’s death. Being “the girl whose mom died” was part of my 
identity throughout elementary school: teachers, peers, and parents all knew. I lived a 
reality outside the norm. I felt an acute sense that others did not know how to relate to 
me. I felt like an other, an outsider. The felt sense of marginalization was formative to 
my intellectual development, and alerted me at an early age to social responses to 
suffering. Engaging with the work of Lorde and Anzaldúa prompted me to consider my 
own identity and experiences of marginalization, and situate myself intersectionally (see 
Crenshaw, 1991). 
 I write as a queer, white woman, from upper middle-class Los Angeles. My 
identity as a woman has been inflected by social norms but also laden with possibility 
by virtue of my mother’s death and the absence of maternal, gendered role modeling in 
my home after the age of five. I came out as bisexual at the age of 14, to which my best 
friend responded “I know” with total blasé. My understanding of womanhood has been 
queer from the outset, as well as subject to imagination and creativity. 
 I was raised in a bilingual and mixed-race home for the first five years of my 
life. My early childhood involved going back and forth between my father’s home in 
Los Angeles and Mexico. After my mother’s death, it was a Mexican woman named 
Norma, my mother’s closest friend who had lived with our family for many years, 
whom I called “second mama”. Her Latino/a family is the only extended family I have 
ever known: my aunties and uncles, cousins, all my relatives until age five, were Latino/
a. These visits ended when Norma decided she wanted to keep and raise my brother and 
I as her own. She disappeared with us for two months. When my dad found us, we said 
goodbye to Norma and our Mexican family. However, the imprint of being raised in a 
bilingual, bicultural context lingers to this day. 
 Having lacked the resources, support, and maturity to deal with these early 
traumas in childhood or adolescence, I began working through these formative 
experiences as a young adult. By 2012, I was experiencing significant relief from the 
chronic physical and emotional pain I had carried since my earliest memories. I was 
filled with a delicate hope for the next stages of my life. That summer, I went to the 
Amazon as part of a field education project. I was to work with an indigenous leader on 
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various postcolonial activist projects to protect indigenous culture, traditions, language, 
and land. What I could not know was that a trap had been laid out for me by the man 
who was supposed to be my supervisor, host, and collaborator.  
 Within days of my arrival, he had changed my name; he gave me a slanted bed 
with only a pale pink blanket between my body and the hard wood, designed to deprive 
me of sleep; he controlled my food intake; he surveilled and managed all my contact 
with the outside world—he even lied to me about his contact details so that no one in 
the outside could reach me; he drugged me against my will with psychedelic plants; he 
used the altered state of consciousness he had induced to manipulate me beyond the 
point of self-recognition. I was paralyzed and intoxicated as he made sexual advances, 
pressed his body against mine in the dark, and told me repeatedly that what he was 
doing was for healing, the will of God. I don’t even believe in God, but I was so 
disoriented by the drugs that I almost believed him. I lacked any capacity to resist his 
assaultive advances. 
 He subverted and commandeered my will, such that even my inner dialogue no 
longer spoke in my own voice. He raped me no less than six times. After 25 days, I 
managed to outsmart him and escape in the hours after I discovered that he was 
internationally wanted for multiple murders, that there were more than a dozen 
dismembered bodies in sacks along a nearby riverbank, which were thought to be his 
victims. The last time I looked into his eyes, I knew that he would kill me without pause 
or question if he believed it would serve his aims. 
 My escape took two days, first on a bus through the Amazon and up into the 
Andes, and then via plane. My thoughts were occupied with two primary concerns as I 
fled: (1) I was constantly looking over my shoulder, trying to stay one step ahead to stay 
alive; (2) I was overcome by an urgent need to understand what had happened to me 
and tell the story. Telling the story was a lifeline. It offered hope that the senselessness 
of what I had lived through might mean something; maybe it would help someone else 
avoid or cope with violence. I imagined that I might learn something worth sharing.  
 I derived strength from remembering what I had already survived: the trauma I 
had already found a way to live with after my mother’s death. I derived strength, as 
well, from the feminists whose work had accompanied me through that first pain. The 
works of Lorde (2007a, 2007b, 2007c) and Anzaldúa (1987, 2002) created possibilities 
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for finding words to describe what I had lived through; they made it feel possible to 
resist shame, blame, and silence.  
 These feminist radical women of color also assisted in an intersectional 
approach to my ongoing analysis of what had occurred in the Amazon. In the years after 
my escape, I worked consistently to see my rapist as a complex person who was shaped 
by colonialism, injustice, and the ongoing environmental degradation of the land 
belonging to his family and ethnic group. Years later, an editor interested in my book 
proposal asked me if his actions were an avenue for justice in the wake of colonialism. 
The question was phrased as though such justice might be permissible, tolerable, or 
legitimate. My agent balked. I balked. The meeting ended swiftly. Yet, underneath the 
cruel question was an understanding that his exploitation of my body was shaped by the 
exploitation of his people: it was a means for survival.  
 As I spoke to more women who had survived this man, I learned that his modus 
operandi involves drugging and raping (“seducing”) white women from North America 
and Europe. He tells his targets that his land is under threat from mining corporations 
and asks them to gather donations so that he can purchase his land and keep it safe. In 
reality, he has owned that land for over two decades: there is no threat to it. He uses 
deception, drugs, and sexual violence to control women. He garners huge sums of 
money via fraudulent fundraising efforts. He uses these resources to support his large 
family. His cruelty is a business for profit, and he legitimizes his actions as justice for 
the colonization of his people. He conscientiously uses the colonial imagination of 
indigenous people as tragic heroes and wisemen to earn trust and build rapport. His 
technique has been practiced, calculated, and refined over at least a decade. 
 I had ventured to his village to join the resistance against the mining of his land, 
and he attempted to turn my body into his mine. This inversion lingered in the back of 
my mind in the years after the Amazon, as I considered his social context, history, and 
human interests. His actions against me were inexcusably cruel, but also 
comprehensible. 
 My engagement with intersectional feminism and the work of queer women of 
color fostered my commitment, after the Amazon, to avoid dehumanizing my rapist. It 
inclined me toward intersectionality, and also helped me resist a barrage of comments 
that white women going to the Amazon should ‘know better’ than to trust indigenous 
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and Latino men; that I should have been poised at the ready to resist inevitable 
advances. 
 I have never known whether to call what happened to me acquaintance rape or 
stranger rape. I knew him; I had developed rapport with him; we had mutual friends. 
But the entire context of knowing him was fabricated for the express purpose of rape 
and exploitation: he engineered the whole thing. What’s more, the litany of other 
criminal charges and allegations against him, especially the murders and trafficking of 
human body parts, align with myths around stranger rape, and with the misconception 
that rape ends in murder. I am aware of a tension in my research, because certain facets 
of the rapes I experienced fall outside the statistical norms of sexual violence. However, 
our acquaintance, and his tactic of isolating victims and using drugs for incapacitation 
are well within the statistical norms of sexual violence (see Senn, 2015). 
 The events of the Amazon, horrific as they were, were something I felt I could 
come back from, something which, in due time, I could confront, process, and digest. I 
believed from the outset that the experience would change me, but I had hope for that 
change. What I did not fathom was the extent to which that process would be 
compounded by the swell and tide of rape myths and victim blame, by attacks on my 
character for daring to speak about sexual violence, by the efforts of some of the people 
I trusted most to mute any attempt to publicly tell the story of what had happened to me. 
The victim-hostile context to which I returned after the Amazon was as damaging as my 
rapist had been.  
 In time, it was secondary victimization that would demand my full attention. My 
scrutiny of various interactions and relationships, and the discourses that both fostered 
them and were embedded within them, was illuminated by Stringer’s (2014) neoliberal 
victim theory, which I discuss below. In this thesis, I examine these more intimate, 
everyday forms of secondary victimization. 
 A full account of my story is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, bits and 
pieces emerge in each of the following chapters, as source material and in the analysis 
itself. In the following section, I explore my early encounters with feminist texts, 
specifically Lorde and Anzaldúa. I then move on to a consideration of Stringer’s (2014) 
neoliberal victim theory. 
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First encounters  
 Audre Lorde and Gloria Anzaldúa articulate life-giving and radical possibilities 
for inhabiting a woman’s body in an oppressive context, for reorganizing a shattered 
sense of self, for accessing and speaking from a deeply embodied place and believing 
that the insights gleaned therein counted for something. Their bodies of work opened 
doorways to hidden sources of knowledge, power, and resistance.  
 In 2006, I read Audre Lorde for the first time. Three essays/speeches—“Uses of 
the Erotic”, “Poetry is Not a Luxury”, and “The Transformation of Silence into 
Language and Action”—were formative texts in my becoming feminist (Lorde, 2007c, 
2007a, 2007b). Lorde’s work validated what I had sensed to be an intimate and political 
relationship between language, the body, and lived experience. The content of these 
essays, which I discuss below, is reinforced by her style of writing and speaking, which 
is lucid, clear, erotic, poetic, and anchored in a life guided by intersectional feminist 
values (although the work predates Crenshaw’s work on intersectionality). In attending 
to her lived and embodied experience, she arrives at intersectional insights that open 
pathways to resistance. She helped radicalize my feminism and my politics, and set me 
on an intellectual path of pursuing more perspectives from radical women of color. 
 According to Lorde, “The Transformation of Silence into Language and Action” 
emerged from a period of stark reflection, while she awaited news about the status of a 
tumor in her breast. Her writing within this period, and the insights she gleaned while 
facing the reality of illness and death, are steeped in the knowledge of finitude, casting 
fear in a different light. In her brush with mortality,  
priorities and omissions became strongly etched in a merciless light, and 
what I most regretted were my silences. Of what had I ever been afraid? To 
question or to speak as I believed could have meant pain, or death. But we 
all hurt in so many different ways, all the time, and pain will either change 
or end. (Lorde, 2007b, p. 41, emphasis in original) 
I read this text several times between 2006 and 2012. Lorde’s words reached though my 
chronic pain—the bodily manifestations of grief and trauma. She urged me to speak, to 
explore my inner life and its links to the social world and systemic oppression, to 
demand answers, to dive into what I felt and saw and lived, and to speak it. Halfway 
through the speech, she directly challenges her audience: “[I’m] doing my work—[I’ve] 
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come to ask you, are you doing yours?” (Lorde, 2007b, p. 42). Reading her work, I had 
a strong feeling about what my work was, and saw the value of grieving and 
confronting the past in a context where death and trauma are often omitted from 
everyday society. Refusing to be silent about that work was something I came to see as 
political, as a result of her writing. 
 Lorde (2007b, p. 41) deals with fear as the root of silence, and harm as its result. 
Several lines from this piece have become etched in my mind: “My silences had not 
protected me. Your silences will not protect you.” Encountering this text foreclosed on 
the possibility of remaining silent about injustice or pain, or the truth as I saw it. After 
the Amazon, these words made suffering in silence impossible. Had I never encountered 
her work, I may have suffocated under shame and refused to confront the proliferation 
of sexual violence in my social circle. Having read her work, I knew silence would not 
protect me: that it posed a threat to me. 
 In the essay I discuss above, and in “Poetry is Not a Luxury”, Lorde argues that 
finding and speaking the words for our experiences provide grounds for solidarity and 
connection to other women. She urges readers to speak, to scrutinize those “fears which 
rule our lives and form our silences” (2007b, p. 36). She harnesses language as a means 
for resistance, as a means for survival. In particular, in “Poetry is Not a Luxury”, she 
lends a sense of legitimacy to sensory and emotionally felt experience: “Within these 
deep places, each one of us holds an incredible reserve of creativity and power, of 
unexamined and unrecorded emotion and feeling” (Lorde, 2007a, p. 37). She cautions 
against getting lost in abstract word play and chastises the male-dominated poetry 
cannon: 
I speak here of poetry as the revelation or distillation of experience, not the 
sterile word play that, too often, the white fathers distorted the word poetry 
to mean—in order to cover their desperate wish for imagination without 
insight. (Lorde, 2007a, p. 37) 
She advocates a radical and embodied relationship to language, and locates feeling as 
instructive in imagining alternative futures and strategies for survival: poetry as 
possibility and strength. In “Uses of the Erotic”, she advances her argument for the 
value of felt, emotional, and sensory experience as a source of power. She links the 
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erotic to the spiritual and political, and argues that the erotic is not only a source of 
power, but a possible guide for living.  
 In the last few years, I have worked to understand and theorize secondary 
victimization as it has occurred, and Lorde’s body of work empowered me in the 
process. In my initial attempts to comprehend the rapes and initial responses, my 
language limped, and my intellectual understanding of the events around me did not 
suffice: the emotional and sensory valence of experience was overpowering. Still I 
strove to articulate it, to find the words that felt right to me, which is a phrase that Lorde 
uses in several works.  
 Lorde’s radical approach had become so ingrained in me by 2012 that I failed to 
realize how my commitment to articulating the realities of rape would challenge those 
around me. In that sense, Lorde’s influence not only shaped my own experience, it 
shaped my actions and behavior, my outspokenness, and thus created the context in 
which those around me responded to my victimization. In the tidal wave of those (often 
troubling) responses, Lorde’s approach continued to provide me with tools to watch, 
listen, analyze, and work on understanding the chaos that had become my life. 
 Gloria Anzaldúa’s work is multilingual, multicultural, and situated 
geographically along the Mexican–American border. She writes in English as well as 
several dialects of Spanish, and uses Nahuatl words and concepts. She situates herself as 
a queer woman: as someone who belongs in multiple worlds. She tells of her university 
days, where she was tugged away from school or from her family home, whether by the 
hearth or the blackboard, “body prone across the equator between the diverse notions 
and nations that comprise you” (Anzaldúa, 2002, p. 548). The body figures as central to 
her work, and she writes about colonization, the violence of delineating borders, and 
their ramifications for humans and shared social worlds. These borders create fault lines 
along human flesh, and break people and communities apart, such that new cultures and 
languages emerge. 
 Anzaldúa echoes Lorde’s understanding of deep and hidden reserves of power. 
She writes about the “Shadow Beast” (Anzaldúa, 1987, p. 38), that which is deemed 
unacceptable, lustful, or dangerous by white supremacist heteropatriarchal society. It is 
a beast on whose face she finds tenderness, not sin. Her work (1987, 2002) builds on 
images and metaphors of dismemberment, fracture, rupture, death, decay, and the 
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perilous path of knowledge. Knowing will break and remake a person, according to 
Anzaldúa. She maps the process of knowing as one of destruction, collapse, and 
regeneration, giving rise to irrevocable changes in oneself and one’s living. 
Every increment of consciousness, every step forward is a travesía, a 
crossing. I am again an alien in new territory. And again, and again. But if I 
escape conscious awareness, escape “knowing”, I won’t be moving. 
Knowledge makes me more aware, it makes me more conscious. 
“Knowing” is painful because after “it” happens I can’t stay in the same 
place and be comfortable. I am no longer the same person I was before. 
(Anzaldúa, 1987, p. 70) 
Anzaldúa also engages with the process of writing as one with the potential to transform 
trauma, to heal, to craft a world and a life. The world-making potential of language 
overlaps Lorde and Anzaldúa’s work. Anzaldúa writes in a manner that foregrounds 
flesh and blood (and the Earth) as sources of knowledge, wellsprings of insight: for 
there is no writing without a body to experience the world, no narrative or 
conceptualization without means to write it out. 
 Anzaldúa’s (1987, p. 101) approach involves a “tolerance for ambiguity”. Of the 
new mestiza, she writes, “Not only does she sustain contradictions, she turns the 
ambivalence into something else.” Her approach synthesizes well with Page’s (2017) 
approach to vulnerable writing. 
 I first read Anzaldúa in 2011, not long before my nightmare in the Amazon. I 
reread her again in late 2012, months after my escape. Her framework for developing 
knowledge resonated with post trauma realities. My inner life was violent in the three 
years after the rapes: I felt as though I was being torn apart. Her acquaintance with the 
felt realities of trauma and its impacts on self-formation were crucial contributors to my 
survival, and inoculated against total isolation during some of the most difficult periods 
after the rapes. I found companionship in her work. 
 I read Anzaldúa with caution and hesitation, realizing that her work is specific to 
a cultural experience and colonial inheritance that I do not share. While I could relate to 
the violence of marginalization and trauma, ours are different stories. Still, she gave me 
some understanding of the gifts of my queer identity, and offered a new definition of 
femininity and feminist power. Her work also came to bear on how I understood my 
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rapist’s actions. He was outspoken in his hatred of colonialism and its legacy for his 
people, and he used the rhetoric of protecting indigenous culture and land to lure in 
targets, which were predominately white women who represented—to him—the new 
face of a violent colonial legacy. He justified his rape of me in part by seeing himself as 
entitled to white women’s bodies as some kind of justice. He weaponized the language 
of healing colonial wounds; he reversed and inverted the wounds of the colonial legacy 
to legitimize his violence. Anzaldúa’s work helped me more deeply understand the 
ramifications of the colonial legacy for him and his people. While it by no means 
excuses his actions, it has been worthwhile to understand. For all the pain he caused, 
and while I do not readily offer forgiveness, I have worked hard to never lose sight of 
the wider social and political context and history that continue to shape him, his family, 
and his social and material realities. 
 Lorde and Anzaldúa have been central to my becoming a feminist. In difficult 
times, it felt as if they walked beside me. As I delved deep into the emotional, 
intellectual, and relational realities of extreme trauma, their insights illuminated my path 
and offered a felt sense of companionship. Anzaldúa emboldened me to throw myself 
into change, to embrace the destruction and pain. She gave me intellectual tools, a 
theoretical construct, that allowed for regeneration after breaking. She gave me hope 
that I could emerge on the other side radicalized and transformed. 
 After the Amazon, the work of these two women bolstered me against the tide of 
rape myths and victim blame that followed my experience of sexual violence. Their 
work is embedded in the ideas I develop in this thesis, as they were embedded in the 
process by which I sought to make sense of what had occurred in the Amazon. The 
violence of my victimization—and the ongoing violence of secondary victimization—
altered my sense of self and my approach to life and relationships. Lorde and Anzaldúa 
sculpted the contours of my own process of change, rendering it at once personal, 
political, and eventually, professional. 
Neoliberal victim theory 
 As I navigated a victim-hostile environment, I spoke out. I did so from the 
foundation of understanding provided to me by Lorde and Anzaldúa. In speaking out, I 
was able to encounter a wide range of responses to my position and my story. Through 
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interviews, conference talks, radio shows, and personal conversations, my story reached 
tens of thousands of people. I was able to receive direct responses from several hundred 
of those people. The vast majority of these were well intentioned, but missed the mark. 
A select few were informed, and helpful. Another select few were aggressive, cruel, and 
intended to attack my character, negate my claims, shut me up, and literally stop the 
presses. This last group is what I remember best, perhaps because pain has a way of 
searing itself in memory. 
 Those who were well intentioned but poorly informed formed the bulk of my 
experience. Those with good intentions were interesting, in that they seemed to endorse 
subtle rape myths, and have a default attitude of victim blame. Yet many also described 
themselves as feminist. Several individuals asked me how I might have avoided the 
rapes, or when my intuition indicated I was in danger, or why I did not heed my 
intuition. In the same breath, they insisted that they did not blame me for what happened 
to me. One woman insisted on telling me about all the work she had done for women’s 
reproductive rights, as if to bolster her feminist credentials and support her claim that 
she wasn’t blaming me, when, in fact, she was prompting me to consider all the ways I 
had failed to keep myself safe or remove myself from my rapist. Many people urged me 
to take personal responsibility for the situation (which I discuss in Chapters 4 and 5), as 
though doing so was the best path forward for healing and personal growth. 
 It was after I had removed myself from these relationships and this social 
context, when the pain of people’s responses became too much to bear, that I first 
encountered the work of Rebecca Stringer. Her theorizations illuminated the phenomena 
I had been experiencing for three years at that stage. She gave me new tools and new 
language, which augmented and advanced my understanding of what I had lived 
through. In particular, her development of neoliberal victim theory offered tangible 
relief to my suffering and struggle by helping me understand the logic underpinning so 
many of the most painful reactions I encountered. By applying her analysis, I could 
identify these logics as stemming from wider cultural and social ideologies and beliefs.  
 Stringer’s (2014) neoliberal victim theory (NVT) offers a framework for 
understanding how neoliberal values, especially personal responsibility, are applied to 
victims in a manner that nurtures victim blame. Gilmore (2017, p.11) highlights how 
“neoliberalism presents an aspirational but false agency to an individual cleansed of 
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history.” Personal responsibility, in the context of this thesis, refers to individual choice 
and action through which an individual becomes accountable for the consequences of 
those choices or actions. According to Gilmore (2017, p.8), we must attend to  
the importance of neoliberalism as an analytical lens through which to view 
the rhetoric of individual agency and responsibility. In neoliberalism, the 
state benefits from abandoning “the individual” to his or her own care and 
promotes that exposure as the freedom to choose in the absence of a safety 
net of appropriate support.  
A fuller understanding of neoliberal victim theory requires some engagement with 
neoliberalism more generally. Its history and economic policies provide concrete 
examples of what have become more generalized ideologies regarding the privatization 
of responsibility and resilience, as well as expectations regarding how citizens ought to 
conduct themselves.  
 The neoliberal economics that came to the fore in the 1970s were developed by 
Milton Friedman and championed by economists at the Chicago School (and its satellite 
school in Pinochet’s Chile) and UC Berkeley (as well as among the Berkeley Mafia at 
work in Suharto’s Indonesia). Its economic framework involves radical reforms in 
service to laissez-faire economics: privatization (in which national resources and 
services are sold off to the private sector), deregulation of the market, free trade, and 
governmental austerity in pursuit of economic growth. Its vision champions the 
distribution of resources based on trickle-down economics: by nurturing the wealthy 
(i.e., tax breaks), persons across other socioeconomic strata would hypothetically profit 
as well. In theory, neoliberalism involves dissolving governmental regulatory powers 
(and subsequently undermining democratic power and processes) and bolstering 
individual responsibilities and freedoms, while trusting the market (supply and demand) 
to perform self-regulation. 
 According to Klein (2007), the neoliberal experiment came to life in Chile and 
Indonesia in the 1970s. Its implementation was reliant on military dictatorships. The 
tactics of these regimes included genocide, disappearances, and mass murder. In more 
recent years, neoliberalism has come home to roost in the United States, especially since 
the Reagan administration, and it has gained a strong foothold in the United Kingdom, 
Europe, New Zealand, and Australia. Klein (2007) provides a detailed analysis and 
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compelling case studies to support her argument that neoliberal economics in fact 
depend upon violence and militarism; these policies take root during or immediately 
following shocks to citizenries such as war, terrorism, disaster, or the collapse of 
government. Neoliberalism hinges on catastrophe—hence Klein’s reference to the 
disaster capitalism complex. In addition to a rather nefarious governmental revamping 
of economics, neoliberalism has a strong cultural valence, and has infiltrated and shaped 
dominant discourse so as to become common sense. Its cultural implications bear 
heavily on conceptualizations of victims.  
 Neoliberal logics run deep in contemporary, shared social values. In the United 
States and New Zealand, individual responsibility is prized, including the responsibility 
to protect oneself from harm, to grab life by the horns and achieve success (not only 
financially, but increasingly in terms of purpose, health, and meaning), and to make 
good on terrible circumstances or traumatic experiences. According to Gilmore (2017, 
p. 91) 
The narrative that underwrites neoliberalism promotes personal 
responsibility. It places both the blame for structural problems and the 
responsibility for their solution on individuals. Within neoliberalism, the 
individual is endowed with the appearance of personal choice (Pepsi or 
Coke?), while the asymmetries of actual power, vulnerability, and reward 
are continuously suppressed through the language of self-striving. 
Neoliberal ideologies champion radical individualism, self-surveillance, and self-
improvement or personal growth based on individual will. It frames an individual’s 
inner life a the site for possibility, change, and resistance.  
 For example, Oprah Winfrey advises overstressed and discontented workers to 
bring chachkies or family photos to place on their desk as motivation and stress 
management strategies; in other words, to find cheap, feel-good attitude fixes, instead of 
railing against oppressive systems that foster unmanageable work conditions (see 
Aschoff, 2015). Every grey cloud has a silver lining under neoliberal logics. So too does 
every silver lining have a cloud, and the ominous cloud of neoliberalism has become a 
fixed feature in our sky to the point that many accept it as normal—and submit to social 
and discursive pressures to take it upon themselves to find the silver edges. It’s hard to 
see alternatives beyond the storm. 
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 These cultural articulations of neoliberalism create a particularly hostile climate 
for victims of crime, a climate which both fosters and is fostered by victim blame. 
According to Stringer (2014, p. 2), anti-victim talk:  
mark[s] a largely conservative intervention upon the language of suffering 
and social being. Coinciding historically with the rise and consolidation of 
neoliberal hegemony, much anti-victim talk powerfully reflects the values of 
neoliberal thought, in particular the concept of personal responsibility. 
Stringer (2014) provides an overview of anti-victim feminism (and some 
straightforward anti-feminism), which came to prominence in the 1990s. Anti-victim 
feminism was largely a backlash, parading feminist sympathies (women’s 
empowerment) to push back on the gains made in resisting women’s victimization 
(what anti-victim writers term victimism). Paglia, Hoff Sommers, and Roiphe were 
particularly dominant in the 1990s. These women reshaped social understandings of 
women’s victimization, reframing victim talk as disempowering all women, and 
crippling advancement in women’s sexual liberation. Stringer uses these texts to 
generate larger insights into the logics, rhetorics, and strategies of anti-feminists and 
anti-victim feminists, bolstered as they are by neoliberal logics. Part of their anti-victim 
argument was that the naming of women’s victimization, and labeling women who had 
endured rape as victims, was itself a violence—more so than rape itself. Such anti-
victim notions maintains purchase today, and come under scrutiny in Part II. 
 Neoliberal victim theory (NVT) is a critical framework developed by Stringer 
(2014). NVT offers a constellation of concepts that elucidate contemporary 
understandings of victims in light of neoliberal values. NVT has four primary elements 
that I explore below: (1) the victim bad/agent good formulation, (2) the motif of 
ressentiment, (3) reverse victimology, and (4) power victims. More generally, NVT 
highlights the logics that prompt victims to reframe the harm done and its consequences 
to emphasize personal responsibility, empowerment, and control. Attention is turned 
away from social and political causes (including gendered oppression) and toward the 
question of what an individual can and will do to protect themselves and—as I discuss 
in Chapters 5 and 6—heroically overcome adversity. While this thesis draws heavily on 
each of these main points of NVT, I also put forth the survivor imperative as an 
additional element of NVT.  
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 Within neoliberal hegemony, victimization is cast as emanating from an inner 
self, and being caused in large part by having a “victim mentality”. A victim mentality is 
conceptualized as a state of mind inherent in some individuals that predisposes them to 
victimization, and the notion harkens traditional, positivist victimological views that the 
causes of victimization stem from victims themselves. The victim mentality is 
positioned as an anathema to the imperatives of personal responsibility; it is constructed 
as interior, personal, and psychological in a manner that erases the external, political, 
and social factors in victimization (Stringer 2014). The victim mentality is an obvious 
and egregious oversight, insofar as victimization, especially criminal victimization, by 
definition involves external sources of harm. However, framing it as mere oversight 
neglects how strategic such framing is in achieving self-surveillance and 
governmentality while undermining a range of possibilities for political resistance. It is 
a depoliticizing frame that situates the responsibility on individuals to find ways to 
overcome and endure, rather than work to overthrow oppressive systems. 
 Neoliberal discourse positions victimhood as a choice that enables the 
abdication of personal responsibility; it is criticized in favor of agency, which is 
constructed as victimhood’s opposite. In a neoliberal context, agency is figured as 
exclusively individual. According to Stringer (2014), the victim bad/agent good 
formulation details the ways that victimhood’s associations with passivity, weakness, 
meekness, and helplessness (see van Dijk, 2009) are pitted against agency and its 
connotations of strength, endurance, will, and empowerment. Victimhood is seen as a 
failure to achieve and express adequate personal agency. Victimhood is devalued, and 
any knowledge associated with victimhood is deemed illegitimate. In addition, 
victimhood is seen as sourced from within the character, personality, and mentality of 
the person who has been harmed, rather than external realities. 
 Stringer’s (2014) motif of ressentiment deals with the pathologization of victims 
as having toxic emotions: complaints of harm (whether traumatic or more insidious and 
subtle) are minimized and dismissed as unjustified or immature articulations of anger or 
vengefulness. Such minimization also justifies the dismissal of victim knowledge or 
insight. Victims are criticized for giving into the debasement of resentment, yet such 
criticism neglects how resentment is a natural and justified response to suffering, 
especially when that suffering stems from the intentional actions of another human 
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being. These so-called negative emotions, according to Stringer (2014, p. 11) are 
“construed not only as an inability to let go of suffering, but as a pathological 
psychological attachment to suffering that, it is supposed, breeds a colourful variety of 
character traits and political tendencies”. Anger and ressentiment are actively erased. 
NVT highlights the common-sense logics and dominant discourses in which those 
suffering from harm are blamed for suffering. Suffering persons are cast as attached to 
or desiring of their suffering, or perhaps even being responsible for precipitating the 
situation that incited suffering in the first instance. An example of such thinking, and its 
penetration of therapeutic spaces, is provided by positive psychologist Joseph, whose 
work I will discuss in depth in Chapter 6. Joseph is an important and prolific figure in 
posttraumatic growth research. He concludes his book on posttraumatic growth by 
discussing clients/patients who don’t make progress or even abandon therapy by 
suggesting that: 
deep down, the clients are relieved. Diagnostic labels can become part of 
people—and the truth is, many people are reluctant to give them up. 
Unfortunately, the dominant professional discourse of trauma tends to 
position people as ‘helpless victims with a lifelong condition”, so it is not 
surprising that many people latch on to this way of thinking. (Joseph, 2011, 
p. 166–167) 
Joseph’s words elucidate the social context and widespread beliefs that often surround 
suffering, especially the suffering that develops as a result of traumatic victimization: if 
some people, by virtue of character or personality, are inclined to hold onto their 
suffering as so-called perpetual victims, they are to blame for their suffering. Such 
people are held up as foils to those who have the fortitude and strength to “choose” 
more positive coping styles, enacting their agency to overcome trauma. The power of 
trauma and PTSD, and of the social or even political circumstances that caused it, are 
kept neatly out of view. 
 Reverse victimology—according to Stringer (2014)—consists of reframing who 
constitutes the real victims of feminist constructions of victimization. It might be 
viewed as a backlash against feminist progress in bringing awareness and recognition to 
women’s victimization. Reverse victimology entails anti-victims blaming feminists for 
casting all women as victims, thereby rendering feminists as the victimizers. Within the 
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anti-victims argument, discussing victimization and positioning women as victims 
creates a victim mentality in women, and reinscribes women as ready-made victims. 
This anti-victimist—and largely anti-feminist—view suggests that the real victims of 
feminist advances are anti-victim feminists, who wish to champion agency and personal 
power in self-protection, and men who are falsely accused or otherwise harmed by 
claims of rape or violence. In short, reverse victimology involves rhetorical strategies to 
reverse who is considered a victim and who is a victimizer, and undermine the gains of 
feminists who espouse compassion and justice for victims, based on a victim-centered 
assessment of the social realities of gendered harm. The rhetoric and strategy of the 
anti-victim argument is insidious: anti-victimists portray themselves as liberal feminists, 
often espousing to protect and advance female sexual liberation which, they argue, is 
under attack by feminists. The rhetoric of personal protection and sexual liberation is 
appealing, since it offers a simple solution to a complex and frightening social issue. It 
also reiterates the notion that we live in a post-feminist era, in which women’s sexual 
liberation and agency have been achieved once and for all. Women’s liberation is 
conflated with sexual liberation; this benefits men by providing greater access to 
women’s sexual bodies. The proliferation of neoliberal discourse assists in this insidious 
twist of what it means for women to have sexual agency; through the valorization of 
personal responsibility and sexual agency, anti-victim sentiment gains a foothold. 
 While Stringer’s NVT details the championing of empowerment and agency in a 
specific, anti-victim style, certain types of power and agency are anathema to neoliberal 
values. Power victims—according to Stringer (2014)—are those who leverage the social 
capital of victimhood in service to the wrong kind of power: power based in 
victimization. One example is the power of angry victim activists who ostensibly do 
harm to innocent others by speaking about victimization. According to Stringer (2014, 
p. 34), the notion of the power victim involves the claim that victim feminism “bestows 
upon women the wrong kind of agency—a bad form of agency best described as the 
cultural capital of victimhood”. Victim’s power is framed as being based on 
victimization and its associated abdication of responsibility. Furthermore, the notion of 
the power victim as suspect undermines victims’ claims to support and resources. The 
power victim label can be used against victims who are politically mobilized and active; 
it is deployed to diminish and undermine their testimonies and calls for change. 
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 Each of the elements of NTV—the victim bad/agent good formulation, reverse 
victimology, the motif of ressentiment and power victims—builds on the victim bad/
agent good formulation. The motif of ressentiment and the notion of power victims 
especially deal with the denigration of victimhood and the championing of agency. In 
this thesis, I will use NVT to identify dynamics and discourses at play in how others 
responded to me and my victimization. Building on NVT, I develop the survivor 
imperative, which emphasizes the manner in which those who are victimized ought to 
respond to and recover from harms done to them. 
 The framework provided by Stringer (2014) became a critical analytical lens for 
unpacking my experiences after the Amazon. I began to unravel the underlying logics 
that shaped how people close to me responded to my victimization and my 
determination to speak about it. I was cast as a power victim; I was chastized for 
holding on to negative feelings rather than moving on or getting over it; I was told that 
naming myself a victim was harmful to me, that doing so undermined the efforts I 
should be undertaking to claim agency and empower myself. Recasting the language of 
victimhood as victimizing was also a manifestation of reverse victimology; the 
assumption was that I was harming myself and other women who had experienced 
sexual violence, or might one day experience it, by adopting the victim label. 
Victimhood was framed as a mentality and a self-fulfilling prophesy that risked 
permeating the rest of my life. I explore these dimensions further in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 It was extraordinarily difficult to untangle these ideas and their sources as I 
encountered them. I could feel that something was  amiss in the ways people reacted to 
my victimization and claims of victim identity. In reading Stringer, I found palpable 
relief via understanding. Her theoretical framework explained what I had lived through 
in a deep and complex manner, rendering it easier to resist taking other’s reactions 
personally, and instead to track harmful responses to underlying discourses. In so doing, 
I began to develop understandings that not only alleviated my own suffering, but also 
deepened my commitment to a feminist life and to developing an explicitly political 
framework for analyzing my own experiences. Stringer’s work advanced my 
understanding of what theory could do in everyday life.  
 It was engagement with Stringer that led me to emphasize theoretical 
engagement and analysis in autoethnographic writing, to a degree that is not standard 
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across the methodology and style. I therefore attempted to link my theoretical insights 
and lived experience with non-autoethnographic academic texts, which helped me to 
avoid excessive self-focus. It also elucidated for me the value of academic writing and 
theory as it might be applied to lived experience. Reading Stringer (2014) was a 
radicalizing encounter. It gave me a path toward claiming victim identity as a political 
act. 
Conclusion 
 In writing this thesis, the ideas, arguments, and approaches developed by Lorde, 
Anzaldúa, Stringer, Brison, and Ahmed shape my analysis, and have shaped the process 
of living by which I have arrived at my analysis. In endeavoring to live my life in a 
feminist way, I have attempted to put Lorde and Anzaldúa’s ideas and approaches into 
practice. Doing so infused and contoured the manner in which I coped with and 
responded to the events of the Amazon in 2012, and how others responded to me in the 
years that followed. Their theoretical work is embedded in the thesis and in my 
approach to life and intellectual work. Therefore, I aim to apply their insights 
throughout the thesis, as part of the theoretical fabric of the text. 
 Further, I aim to advance the theories developed by Brison, Ahmed, and Stringer 
in explicit ways. Brison (2002) argues the value of victim’s epistemological stance. I 
advance Brison’s work by considering the constructions, stereotypes, and stigmas 
associated with the victim label that foreclose possibilities for victims to share their 
knowledge or are used as grounds to delegitimize their claims. Brison (2002) also 
emphasizes the relational dimensions of life after sexual violence. I advance Brison’s 
argument by exploring these relational dynamics in depth, with special attention to 
conversations. Further, I consider the discourses that inflect these interactions, and how 
they fostered secondary victimization and a climate of victim hostility.  
 My choice to bridge autoethnography and feminist theory is bolstered by 
Ahmed’s (2017) challenge to the theory/experience divide, which is well encapsulated 
in her notion of “homework”. Life and work are not neatly parsed apart. Ongoing 
application of her theoretical framework is lived as much as it is a facet of theoretical 
work. These insights from Ahmed are recent contributions to feminist theory, and I hope 
that my explicit engagement with them might demonstrate one manner by which they 
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may be applied to theorizing sexual violence and secondary victimisation. Furthermore, 
I seek to build on her reframing of brokenness and refusing to aspire toward wholeness 
by challenging the social imperative to eschew victimhood in favor of survivorship. 
 Stringer’s (2014) NVT is the catalyst for the production of this thesis. I aim to 
apply and advance her framework by engaging in sustained analysis of the survivor 
label in the context of sexual violence. Pursuant to NVT, I argue that survivorship has 
become a distinctly neoliberal construct in recent years, and that it furthers the same 
trend toward depoliticization and excessive emphasis on the individual that Stringer 
(2014) articulates and challenges.  
 It is interesting to note that none of these authors contextualize their work as 
autoethnography. Brison, Ahmed, Lorde, and Anzaldúa, whose work depends on self-
story, make no mention of their autoethnographic approach. Instead, they situate 
themselves as feminist theorists and writers, with varying degrees of explication. In the 
following chapter, I take up autoethnography as a method, and tie it into these existing 
feminist theoretical approaches. The tradition of autoethnography offers tools, insights, 
and cautions that I have found useful in crafting this thesis, which I consider a work of 
feminist theory as well as autoethnography. In bringing these feminist theoretical 
approaches into conversation with autoethnography, I hope to contribute to the 
advancement of both domains by practicing authoethnography as a feminist method. In 
the following chapter, I consider some of what an autoethnographic frame offers to 




 Autoethnography offers useful insights into the feminist theoretical and 
methodological approaches discussed in the previous chapter. Feminist theoretical work 
stands on its own, methodologically; however, autoethnography furnishes my approach 
with some important tools and perspectives. In this thesis, autoethnography provides me 
with ethical frameworks; it offers a structure for writing, and it helps sustain my focus 
on unpacking the personal and interpersonal as they relate to the social and cultural. I 
have drawn from analytic ethnography (see Anderson, 2006) and evocative ethnography 
(see Ronai, 1992; Ellis, 1991; Ellis and Bochner, 1996), utilizing insights and 
commitments from both to elucidate and advance feminist theory from within personal 
experience, drawing from larger bodies of qualitative and social science research. To do 
so, I engage with discourse. Discourse is a complex term, which I define and discuss in 
greater detail below. 
 Autoethnography is a method of research that uses the researcher’s personal 
experience as a source of data. As a method, it offers a useful basis for research into 
complex lived experience; it enables inquiry directed by personal experience and 
insight. As I discuss in Chapter 2, there is a risk of under-generalizing and over-
generalizing first person accounts and analysis (Brison, 2002). This insight applies to 
autoethnography. The type of knowledge generated in autoethnography has limits in 
terms of generalizability, but the method offers substantial insight into how discourse 
shapes lived experience. By situating findings as originating in personal experience, 
there is scope to generate qualitative data which may open new possibilities for further 
research. There is ample information available about intimate social interactions and 
discourse in autoethnography. Autoethnography involves synthesizing research, theory, 
and lived experience. Autoethnographers have been considering questions of how to 
best engage with personal material in service to intellectual work for several decades. In 
doing so, they have elaborated on the pitfalls of the method and offered strategies for 
avoiding these issues. They have also forged pathways for using personal data 
effectively and ethically. I outline these components in depth below. 
 As I discussed in the Introduction, autoethnography allows for investigation 
beyond the scope of other methods; I draw on the rich and textured data of lived 
 82
experience over several years, and attempt to engage with it holistically, with a different 
degree of nuance than interviews and with some attention to emotion. The structure of 
my inquiry is influenced by the layered account of autoethnography (Ronai, 1992, 1995, 
1996), although I make some significant departures.  
 Informed by Ronai’s approach, I explore how dominant discourses came to bear 
on my relationships and identity negotiation after sexual assault. I focus on 
interpersonal, conversational manifestations of dominant discourses, including rape 
myths and neoliberal victim theory. Conversation offers insight into meaning making, 
relational identity negotiation, social interaction, social norms, and social responses. 
The data from these conversations is not limited to verbal exchanges and departs from 
conversational analysis. Since it is autoethnographic data, it includes my own thoughts, 
feelings, narration, and recollection. By exploring how dominant discourse comes to 
bear on interpersonal interactions, I embrace Ahmed’s (2017) challenge to the division 
of theory and experience to analyze the contours of dominant discourses regarding 
victimhood and survivorship.  
 In this chapter, I detail the autoethnographic methods that inform my research, 
including structure and ethical considerations. I outline the unique role of 
autoethnography in addressing the gaps in research discussed in the Introduction, and 
how autoethnography fits alongside the feminist theoretical work laid out in the 
previous chapter. I then consider an adaptation of the layered account drawing from 
analytic autoethnography. I introduce and engage the concept of discourse, since much 
of my analysis in later chapters hinges on elucidating dominant discourse as it shaped 
the language of interpersonal interactions. Throughout this chapter, I discuss Page’s 
(2017) elaborations on not knowing—working with uncertainty and the tentative, 
cautious aspects of research—as a feminist epistemology, which I enfolded into my 
methodological approach. Finally, I consider the ethical complexities of 
autoethnography, including how to manage the rights of others in self-narrative. 
Autoethnography 
Autoethnography is not simply a way of knowing about the world, but also 
a way of being in the world. An autoethnographic perspective requires 
living consciously, emotionally, and reflexively. It asks that we not only 
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examine our lives, but also examine how and why we think, act, and feel as 
we do. (Ellis and Adams, 2014, p. 271) 
The study of self within culture 
 Autoethnography can be defined as a research method and process, as well as a 
writing style, which deals with the study of self within culture. According to Chang 
(2008), quoting and further developing ideas from Ellis and Bochner (1996, p. 740), 
“autoethnographers vary in their emphasis on the research process (graphy), on culture 
(ethno), and on self (auto)” and autoethnographers may “fall at different places along 
the continuum of each of these three axes”. In autoethnography, self-knowledge is 
deployed as a medium through which to glimpse and explore cultural phenomena and 
mobilize insights from the ground. Autoethnography has generated a set of 
methodological perspectives and skills that are vital to systematizing autoethnographic 
data and knowledge.  
 By definition, autoethnography requires extensive social and cultural analysis 
and theorization, which distinguishes it from other forms of self-narrative, including 
autobiography and memoir. Moreover, it is an ideal methodology when dealing with 
issues that evoke discomfort and are seldom discussed in everyday conversation, and 
require creative, new ways of examining and articulating experience (Ellis and Adams, 
2014). This is especially the case when the experiences under inquiry are taboo (see 
Ronai, 1995), and when working to create space for new, alternative, or subversive 
subjectivities (see Gunne and Thompson, 2010). Since autoethnography casts the 
researcher as narrator, author, subject, protagonist, and analyst, it allows for multiple 
angles and dimensions of study. In addition, it affords control of the writing, as well as 
fluidity between voices and perspectives. Control of the narrative has special 
significance when dealing with the study of traumatic experiences, where a sense of 
control is paramount (see Spry 2011 and Janoff-Bulman, 1992), and where the sense of 
self might be fragmented (Ronai, 1993; Brison, 2002; see also Anzaldúa, 1987). 
 Autoethnography looks inward at a vulnerable researcher to develop critical 
insights about the social world and elaborate upon links to existing research (Ellis and 
Adams, 2014). Wider engagement, theorization, and critique formulate the unique 
contributions enabled by autoethnography. As Chang (2008, p. 43) argues, “Stemming 
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from the field of anthropology, autoethnography shares the storytelling feature with 
other genres of self-narrative but transcends mere narration of self to engage in cultural 
analysis and interpretation.” Engagement with culture, analysis, theory, dominant 
discourse, and research is necessary to qualify a work as autoethnography.  
 Autoethnography’s roots are in ethnography—an anthropological tradition of 
studying culture—and its development has been nurtured by two key insights. The first 
of these insights is an awareness of the problematic colonial qualities of traditional and 
early ethnographic research, in which researchers took knowledge from an exotic other 
and constructed knowledge for their own ends, often without due consideration for 
those who were their subjects of study (Chang, 2008; Ellis and Adams, 2014). Second, 
according to Chang (2008, p. 45), “the ‘new’ trend of self-focused anthropology is 
based on intentional self-reflexivity; anthropologists are turning their scholarly interest 
inward on themselves.” As self-reflexivity has developed, the voices of marginalized 
people have gained greater visibility in academic work, demonstrating the value of 
subjugated subjectivities and perspectives in scholarship (Ellis and Bochner, 1996; 
Chang, 2008). According to Ellis and Bochner (1996, p. 18): 
united by alienation and liminality… ‘new ethnography’ appealed so 
strongly to women, people of color, marginal voices… who wanted to come 
to grips with the predicaments of the scholar as an involved, situated, and 
integral part of the research and writing process. 
Prior to the development of authoethnography, researchers neglected the interior 
experiences of marginalization. Autoethnographers are able to explore marginal terrain 
with sensitivity, on their own terms and in their own voices. In autoethnography, tools 
for generating knowledge are repurposed and deployed to resist marginalization, 
oppression, and erasure. Autoethnography sheds light on lived experiences of marginal 
social contexts, values subjugated knowledge, and engages dominant discourse to 
consider its lived ramification. 
 Feminism has contributed to the trend of reflexivity and the turn toward 
explicating and leveraging personal investment, involvement, and bias in research. For 
example, Ahmed’s (2017) approach challenges the division between theory and 
experience, and Brison’s (2002) work upholds the epistemological value of victim 
accounts. Research considering lived experience has benefitted greatly from 
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intersectional feminist theory, which elucidates and amplifies subjectivities that often 
fall through the cracks of audibility (see Crenshaw, 1991). 
 The feminist adage that “the personal is political” interlocks with Brison’s 
(2002) view that the epistemology and knowledge of victims has merit. Therefore, I 
self-identify from the outset. I am a female and feminist autoethnographer, and a victim 
of sexual violence. I use my situation and stance, my identity and perspective, in service 
to understanding interpersonal interactions and broader discourse. My project is 
inherently political, and I aim to contribute to the political struggle to end sexual 
violence and create a more caring society for those who have been sexually victimized. 
Feminist theorizations and autoethnography both hold my position and subjectivity as 
an asset to research, rather than a fatal flaw. Within these frameworks, there are possible 
limitations, including bias, but sources of bias are also sources of sensitivity from which 
generative insights might be gleaned. In this thesis, I endeavor to manage the tension 
between the depth available in autoethnographic data and the limits of generalizability. 
My strategy for navigating this tension and distinction involves care and caution 
regarding the conclusions I draw. I engage dominant discourse from a situated 
perspective in order to critically inquire into my own life and experience such that my 
insights can be viewed in context. 
 Feminist autoethnography allows for my self, my narrative, and my internal 
experience to serve as a gateway into apprehending and challenging the cultural 
conditions and discourses that shape them. According to Chang (2008, p. 48–49), 
“Autoethnography is not about focusing on [the] self alone, but about searching for 
understanding of others (culture/society) through [the] self.” By looking at personal 
interiority, I seek to unearth information about the conditions that influence me, my 
relationships, and the social context in which I live. 
Evocative and analytic autoethnography 
 Crawley (2014) maps the distinction between three types of autoethnography: 
evocative, analytic, and performance. Evocative autoethnography uses story and feeling 
based writing to evoke emotional responses in readers, and explicitly values feelings as 
a source of knowledge. Performance autoethnography includes creative enterprises, 
which are used to generate knowledge and express insights gleaned from research, 
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deploying a sensibility of “making-as-inquiring” (Downing, 2016). The goal of creative 
output is not to demonstrate the text, so much as to generate knowledge (Spry, 2011). 
My research is primarily analytic autoethnography, but draws on evocative approaches 
and values emotional information. 
 Anderson (2006, p. 386) focuses on analytic autoethnography, which he suggests 
has five main tenets: the researcher as a member of the group they study, analytic 
reflexivity, the researcher’s visibility in the text, their dialogue with others as subjects, 
and a “commitment to an analytic agenda”. While I have not undertaken dialogue with 
other subjects, Anderson’s (2006) framework helps me explicate some of the parameters 
of this thesis. I write about victimhood and survivorship as a victim/survivor; I write 
myself into the text; I attempt self-awareness and reflexivity, especially to remind 
myself that my perspective is situated and specific. Further, I use self-narrative and aim 
for “connection to broader social science theory” (Anderson, 2006, p. 378). 
 Analytic autoethnography nuances my approach, and distinguishes the work 
from evocative autoethnography. According to Anderson (2006, p. 387), 
The purpose of analytic ethnography is not simply to document personal 
experience, to provide an “insider’s perspective”, or to evoke emotional 
resonance with the reader. Rather, the defining characteristic of analytic 
social science is to use empirical data to gain insight into some broader set 
of social phenomena than those provided by the data themselves. 
I do not seek to write experience as it is lived or to evoke emotion in readers. Instead, I 
use data acquired in living a feminist life to develop theory. I aim to go beyond 
capturing my own personal process, and instead use “empirical evidence to 
formulate and refine theoretical understandings of social processes” (Anderson, 2006, p. 
387). My commitment is to engage feminist theory and social science research and to 
examine its explanatory value for lived experience, while also using lived experience to 
problematize, scrutinize, and advance existing theory.  
 I do not depart entirely from the evocative ethnographic tradition championed by 
Ellis, Bochner, Adams, Ronai, and others. Evocative ethnography allows for the 
acknowledgment of emotional valences of knowledge production. Central to evocative 
autoethnography is an emotional epistemology that moves readers, and those adhering 
to their style aim for narrative fidelity and conveyance of emotional experience 
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(Anderson, 2006). Ronai’s work, while also analytic, offers a clear example of how 
storytelling and emotional reflection saturate her approach. Among the important 
contributions of the style is that it accommodates marginalized voices in important 
ways. This is a significant oversight in Anderson’s (2006) approach: nearly all his 
citations are male, and there is no mention of the need for marginalized voices in 
scholarship. Hence, I work from both domains to help elucidate the methodological 
framework for this thesis. In Chapter 4, I use some reflection on memories and feelings, 
situated in the context of ongoing experience, to elucidate the grounds for my 
theorizations. The evocative approach allows for feeling-based data; while I do not 
foreground such data, it does play some role in my analysis. Further, I am not the first to 
span both styles: according to Crawley (2014, p. 10), Ronai “clearly attempts to engage 
analytic and evocative” approaches. Ronai’s work informs my choice to deploy an 
adapted form of the layered account (discussed below) in this thesis. 
Cautions and critiques 
 It is important to keep in mind that autoethnography, similar to any method, is 
best suited to specific kinds of research. Furthermore, there are stumbling points that 
may compromise the integrity of an autoethnographic text. Chang (2008) addresses five 
common pitfalls to autoethnographic research, which I will list before explaining how I 
will avoid or address them. The first is “excessive focus on self in isolation from others” 
(Chang, 2008, p. 54). I avoid focusing on introspective or feeling-based writings, and 
use memory sparingly in Part II, where I construct my argument. I emphasize stories 
that include social interactions with others, and engage power differentials as well as the 
content of the exchange in analysis. Emphasis on secondary victimization—especially 
everyday, interpersonal interactions—helps prevent the work from excessively 
concentrating on my isolated self. My approach reflects Ahmed’s (2017) insight that 
theory is developed in living a feminist life, and in seeking to understand what we come 
up against; in the case of my thesis, rape myths and victim blame. In the conversations 
that I analyze, I engage with others, furthering Brison’s (2002) argument that recovery 
of the self after trauma is inherently relational. 
 Second, Chang (2008, p. 54) warns against “overemphasis on narrative rather 
than analysis and cultural interpretation”. The majority of space in my thesis has been 
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dedicated to analysis and theorization, using narrative as an opening for theoretical 
inquiry and engagement with wider bodies of literature. I therefore attempt to build on 
Anderson’s (2006, p. 378) approach to analytic autoethnography, especially the 
“commitment to an analytic agenda”. In thinking about form, I draw on Ahmed (2017) 
and Brison (2002), who use self-narrative in a similar manner, as a basis for scholarly 
engagement and argumentation. 
 Third, Chang (2008 p. 54) advises against “exclusive reliance on personal 
memory and recalling as a data source”. A significant portion of my data derives from 
archived material, especially written records of conversations that took place in the 
three years following the rapes. In Chapter 5, some memory data is included, because 
the events described were not recorded at the time but remain prominent in memory. In 
Chapter 7, I discuss events that occurred while writing this thesis, and current personal 
reflections informed by the research process. These diverse sources of data provide an 
array of insights, but my cornerstone is unplanned personal experience that was 
recorded between 2012 and 2014. I elaborate on my data in a dedicated section below. 
 Chang’s (2008) fourth point is especially significant. She warns against 
“negligence of ethical standards regarding others in self-narratives” (Chang, 2008 p. 
54). Tolich (2010) expands on the issue of ethics and others in an article on 
autoethnographic ethics that significantly shaped my application for ethical approval. I 
obtained ethics approval from the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee before 
I began research and writing. As with any methodology, autoethnographic ethics are not 
universal or one-size-fits all. Since autoethnography implicitly involves writing about 
others in close relational proximity to the researcher, there are unique risks regarding 
trust and privacy. Tolich (2010) provides some examples of failures by seminal 
autoethnographers to adequately handle ethics, thereby exposing family and friends to 
potential harm. Tolich’s work and the errors he highlights create a climate in which 
ethical considerations require ongoing care and consideration. At the outset of the 
research, I outlined the processes by which certain persons would be anonymized, and 
how I would approach individuals for informed consent should it prove impossible to 
conceal their identities. No such cases arose in the research and writing process. 
However, planning ahead and formulating firm guidelines for the ethical inclusion of 
interactions with others has been vital to this project. This thesis is an inherently social 
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and relational inquiry (see Brison, 2002), and attention was paid to the ethics and the 
safety of all others involved in the story. 
 Finally, Chang (2008 p. 54) discusses “inappropriate application of the label”, 
which is consistent with her efforts to define autoethnography as distinct from other 
forms of self-narrative. This thesis engages theory and existing research extensively, 
and uses limited self-narrative data. Introspective data is kept minimal, as is emotional 
data; however, emotional and introspective writing is scattered throughout the thesis, in 
service to elucidating the consequences of certain discourses at play in interactions, and 
to establish the grounds for various theoretical insights. Throughout the research and 
writing process, I maintained course by revisiting the guidelines by which Chang (2008) 
and others define autoethnography. 
Autoethnography and feminist theory 
 I build my analysis on the theoretical works of Stringer (2014), Brison (2002), 
Ahmed (2017), Anzaldúa (1987, 2002), and Lorde (2007). I have worked to advance 
these theorizations in several ways: to add the survivor imperative to Stringer’s (2014) 
neoliberal victim theory; to explore the ramifications of embodying Lorde’s work on 
silence and articulation in the context of victim/survivor speech; to use Ahmed’s (2017) 
argument that we theorize as we live feminist lives to elucidate the lived experience of 
secondary victimization; and to advance Brison’s (2002) argument for the necessity and 
value of victims’ knowledge and the relational facets of life after rape. 
 In the Introduction, I outlined several gaps in research, especially in first-person 
accounts of sexual violence and its sequelae. These gaps include the role of dominant 
discourse in shaping secondary victimization, and the value of such accounts in 
developing theory. I suggest that autoethnography synthesizes well with feminist 
theoretical approaches. Autoethnography affords a framework for maintaining analytic 
focus, and provides important cautions regarding pitfalls and ethical issues. Together, 
these approaches contribute to filling a gap in sexual violence research, where 
researchers are also victim/survivors.  
 By adopting some of the analytical autoethnographic framework, I hope to use 
self-narrative as a springboard into analysis. I deploy feminist approaches to critique 
non-feminist research regarding victim/survivors of sexual violence. I also engage 
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critically with discourses of victimhood and survivorship from a situated perspective, 
and examine the lived ramifications of rape myths. To do so, I build upon and adapt 
Ronai’s layered account. 
The layered account: overview and critique 
 The layered account is a method for conducting autoethnographic research 
(Chang, 2008). According to Ellis and Adams (2014, p. 267), the layered account refers 
to “texts that assemble fragments of personal experience, memory, extant research, 
introspection, and other sources of information alongside each other in creative and 
juxtaposed ways”. It is a bricolage style of autoethnography, which allows for a 
multiplicity of perspectives and voices to be explored by the author; a key aim of the 
layered account is to articulate the multiple and complex subjectivities of a researcher 
writing self-narrative and conducting analysis. 
 The layered account is rooted in the recognition that identity is complex; 
research involving self-narrative requires navigating between multiple perspectives. The 
layered account is therefore enhanced by tightrope talk of McKenzie-Mohr and 
Lafrance (2011) and Page’s (2017) approach to vulnerable subjects (which I discuss 
below). Layered accounts use complex, contradictory perspectives to move analysis 
past dominant understandings. As an autoethnographer, I am author, narrator, 
protagonist, subject, interpreter, and analyzer of the text that I produce. Ronai (1995, p. 
396), sums it up elegantly in her article outlining the layered account, writing that, “The 
boundaries of these identities converge, blur, and separate as I write…” She suggests 
that the layered account is stylistically able to accommodate fluidity, multiplicity, and 
movement. 
 Ronai has contributed significantly to the development the layered account and 
style of autoethnographic research (Ronai 1992, 1995, 1996). In her texts, she 
demarcates shifts between various perspectives and authorial voices using an asterisk, 
although she does not name which voice she is using for various segments. The asterisk 
offers a visible demarcation which explicates her negotiation of the multiple identities 
shaping the text, and denotes a shift between narrative, reflection, and analysis. 
According to Fox (1995, p. 330): 
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in her approach she shifts back and forth between a narrative account of her 
abuse experiences and a theoretical analysis of abuse. The tension created 
by the layered method reflects the gap that often exists between the lived 
experiences of survivors and the codification of those experiences by 
researchers. Ronai challenges the authority of the researcher by juxtaposing 
graphic experiences of abuse with a distant voice of authority… 
The structure of the layered account is designed to move across and between different 
voices; it articulates a complex, multifaceted interiority and a range of perspectives. It 
does this through multiple voices, which can be in dialogue, in concert, or in tension 
with each other. The range of voices within the layered account allows for a high degree 
of analysis or theoretical engagement. 
 The structure of the layered account requires adaptation to fit the length and 
scope of this thesis. Ronai’s work is article or chapter length. She does not use the 
section headings found in other academic texts; she relies solely on the asterisk. Here, I 
deviate from Ronai in style, and attempt to enact the theory behind her style in a novel 
manner. I do not use the asterisk. A document of thesis length requires headings to 
organize ideas, and I have found that the synthesis of headings with asterisks creates a 
jumbled, clunky, and discontinuous text. More importantly, I find that fluidity amongst 
various voices—author, narrator, protagonist, subject, interpreter, and analyzer—can 
still be achieved using headings. Naming these various perspectives echos Ronai’s 
(1995, p. 396) comments about the mingling, divergence, overlap, and blurring of 
identities in her writing. In addition to using headings and not using asterisks, I 
demarcate archival pieces at the beginning of narrative segments, to note the timeframe 
in which those segments were written.  
 The layered account is committed to the creative enunciation of multiple and 
complex subjectivities of autoethnographic researchers. Therefore, I contend that the 
stylistic and organizational approach adopted in this thesis are true to the spirit of the 
layered account and build upon its insights, even if the form departs from traditional 
layered accounts. Further, while Ronai (1992, 1995, 1996) advocates for the generative 
potential in breaking away from traditional academic conventions, I opt to stay closer to 
those convention, for example, by using headings. Another example is my wider 
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engagement with social science research, which is consistent with an analytic 
autoethnographic approach committed to advancing theory. 
 Several additional aspects of my approach distinguish it from other 
autoethnographic layered accounts. Ellis and Adams (2014, p. 267) situate the layered 
account as evocative autoethnography when they state that, “The primary purpose of the 
layered account is to texually represent selves as lived—as fragmented, uncertain, and 
exposed to different kinds of information at different times.” I stand with the latter half 
of this statement. The layered account embraces the experience of fragmentation, 
especially to the degree that my self and perspective have changed over time, in and 
through relationships. By reflecting on archived records of conversations that transpired 
years in the past, I demonstrate these fluctuations and changes. 
 However, I disagree with the notion that a text is capable of representing lived 
selves and experiences. The universalization of the idea of what texts are capable of 
portraying stands in tension to the emphasis placed on situating the researcher, which is 
central to the approach. While it is useful to denote what a research method is able to 
do, or even should do, the assessment that it can and should always “represent selves as 
lived” fails to account for the diversity of selves, one’s experience of their self, and self-
articulation. Attempting to portray lives as lived may serve as a helpful guideline when 
setting out to construct a layered account, but I resist accepting this assertion at the 
outset of my research. Instead, I approach the layered account as a powerful means for 
deploying multiple perspectives and engaging complex interiorities. I am reluctant to 
take a further step in stating that my writing is true to how my self is lived, or that 
writing the lived self was my primary purpose. Rather, I seek to analyze lived 
experience in order to advance theory. 
 Further, Ellis and Adams (2014) do not specify what they mean in stating that 
the layered account represents uncertainty. Perhaps they are suggesting that the layered 
account is automatically uncertain, or cannot make claims; if so, I disagree. I suggest 
that the juxtaposition of various authorial voices, in harmony and contrast, points 
toward hesitations and contradicting views. Such contrast can be productive in 
developing arguments and insights while keeping in mind their context, and the limits 
of what can be known and declared. In her work on feminist vulnerability as an 
epistemological tool, Page advocates for curiosity (2017, p. 19). Embracing uncertainty 
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within a layered account provides an opportunity to resist dominant, hegemonic forms 
of knowledge production. It creates space for inquiry and nuance. 
 Both autoethnography in general, and the layered account in particular, are 
discussed as having healing potential for researchers who need to tell a story in order to 
resolve it (Ellis and Bochner, 1996; Ellis and Adams, 2014; Ellis 1991). I am skeptical 
of this claim, and concerned that it bolsters critiques of the genre as narcissistic and 
self-absorbed (Chang 2008). In this project, I aim to use self-story as data that I 
unwittingly accrued. Such data allows for deep and sustained engagement over several 
years of lived experience. It provides increased access to interiority. Drawing from 
analytic autoethnography, I focus primarily on theory and analysis, rather than on my 
self, my story, or my personal reflections or emotions. Reflection and emotion are tools 
and raw materials for engagement, analysis, and deconstruction; the endgame is not 
simply to tell the story because I have a personal need to do so. While such enterprises 
are legitimate and valuable in a multitude of contexts, and may be a project that I take 
up in other spaces, the purpose of this research project is to explore links between 
personal experience and dominant discourse using academic tools to advance theory. I 
use narrative as an anchor—not only to provide nuance, but also to keep my analysis on 
the ground and inoculate it against devolution into abstractum ad absurdum.  
 In this thesis, I deal with the social consequences of events that are taboo and 
stigmatized, in addition to being traumatic. I hope to develop new ways of speaking, 
writing, and thinking about sexual victimization, identity negotiation, and secondary 
victimization. These taboo subjects are commonly left unspoken or, according to 
McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance (2011), muted. Ronai (1995, p. 407) states it succinctly 
with regard to child sexual abuse: “If it becomes extremely common to discuss sexual 
abuse, without shame, there is an improved chance for children to come forward when it 
is happening to them.” It is important to normalize these conversations, and to reduce 
the stigma around them by examining the complex factors contributing to their 
stigmatization. 
 Autoethnography offers a distinct and useful approach to theorizing lived 
experience and using lived experience to think beyond the personal. As a member of the 
social world, I am influenced by dominant discourses—both in my own sense-making 
and by way of relationships to others. Autoethnography allows me to carefully excavate 
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the links between myself and my cultural context. By considering the value and limits 
of autoethnography, especially Chang’s (2008) warnings and Anderson’s (2006) 
framework, I strive to construct an autoethnography that balances these tensions to 
refine, test, and generate theory. To do so, I focus my analysis on dominant discourses 
as they manifest in conversations I had after sexual violence, and how such discursively 
constituted experiences impacted my relationships and identity. I explore my method for 
doing so in the next section. 
Method and data in this thesis 
 The rapes transpired in June and July 2012. I began recording the story of what 
happened and some initial conversations about it in September 2012. Several weeks 
later, I named the events as rape. Over the following three years, I drafted three versions 
of a memoir, experimenting with different tones and styles. Among my main goals was 
to record the events of the Amazon as accurately as possible, and close temporal 
proximity seemed important to that enterprise. However, it became apparent almost 
immediately that there were ongoing consequences that I wanted to consider further. I 
wrote down several conversations immediately after they occurred. 
 I drafted these records between 2012 and 2015. In total, they contain over 
100,000 words. One draft was written between September 2012 and January 2013. The 
next was written between April 2013 and February 2014, and the final version was 
written between May and November 2014. The memoir’s working title was Singing in 
the Dark, which referred to the tradition of singing during the ceremonies that are 
usually performed with the psychoactive plants that my captor used to incapacitate me. 
 The longer conversations that were extracted as data for this thesis were 
recorded in writing within a few hours of their occurring, as close to verbatim as 
possible. I recorded these conversations swiftly to keep the tenor of the discussion and 
specific words fresh. However, as several years have transpired between writing these 
accounts and using them as data, I cannot account entirely for editing in the meantime. 
The conversations included in this thesis are presented as they were saved in a PDF 
from before 2015, and are consistent with my memory of the language and tenor of the 
conversation. 
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 My data is what Lucal (1999, p. 786, citing Reinharz, 1992) terms “unplanned 
and unwitting research” in that it was accumulated by happenstance, for purposes other 
than academic research: “It is an analysis of ‘unplanned personal experience’, that is, 
experiences that were not part of a research project but instead part of my daily 
encounters.” I kept records of these conversations within the memoir drafts without 
knowing that they would one day form the basis for analysis in a doctoral thesis or any 
academic work. 
 To select portions of the memoirs for use in this thesis, I performed keyword 
searches in the text for the words “victim” and “survivor”. I also selected other 
keywords, which was how I found the excerpt on “not knowing” below, by two criteria. 
First, if I found ideas in the literature that sparked memories of events, I performed a 
word search accordingly in order to explore the link between salient memories and my 
research. For example, I performed a word search for “not knowing” in several drafts, 
and proceeded to analyze the record in light of current research.  
 Second, I sought to include conversations that had some emotional charge, 
indicating ongoing influence or importance in my subjective experience. Early on, I 
decided to consider the language of victimhood and survivorship. Upon searching for 
words in my drafts, I found only a few examples. All of the narrative fragments 
containing consideration of the terms “victim” or “survivor” in my archives were used 
in the thesis as starting points for analysis. The conversations I analyze in later chapters 
were particularly important in my experience, and lingered as especially strong 
memories over time. My assessment of importance may be why I recorded them at the 
time, or their ongoing significance may stem from my having written them down.  
 In addition to archived material, there are two areas of analysis based on 
memories recalled during the process of writing this thesis. One such memory is of a 
specific conversation, which I recall and analyze in Chapter 5. The other, included in 
Chapter 4, is more generalized and includes events which transpired over a longer 
period and generated emotions which inform my analysis. My analysis of emotions as 
data builds on Campbell (2002, p122): 
 Rather than pretending that it is not there, our field must come to terms 
with the emotion of rape. When we write about rape, we must discuss the 
emotional pain—to the survivors and to secondary victims—that is caused 
 96
by rape. There is much to be learned by feeling rape, by understanding the 
emotions of rape, and by embracing the emotionality of this topic… 
Emotions can be an important resource for science, and the emotionality of 
rape is essential to its understanding. 
My inclusion of memory and emotion data is consistent with a layered account, which 
overlaps evocative and analytic autoethnographic styles. Findings are drawn by 
analysing my data in light of existing theorizations and research, using experience as the 
basis for inquiry. 
 I find contradictions between the ideas I articulated in the past and the ideas I 
developed while writing the thesis, indicating changes in my perspective. Therefore, my 
engagement with Page (2017) and her argument about tentative aspects of research is 
especially important: having lived through these experiences, I am aware that my 
perspective has changed over time. I have sought to elaborate on these changes in this 
thesis. 
Working with memoir 
 In 2012, while fleeing the Amazon, I decided I would write the experience I was 
escaping. At the time, I took for granted that memoir was the obvious genre for my 
enterprise; it was highly visible in popular culture as an outlet for women’s stories. 
Writing a memoir was not an active or considered choice at that stage. Rather, my 
perceptions about the avenues for narration available to me constructed my approach to 
drafting the story, especially my awareness of an audience, my desire for a witness to 
my experiences, and my understandings of what others expected from the story, which I 
address below and in Chapter 5.  
 Memoir is a form of self-narrative, similar to autobiography. Memoir is the older 
term, and denotes personal experience with events and historical periods, and testimony 
rendered in an accessible, creative form (Buss, 2002; Smith and Watson, 2001). 
Autobiography emphasizes reflection on the state of the soul pursuant to public 
accomplishment, while memoir deals with memory and chronicles of the past (Smith 
and Watson, 2001). According to Buss (2002 p. 2-3), memoir “can accommodate both 
the factual and the theoretical” and  
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bridges the typical strategies of the historical and literary discourses in order 
to establish necessary connections between the private and the public, the 
personal and the political. 
Memoir, therefore, provides means for probing into individual lives and social norms, 
and for elucidating links between the political and the personal. Memoir has been 
especially important for women as a means to challenge exclusion from history (Buss, 
2002). It can centre women’s stories in a male dominated social context. 
 Both memoir and autobiography deal with the “autobiographical pact”, a term 
coined by Lejeune in 1975 (Miller, 3007). Within the pact, the writer will convey the 
truth, even if the truth is not entirely fact based (Miller, 2007). The pact also addresses 
the different manner in which texts are approached when taken as based in real life 
(Smith and Watson, 2001). According to Smith and Watson (2001, p18)  
Commitment to self-narration, not as an act for calculated gain in fortune or 
fame but as an epistemological act of thinking through what one as a subject 
knows to be or not to be, remains a basis of both writerly tact and readerly 
trust. 
This insight is crucial in understanding my own aims as I thought about drafting a 
memoir to record my experiences in and after the Amazon. I embarked on writing and 
recording with an audience in mind, an external witness to whom I imagined I was 
accountable for the accuracy of my record of worldly events and internal realities. I 
endeavoured to write something that could withstand factual investigation, while 
thinking and working through the emotional and intellectual challenges brought to bear 
through my own experiences.  
 Life writing, according to Eakin (2004), asks readers to trust the credibility of 
the author to self-narrate, and includes a moral imperative to tell the truth; life-writers 
may be criticised for embellishing and lying, or for telling too much truth. Memoir 
raises questions of how much to disclose, for the sake of the writer and the readers, and 
relations enfolded in the text (Miller, 2007). In my own writing, I tended toward telling 
uncomfortable truths, out of a desire for complex contours of sexual violence to stand in 
the open for further consideration. I felt unable to master my own telling, which was an 
experience I imagined might resonate with others. It seemed important and interesting 
to leave the mess intact. 
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 Memoir has been especially important in advancing women’s accounts and life-
narratives, and for articulating complexity. According to Brodzki and Schenck, (1988) 
memoir “localizes the very program of much feminist theory.” Writing in the late 1980s, 
Brodzki and Schenck argue that autobiography had been male dominated, dealing with 
western norms of masculinity and male selves, while women’s autobiographical writing 
had been under-theorized. Since then, several scholars have advanced theorization of 
women’s memoir, especially Smith and Watson (2001), Buss (2002), Miller (2007), and 
Gilmore (2017). For instance, Miller (2007, p.544) argues for the inherent relationality 
of memoir, and states that: “Feminist critics have been making the case for the model of 
a relational self at the heart of the autobiographical project for over two decades.” Her 
relational stance includes others within the texts, and also the other in the reader, on 
whom the writer depends. This relational stance to life-writing overlaps with the some 
of the ethical considerations of writing autoethnography, which I discuss later in this 
chapter. It also aligns with my argument in this thesis, building on Brison (2002), that 
the aftermath of sexual violence is profoundly relational. 
 Memoir is also political. It offers a space to consider everyday traumas in 
various historic moments (Miller, 2007), and a means of conveying testimony (Smith 
and Watson, 2001; Gilmore, 2017). Gilmore (2017) deals extensively with the politics 
of self-narration, noting how women’s accounts (especially of sexual violence) have 
been subject to doubt, blame, stigma, judgement, and charges of deception. She 
discusses how the predictability of these denouncing responses “are a threat that 
prevents women from testifying” (Gilmore, 2017 p. 7). Denouncing responses inhibit 
the means by which women name harms or wrongs that have been done and seek to 
advance justice. 
 Gilmore’s work provides a clear critique of memoir in a neoliberal context, 
which has informed the development of my own critique. Gilmore maps a turn in 
memoir toward the neoliberal life narrative. Prior to the turn, memoir showcased 
women’s voices, offering accounts for normative violence within oppressive systems, in 
a style that was accessible to a wide readership. It highlighted personal experience and 
narrative and played with multiple genres. In the late 1980s, for example, memoirists 
advanced stories of complex lives and systemic violence. However, they were 
eventually subject to censure, denunciation, and shaming. According to Gilmore (2017, 
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p.93), memoir’s “potential had to be absorbed into neoliberalism by emptying the form 
of its challenging and politicized content and replacing its aesthetic challenges with the 
closure of the redemption narrative” which offered happy endings and personal triumph. 
Testimonial narratives were crowded out in the 1980s and 1990s by neoliberal life 
narratives. 
 Neoliberal life narratives, like redemption narratives, allow the stories to be 
“absorbed and neutralised” or otherwise recuperated and depoliticized, thereby gutting 
the potency of critical memoirs (Gilmore, 2017 p. 86). Gilmore suggests that Oprah 
contributed to the proliferation of redemption narratives and self-help by way of her 
media empire. Memoir was thus reduced to the individual person, constructed to 
overlook systemic power and bypass calls for justice in favour of personal overcoming 
and redemption. Neoliberalism evacuated memoir of political and social power, and 
constricted narrative accounts to fit within its logics (Gilmore, 2017). Gilmore (2017 p. 
89) argues that  
the neoliberal life narrative features an ‘I’ who overcomes hardship and 
recasts historical and systemic harm as something an individual alone can, 
and should, manage through pluck, perseverance, and enterprise. The 
individual transforms disadvantage into value. 
This template dictates the themes and structures of popular, contemporary memoirs. Not 
only is oppression rendered a hurdle that can be individually overcome, but the 
experience is imbued with value and profit. Such value may be in the suffering itself, or 
else in its successful surmounting of struggle, depending on the text. In this thesis, I 
build on this notion and advance it by suggesting that neoliberal norms and values 
constitute the experiences of victim/survivors of sexual violence. 
 The neoliberal life narrative structure dovetails with my own experience of 
directives on how I should interpret and respond to my life’s events. I address this in 
detail in Chapters 4 and 5. Friends and trusted others encouraged me to write (and 
therefore live) an uplifting story. Their expectations were likely informed by the 
proliferation of popular neoliberal life narratives, which also fits with the journey 
metaphor (a subject of Chapter 5) by which victims become survivors and overcome the 
realities of sexual violence. 
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 This shift toward individualistic accounts shields readers from moral and ethical 
imperatives elucidated by disclosing the realities and details of lives under oppression. 
Gilmore (2017, p. 115) points out that neoliberal life narratives “focus on one’s relation 
to one’s self rather than to others. They focus on what one person can do, and they 
distill politics and social chance to an n of one.” Justice remains out of the frame. 
 In reflecting on my own experience of drafting a memoir-structured record of 
my experiences, my aims were shaped by my readings of politically potent and feminist 
self-narrative, as well as popular neoliberal memoirs. These differing agendas and 
narrative structures were in tension within me as I sought to create a text reflective of an 
immediate and ongoing experience. I could not live a redemption narrative and a 
politically potent story simultaneously. I lacked the analysis and language to parse out 
the distinctions between these types of memoirs and the realities they might construct. 
 In this sense, my use of the term memoir to describe my data and records is 
fitting, because the turn from complex and subversive life writing to the neoliberal life 
narrative encompasses two dimensions of what I sought to do. Most importantly, my 
goal was to keep an accurate record, which I generated with a sense of accountability 
for the truth and tact to an imagined audience. I was bearing witness and creating 
testimony. In the context of this thesis, the memoir draft is relevant because it provides 
the record basis of my data. That record is laden with expectations to personally 
overcome — as per the neoliberal life narrative aesthetic. The depoliticising 
consequences of neoliberal expectations, and their manifestation within and through 
interpersonal relationships, are a central subject of Part II of this project. 
 In the following chapters, I explore ideas that came up in my memoir excerpts 
and in existing literature, using a revised autoethnographic layered account. I apply the 
theories I explored in Chapter 2 to consider how dominant discourse shaped my 
experience of the untenability of the victim label, the survivor imperative, scholarly 
notions of posttraumatic growth, the role of rape myths in everyday conversation, and 
secondary victimization. Below, I outline what I mean by discourse, and how I will 
engage with discourse in this thesis. Thinking in terms of discourse helps broaden the 
focus of my work beyond the personal, to the social and discursive context in which my 
personal experience and insights are situated. 
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The term ‘discourse’ in this thesis 
 The term discourse has a number of definitions, varying between theorists and 
disciplines. As Baxter (2003, p. 7) notes, “Aptly demonstrating the non-fixity of 
meaning, the term ‘discourse’ is itself a highly contested term within the field… varying 
in meaning according to user and context.” Fairclough (1992) discusses the difficulty of 
the concept, noting that definitions varyingly clash and resonate between disciplines and 
theoretical approaches. Therefore, it is imperative that I define the term discourse and 
explicate how I use it for examination and analysis. 
 Discourse includes ideas and language that are available to construct and 
interpret reality, and which in turn shape reality. Discourse enfolds both language and 
the social (Fairclough, 1992). Mills (2004, p. 49) states that “the only way to apprehend 
reality is through discourse…” In a sense, discourse functions as an arbiter of reality. 
More broadly, Philips and Jorgensen (2002, p. 1) consider discourse “a particular way of 
talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” that is not 
neutral. Discourse does something (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Rather than reflecting 
reality like a mirror, the language we use constitutes and is constituted by discourse, 
which makes, creates, and changes the world and our relationship to it (Fairclough, 
1992, 2011; Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002; Potter, 1996). Experience is mediated by 
discourse. Theorizing discourse may open new possibilities for resisting dominant 
discourse, and synthesizes well with Ahmed’s (2017) challenge to the bifurcation of 
theory from experience.  
 Discourses are not singular: there is not one universal discourse. Our selves, 
relationships, and places in the social world are, according to Baxter (2003, p. 1), 
“located in competing yet interwoven discourses”. Within the multiplicity of discourses 
in contention and overlap, some have more currency than others; some are more readily 
accessible for interpretation and sense-making. Brison (2002) nods to available sense-
making frames in her discussions of how people responded to her attack. People who 
could not conceive of her experience, who stumbled to find adequate words to respond 
to her, defaulted to blame and expectations that she would use her experience for good 
(Brison, 2002). Sense-making, interpretation, and the apprehension of reality are 
processes of applying language (names, narratives, and concepts) to experience and 
observations; in turn, perceptions of those experiences are mediated through language.  
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 The most widespread and dominant discourses are known as hegemonic 
discourses; these seem to be common sense (Fairclough, 1992), and therefore have 
more currency. For example, the discourses of heterosex, as outlined by Gavey (2019), 
combined with rape myths provide one set of prevailing logics for making sense of 
sexual violence. In the #MeToo era, there are alternative feminist discourses available to 
make sense in novel ways and resist or reject dominant, rape-permissive discourses. The 
tensions between dominant discourse and novel meaning making frames highlights that 
there are multiple, competing discourses available in any given instance (Phillips and 
Jorgensen, 2002). Potter and Wetherell (1987, p. 3, 9) identify “the ever-present 
possibility of alternative descriptions and categorizations”, including “delicate shades of 
meaning” that can be articulated in a common linguistic system of meaning. There are a 
range of discursive possibilities, including new discourses that emerge from tensions 
and competition between existing discourses. McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance (2011) 
offer tools for handling these contradictions and tensions, which are discussed below.  
 We make sense of the world and our social experiences through discourse. Mills 
(2004, p. 46) provides a useful example of how discourse functions: 
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has 
nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the 
realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an 
event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, 
independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is 
constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of 
God’ depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is 
not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different 
assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any 
discursive condition of emergence. 
The example above highlights what Potter and Wetherell call “an available 
choreography of interpretive moves” (cited Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002, p. 107). In 
Mill’s earthquake example, discursive structures within the fields of religion, poetry, 
geology, or engineering shape how the earthquake or felled brick are identified and 
interpreted, which narrative they are made to fit, and how they are made conceivable. 
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 Some ideas appear as common sense—in other words, they are obvious and 
taken for granted—and new ideas can naturalize quickly if they function well in various 
circumstances (Fairclough, 1992; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Yet, according to Potter 
and Wetherell (1987), “Taken-for-granted meanings are not natural, inherent properties 
of these things but essentially arbitrary, culturally constructed conventions.” Further, 
these conventions serve existing power structures and inequities. Rape myths offer a 
clear example: rape myths are widespread, false beliefs about rape that shape the 
meaning made from sexually violent events, and which influence social responses to 
victims of sexual violence in potentially deleterious, material ways. Rape myths do 
things: their articulation conveys meaning to victims that may foster self-blame or deter 
help-seeking. As I discussed in Chapter 1, in a social climate where rape myths are 
increasingly challenged they persist in more subtle forms: they change, and coexist with 
competing discourses.  
 Challenging dominant discourses requires a willingness to “investigate and 
analyze power relations in society”, Phillips and Jorgensen (2002, p. 2) tell us, with “an 
eye on the possibilities for social change”. Discourses are often used to maintain 
unequal power relations in society, and “power creates and shapes how social worlds 
can be discussed” (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002, p. 14). Discourse is distinct from 
ideology, which is “meaning in service to power” (Fairclough, cited in Phillips and 
Jorgensen, 2002, p.75). Discourses can be more or less ideological depending how 
strongly they maintain or challenge power relations, potentially opening avenues for 
political resistance. 
 In addition to their multiplicity, discourses change; they are active, and the 
knowledge constructed through discourses has “social consequences” (Phillips and 
Jorgensen, 2002, p. 6). Potter (1996, p. 47) notes that, “Descriptions are not just 
about something but they are also doing something; that is, they are not merely 
representing some facet of the world, they are also involved in that world in some 
practical way.” Potter (1996) develops this idea through the metaphors of a mirror and 
of a construction yard. These metaphors are extended through a range of texts by 
multiple authors. According to Potter and Wetherell (1987, p. 4), language is not a 
mirror, and language itself does not exist independent of what it describes; instead, it 
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actively constructs what it describes, “and being active, [language has] social and 
political implications”. Discourses create social worlds. 
 According to Potter (1996, p. 97), the construction yard metaphor has two 
aspects: “The first is the idea that descriptions and accounts construct the world, or at 
least versions of the world. The second is the idea that these descriptions and accounts 
are themselves constructed” (emphasis in original). Put another way, the language we 
deploy to account for reality both constitutes and is constituted by discourse. Discourses 
are not neutral: we access reality through language and discourse, and discourse lends 
meaning to reality via language. The cycle moves in two directions: discourse, made up 
of language, shapes how we take in the world—how we make the world make sense 
inside our minds—as well as what we do about it. 
 In seeking to engage with and analyze discourse, I draw on Page’s (2017) 
theorization of vulnerable writing as a tool to generate understandings that are cautious, 
deep, and attentive to the limits of the data set. The goal is to move analysis beyond 
hegemonic and dominant frameworks by picking up tensions, contradictions, and 
hesitations as sites of reflection and inquiry. I also build on McKenzie-Mohr and 
Lafrance (2011), who develop the notion of tightrope talk by building on DeVault’s 
notion of “linguistic incongruence”, which occurs where dominant discourses fail to 
narrate or make sense of events and experience. McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance (2011, p. 
56) advocate working with “frequent starts and stops, pauses, hesitations, and 
contradictions”, in order to get at understandings that go beyond dominant or 
hegemonic frames. Tightrope talk allows for consideration of novel articulations 
achieved by deploying the precise discourses that a speaker aims to move beyond. I 
outline these approaches below. 
Analysis beyond dominant frameworks 
 In this thesis, I attempt to push my analysis past readily available discursive 
frames in an effort to dismantle and challenge those frames. Such analysis includes 
critiquing bodies of research that reiterate dominant norms in their analysis, as well as 
deconstructing binary categories. Doing so has involved challenging my own 
assumptions on an ongoing basis and working within the data, which is part of the 
framework termed “vulnerable writing” by Page (2017). I have also benefited from the 
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notion of tightrope talk as developed by McKenzie-Morn and Lafrance (2011). In the 
current section, I wish to introduce these concepts and their application to the project, 
both with regard to my approach and in the final product I have produced. 
 Page’s (2017) analysis and method emerge from her thesis work on self-
immolation, focusing on the narrative of Miriam Al-Khawli, a Syrian refugee and 
mother of four. In her article on vulnerable writing as feminist method, she highlights 
the ambiguities, uncertainties, tensions, and hesitations that helped her work from 
within the data, rather than superimposing her preexisting assumptions onto the data. 
Among Page’s (2017, p. 16) crucial insights is that, “Within the research process, self-
immolation can become transformed and understood within existing frames of 
hermeneutic and analytic knowledge.” Research can transform, unpack, and analyze 
trauma and violence in a manner that risks morphing or resolving it in familiar terms, 
thus reiterating existing norms. This risk is one I wish to mitigate in my research. 
 Page’s vulnerable writing comes to bear on how I approach the material in this 
thesis; it informs my engagement with my data and other texts. For example, in 
developing Chapter 6, I assumed that PTG might offer scope for positive outcomes 
following trauma. PTG had been a prominent discourse in my recovery, and one which I 
drew on myself; I believed I might become a better, stronger person as a result of 
trauma. Sitting with this assumption as I began my research and reflection, I realized 
that I wanted to imagine positive possibilities. As I deepened my critical engagement, I 
considered the deleterious effects of PTG discourse on my post-rape experience. I 
reconsidered PTG oriented framings of my story and began to ask questions about the 
negative consequences of advancing PTG—especially as an imperative or expectation. 
Gradually, as my analysis deepened, my assessment of my own experience shifted in 
ways that helped me more deeply understand the stakes of advancing or critiquing PTG. 
I came to grips with the extent to which PTG constituted pressure to perform 
victimhood in particular ways, which were not always achievable to me, and where the 
consequences of failure to grow were disastrous to my relationships. I explore this in 
greater detail in Chapters 6 and 8. 
 My understanding of PTG and its problematics remains tentative and cautious. 
Because my research has forced me to reconsider my own assumptions about PTG, I 
imagine that over time my perspective will continue to change. Page’s (2017) approach 
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encourages reflection, care, and openness throughout knowledge production. This may 
or may not be explicitly written into the text—it veers toward a more evocative 
autoethnographic style—but it nevertheless shapes the process of knowledge 
production. In the case of this thesis, Page’s (2017) approach informs my ontology in 
knowledge production. The tools of vulnerable writing are also applicable to engaging 
with tightrope talk, which was developed my McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance (2011). 
 McKenzie-Mohr conducts research with women living well after rape, and 
Lafrance researches women with depression. They discuss how dominant narratives 
only go so far in providing language for women to articulate their experiences. 
McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrances (2011) argue that inquiry into women’s lived experience 
must engage carefully with non-standard use of language; researchers must “translate” 
and look beyond what is said to consider what novel narratives are being told. Their 
method of dealing with “linguistic incongruence” involves examining sites of 
contradiction and tension. Their approach maintains awareness of the tendency for 
stories that do not fit dominant narratives to be expressed in dominant or normative 
terms. Tightrope talk synthesizes well with Page’s (2017) approach to vulnerable 
writing. Both approaches require patience, care, and a willingness to take up glitches 
and incongruences, to go beyond the analytic, narrative, and discursive frames that are 
most readily available for interpreting experience, and to engage data with caution. 
 Tightrope talk includes metaphor, both/and descriptions, struggles to make 
meaning, and contradiction in speech. In one example, McKenzie-Morh and Lafrance 
(2011, p. 62) discuss a participant’s desire to “see herself as both an empowered, active 
agent of her life and also without blame for her rape.” This participant voices concern 
that the tensions generated by this both/and and its contractions may foster blame. 
These sorts of tensions are precisely where tightrope talk becomes a vital analytic tool, 
since it encourages naming the tensions and consideration of various discourses which 
influence the construction of these tensions. In the case above, I would suggest the 
participant is managing the survivor imperative (which I outline in Chapter 5), the 
legitimacy of her claim that someone assaulted her—and therefore her status as a 
victim, while evading blame for causing her own victimization. Tightrope talk allows 
these to be taken together and teased apart in productive ways. 
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 Page (2017), and McKenzie-Morh, and Lafrance (2011) argue that researchers 
risk defaulting to obvious and readily accessible analyses, tools, modes, and theories at 
the expense of sitting with inaccessible, incommunicable, and unintelligible facets of 
the data. They suggest that resisting default meaning making modes is especially 
relevant when that data involves trauma. Advancing the work of Mahmood (2012), Page 
(2017, p. 16) argues that superimposition of meaning is a form of violence; what existed 
beyond the limits of hegemonic sense-making is now “tam[ed] and control[ed]”. She 
contends that such knowledge is produced in advance of an encounter with the other, 
which might neglect or colonize new information or articulations, and preclude 
engagement with something novel on its own terms. Page’s vulnerable writing as a 
methodology inoculates against these potential risks to delicate research projects. 
 The framework provided by McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance (2011) is vital to 
advancing analysis beyond hegemonic frames, especially when analyzing victimization 
and identity negotiation. Their notion of tightrope talk is highly applicable to working 
with victim/survivor speech. In conducting my research, I have stumbled in trying to 
make sense of contradictory speech. Their framework allows for working with and 
through those contradictions. Rather than fixate on one statement or another, McKenzie 
Mohr and Lafrance (2011, p. 65) suggest that contradictions themselves are the 
site where novel articulations occur: “Our analysis calls for attention to the importance 
of listening for, and lingering in, the spaces where language fails.” In so doing, counter-
narratives can grow, opening up new spaces for resistance. 
 Page (2017) offers insights for planning a cautious and vulnerable approach in 
working through the tensions and sensitivities inherent in this project. In particular, her 
method supports unpacking sites of paradox and contradiction elucidated by McKenzie-
Mohr and Lafrance’s (2011) tightrope talk. Throughout my research, Page’s (2017) 
insights are built into my approach, reminding me to pause with various tensions, to 
move slowly and cautiously, and to engage curiosity and not knowing.  
 I also distinguish between intellectual vulnerability and emotional vulnerability, 
especially in the context of autoethnography. In early drafts, I avoided personal 
reflection or emotionally explicit writing, despite their common appearance in evocative 
autoethnographic writing and my fondness for the style. I began the writing with a 
strong emphasis on the theoretical, on analyzing the data in relation to other research; 
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only later did I include a little more personal reflection. This strategy enables me to 
work from within the data, and prioritize the analysis, rather than emphasize my 
personal process as a researcher writing on the sensitive subject of sexual victimization. 
The ideas I develop are vulnerable material: the analysis is new to me, and thus 
tentative. I have worked to destabilize my own assumptions, thereby allowing those 
assumptions to be examined and challenged throughout the research process.  
 Tensions also arise from the subject matter: sexual violence, its effects, and 
secondary victimization are challenging topics. Page (2017) argues that explicitly 
vulnerable writing is vital in attempting to analyze traumatic experiences. I am acutely 
aware that I am a researcher who has experienced victimization, and seeks to place that 
personal experience within the landscape of scholarly scrutiny. Personal vulnerability 
was another basis for foregrounding theoretical and analytical writing, rather than 
personal reflection or more emotionally explicit writing. My own vulnerability was 
implicated in my willingness to challenge my own ideas as well as the norms and 
discourses that have inflected my lived experience. The matter of intellectual 
vulnerability sensitized me to the limits of how emotionally vulnerable I was willing to 
be in writing a thesis. 
Not Knowing 
 Page (2017) develops ideas about vulnerability, she also addresses not knowing 
as a methodological practice. Her use of the word “practice” prompts consideration of 
variations in the definition of the term. The Oxford English Dictionary provides three 
definitions for practice: 
1. The actual application or use of an idea, belief, or method, as 
opposed to theories relating to it. 
2. The customary, habitual, or expected procedure or way of doing 
something. 
3. Repeated exercise in or performance of an activity or skill so as to 
acquire or maintain proficiency in it. 
Each of these varying definitions apply to the practice of research. In the first instance, 
research involves the theorization and practical application of a method. Second, 
methodological practices often fit within traditions of inquiry, either adhering to them or 
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breaking from them in a derivative manner: for example, autoethnography derives from 
ethnography and its critiques. Third—and somewhat unique to the methodology of not 
knowing—is the aspect of repetition of a particular task over time, in service to the 
acquisition of competence in that task.  
 Not knowing as a practice, as an epistemological and ontological stance, asks a 
researcher to return to the open state of not knowing at multiple stages of research. It 
functions in much the same way that the practice of meditation asks meditators to return 
to the breath over and again; this returning grows more habitual over time, just as not 
knowing in research becomes more habitual. I find that the habit of not knowing 
increases the likelihood that I move cautiously and in directions unforeseen from the 
outset. In my research process, not knowing has opened possibilities for new analyses 
and interpretations beyond dominant discourse. 
 Not knowing plays an important role in how I live and make sense of my 
experience. It informs my approach to this thesis. Therefore, in the section below, I 
introduce data from a narrative excerpt which relates to not knowing and the role it 
played in the initial years after the rapes. I have included it in this chapter on methods to 
demonstrate how I will use methods and organize data and analysis in the thesis.  
 In the immediate aftermath of the rapes, while I was in the process of fleeing 
back to the U.S., I spoke with Michelle, whose ideas resonate with Page’s (2017) 
theorization. As a person with power in our relationship, Michelle offered her 
perspective on the role of not knowing as it might pertain to my post-rape sense-
making. Hers was pivotal guidance. 
Singing in the Dark, 2014 draft 
 [Michelle] spoke a lot about uncertainty, about the unknown. There was so much 
about this mess, about [my abuser], that I would never know, that I could never know. 
Certainty was not on the table. She encouraged me to expand my ability to hold that 
uncertainty. She reminded me to hold myself gracefully in contradictions [that] could 
not be resolved. 
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Singing in the Dark, 2012 draft 
 “There are so many things about this that you will never know.” [Michelle] was 
calling me to the task of being in a place of radical not knowing, not drawing 
conclusions, but gathering information. She suggested that I leave space for meaning to 
emerge, and that I stay on the radical edge of navigating this process of integration and 
healing from a place of not knowing. I knew that I would have to grow to be able to 
hold what felt like such vast uncertainty and multiple truths in this deeply complex 
situation. 
 What I considered to be the most significant aspects of the above conversation 
remained with me in the years that followed. However, were I to attempt to recall the 
memory now, the details held within these two accounts would elude me. I remember 
Michelle discussing not knowing as a survival tool, and as a strategy for coping and 
sense-making. The emotional valence of the memory has gravitas, and I can pinpoint 
various fruits of Michelle’s guidance. Yet the details have decayed over time. 
 These accounts of a conversation with Michelle touch on the idea of not 
knowing as a strategy for personal resilience in dealing with the long-term 
consequences, of trauma. Not knowing is a skill that is honed and developed over time. 
It requires returning to uncertainty, hesitating, and accepting the limits of current 
knowledge on a regular basis. According to Page (2017, p. 16), “Receptivity to not 
knowing and to remaining with uncertainty and hesitancy can become integral to 
particular textual strategies and methodological approaches.” Page (2017) and 
Michelle’s insights resonate with the ontological stance I developed in the wake of 
sexual violence. In the personal sense, actively not knowing was a method for coping 
with trauma and crafting a functional (and evolving) narrative of the events. These skills 
can be applied to research, and to developing a cautious, nuanced, and slowly unfolding 
research style. 
 McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance (2011) offer a complimentary set of practices for 
not knowing. First, they suggest attention to points of contradiction as they arise. 
Second, they encourage consideration around how contradictions can signal an effort to 
articulate something outside of dominant understandings, using the language that is 
available to the speaker. Holding contradictions is particularly useful to me in 
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considering the untenability of victim identity, based on the contradictory imperatives of 
various victim stereotypes and the consequences of adhering to or breaking from them. 
It is also useful in developing the survivor imperative framework.  
 My thesis fluctuates between consideration of the particulars of a single 
narrative and theorizations of larger social phenomena. The strategies put forth by Page 
(2017) and McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance (2011) resonate with my preexisting 
ontological stance and provide strategies for thinking and writing. I applied these 
strategies to self (auto) and social (ethno) inquiry, and also to the terrain that exists 
between these two realms, manifest in interpersonal interactions. These approaches 
offered a method for achieving a high degree of nuance in inquiry. 
 Writing the thesis was, for me, part of living a feminist life, and involved 
engaging lived experience and theory simultaneously. The approaches set out by 
McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance (2011) and Page (2017) offers skills and tools that are 
useful for living outside the context of producing academic work. Their frameworks 
continue to offer novel ways to approach ideas, consider new experience, and work 
through contradictions, hesitations, and uncertainty in daily life. Furthermore, the 
applicability of their methodology to daily life echoes Ellis’s (1991) insight that 
autoethnography is a way of living, and highlights the utility of the method outside the 
context of academic work. The methods that I deploy in this thesis continue to be tried 
and tested in a range of contexts, and contribute to my ongoing commitment to do 
theory as I continue to live in a feminist way. 
 Autoethnography is, by definition, radically local and specific. It involves 
learning from personal experience and connecting it to larger social and political 
phenomena (see Ahmed, 2017). Among the crucial contributions of Page’s (2017) 
approach is a keen awareness of the efficacy of starting within an experience and testing 
it against existing theory; Page’s approach inoculates against taking theory as a starting 
point and superimposing it onto experience where it may not fit, in efforts to contrive a 
pattern, solution, or resolution to complex phenomena. I do not view this as a simple or 
tidy process. However, as a methodological guide, it anchors the processes of research, 
writing, and living. 
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Ethics 
 Ethical standards for autoethnography are in development, and there is no 
universal method for adhering to ethical standards. There are always others in 
autoethnographic research, who are implicated in the narratives and insights that the 
researcher chooses to include in the work. The failure of some autoethnographers to 
consider the rights of others, or the impact of the writing on their own selves, 
demonstrates the need for forethought regarding ethical considerations in this method.  
 There are no formal, recruited participants in this research. However, as Tolich 
(2010) points out, all autoethnography includes others. Tolich (2010) discusses the 
rights of others in work based in self-narrative, and makes the critical point that it is 
essential to give significant forethought to methods of protecting others in the text and 
adhering to ethical standards to conceal identity and do no harm. Tolich (2010) is 
correct in his principles regarding protection of others and ethical forethought. 
However, the method by which he suggests these principles be applied, especially the 
universal necessity of informed consent, does not apply to all cases.  
 Tullis (2013, p. 249), responding to Tolich (2010), notes that, “Decisions about 
how to approach obtaining consent from the others autoethnographers choose to include 
in their narratives are not easily resolved by employing a single or universal procedure.” 
Tullis (2013), who performed research in a hospice setting, determined that it would be 
inappropriate to request informed consent for participation in some instances—for 
example, from individuals experiencing acute distress or actively dying. 
 Tolich’s (2010) critique centers on cases in which the proximity and specific 
nature of relationships implicitly reveals identity and breaks with confidentiality, at 
times revealing personal and private material without consent; he critiques pieces that 
include close friends and family members as main characters. These others are often 
readily identifiable, since the nature of the relationship (parent, child, partner) is 
essential to the integrity of the story being told by the researcher. Tolich (2010) also 
addresses works in which ethics are addressed as an afterthought: he points out several 
autoethnographies in which ethical standards are not adhered to at all, or are addressed 
inappropriately, for example in retrospect (Tolich, 2010).  
 Tolich’s (2010) argument makes sense in many autoethnographies, especially 
those in which others are in close relational proximity to the researcher. The identity of 
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these individuals is impossible to conceal. As I outline below, his guidelines do not 
apply in the case of my research, although his principles and standards absolutely do. 
The rights of others were an ongoing consideration in each instance where I included a 
narrative except or memory, including their right to privacy, anonymity, and non-harm.  
 In my thesis, the majority of others are peripheral others, and mentors or 
teachers in a range of contexts and locations, rather than close friends or relatives. Their 
relational proximity to me made for a rather simple process of changing names and 
details to conceal their identities. I did not include close friends or family. However, I 
prepared and planned for every person I could foresee including in the thesis from the 
outset, and included this plan in my ethics application. Those featured in this thesis are 
scattered across the U.S. and South America, and are further concealed by my having 
moved multiple times (between coasts and eventually overseas) in the timeframe 
discussed. 
 My thesis underwent ethics approval by the University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee in the early stages of finalizing my research topic. In my application, I 
provided a table detailing communities and groups that might have been included in the 
research narrative, and how individual identities were to be protected, or if informed 
consent would be pursued. There is a published account of my story by Rachel Monroe 
in New York Magazine. Details included therein cannot be altered, and the inclusion of 
any persons from that account in my autoethnography would have required informed 
consent. However, none of these individuals or interactions have been included in this 
thesis. My rapist was not named in that article, and is not named in this thesis. 
 My aim was to plan ahead. I examined any possibly identifying information and 
the potentials for concealment, tried to anticipate unforeseen possibilities, and 
developed plans to address them. For example, a standardized letter explaining the 
project and requesting informed consent was drafted for approaching those whose 
identities were at risk of exposure. If any unanticipated persons were to become 
potentially identifiable as the thesis developed, and work to conceal their identity 
proved insufficient, I would have returned to the ethics committee to pursue informed 
consent for these individuals. My intention was to seek informed consent as early as 
possible, as a preemptive request rather than a retroactive one. However, no cases 
requiring informed consent arose in the research. 
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 Some relationships that feature in the thesis involve persons with authority, or in 
a position of power that was influential to our relationship dynamic. Identifiable 
information, such as the specifics of our relationship or their identity, has been altered 
or omitted, and the specific nature of their role has been changed. The power differential 
and influence of the role was maintained, along with any other details that were 
essential to the integrity of the story.  
 Another ethical concern throughout this research was with regard to my 
emotional and intellectual safety as an autoethnographic researcher working on a topic 
pertaining to personal trauma. I used several strategies to manage self-care from the 
outset. I chose a topic of study that was somewhat removed from the acute trauma of 
sexual violence, and carefully assessed my comfort level with the topic throughout the 
earliest stages of inception and development.  
 Self-care was planned and strategized in advance as well. I began working with 
a local therapist with a strong trauma background in June 2017 and maintained 
bimonthly appointments. In addition, I worked ahead of schedule where possible to 
allow for time off without the pressure of impending deadlines, so that if the work 
became distressing, I could step away. In addition, I maintained a few other projects 
related to my research interests at any given time, so that I could put aside distressing 
thesis material and focus on other projects. Very rarely did the material for the thesis 
cause distress. 
 Finally, I largely avoided discussion of my thesis in personal time, and did not 
work on weekends or into the night. I discussed my work almost exclusively with those 
in a position to offer educated critiques and comments, and with the emotional skills to 
do so with sensitivity to and respect for the subject matter. These boundaries helped 
prevent fixation on difficult material in the thesis, and allowed adequate time for rest, 
restoration, and decompression. These measures were helpful in avoiding a slip into the 
terrain of PTSD or triggers, and have been successful. 
  
Conclusion 
 The autoethnographic method I use in this thesis is based on, and adapts, 
Ronai’s layered account. My approach is informed by Page’s (2017) vulnerable writing 
methodology to narrate, analyze, and reflect upon secondary victimization. Page’s 
 115
(2017) insights are embedded in my approach, and surface occasionally in later 
analysis. I also use McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance’s (2011) notion of tightrope talk to 
push my deconstruction and theorization beyond dominant norms.  
 For my data, I draw from extensive contemporaneous writings in the years after 
my sexual assault. I engage the data alongside existing theory and research to develop 
new theoretical insights. Among the advantages of the autoethnographic layered account 
is that it honors the fluidity of memory, and allows me to access and use various 
perspectives in writing: that of a researcher, a storyteller, and a victim/survivor of sexual 
violence. 
 In this section, I have discussed autoethnography generally, and the layered 
account as the methodological basis for this thesis. I have tried to use insights from 
autoethnography to enhance the feminist theoretical approaches laid out in the previous 
chapter. Autoethnography allows me to navigate ethical concerns and avoid the pitfalls 
endemic to self-narrative in research. I have outlined various ethical concerns pertaining 
to autoethnography and detailed my plans from the outset to manage them. In addition, I 
have framed and defined discourse as I use the term. I organized this chapter to deal 
with the methods, tools, and theories that pertain to the practice of this research. In Part 
II, I used these methods, synthesized with feminist theoretical approaches, to consider 
my experience of the untenability of victim identity, the survivor imperative, and 
implications for posttraumatic growth. 
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Part II 
Chapter Four: The untenable terrain of victimhood 
Chapter Five: The survivor imperative 
Chapter Six: Posttraumatic growth: imperatives, subversions, and recuperation 
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Chapter Four 
The Untenable Terrain of Victimhood 
 While victimhood offers a legitimate claim to help and support, as well as 
grounds for legal action against an alleged perpetrator, I argue that victimhood is laden 
with stigma and contradictory imperatives. Based on contradictory mandates and social 
expectations for victim behavior, I have found that, for me, victim identity was 
untenable. To understand the discursive roots of this untenability, I consider the 
construction of the victim label, and how it is articulated by researchers and their 
interview subjects. I draw on Christie (1986), van Dijk (2009), and Stringer (2014), and 
apply their frameworks to elucidate the possibility of victimhood as a walled-in identity 
category, wherein adherence to one set of norms and stereotypes necessarily violates 
another set, inciting deleterious social consequences. 
 My sites of analysis involve personal conversations, in which responses to my 
victimization were shaped by dominant conceptualizations of victimhood fostered by 
neoliberal victim theory, victim stereotypes, and rape myths and discourses. I explore 
how these conversations created interpersonal forms of secondary victimization. In my 
examination of victimhood, I evaluate the construction of victimhood as an undesirable 
identity category, insinuating a weakness of character and hindering individuals in their 
journey toward survivorship, which is a journey enabled by personal responsibility.  
 Then, I begin to examine the survivor category in opposition to victimhood, 
especially its emphasis on strong character and satisfactory coping. I argue that survivor 
identity is constructed as an escape hatch, enabling departure from the impossibilities of 
victim status and victim identity. A great deal of research, which I examine in Chapter 5, 
takes as a given the narrative arc from victim status to survivorship. In examining the 
construction of the terms, I aim to create a comprehensive theorization of their 
relationship. I draw from personal experiences and insights, embracing the overlap of 
theory and experience, and use tightrope talk to reframe the categories as more complex 
and paradoxical—as well as overlapping—than their binary formulation might suggest. 
I begin with a thorough examination of the victim label. 
 As Stringer (2014) argues, neoliberal victim theory bears heavily on the 
discourses of victimhood under scrutiny in this chapter. Radical individualism and an 
emphasis on personal responsibility, self-surveillance, and personal growth in the face 
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of adversity are encompassed in the neoliberal turn toward interiority as a locus of 
change and possibility. Neoliberalism contributes to a context in which those who 
experience sexual violence seek to distance themselves from victimhood (and its roots 
in gendered oppression and inequality) in favor of a more individualistic 
conceptualization, undermining the possibility for political and social analyses, 
diagnostics, and remedies. Neoliberal hegemony has infiltrated the fundamental 
assumptions that regulate our social, political, and economic world (Harvey, 2005; 
Stringer, 2014). These logics give rise to a sense-making frame which, I argue, compels 
those harmed by sexual violence toward survivor status. I discuss my how pressure to 
be a survivor may be damaging to individuals and relationships, and obscures social 
realities. 
 Central to my analysis is what Stringer (2014) terms neoliberal victim theory 
(NVT), which I discussed in Chapter 2. The logics of NVT have influenced feminist, 
anti-victim feminist, and post-feminist rhetoric regarding victims in general; they are 
highly visible in dominant conceptualizations of victims of sexual violence. Neoliberal 
victim theory (NVT), according to Stringer (2014, p. 9) frames:  
victimization as subjective and psychological rather than social and 
political. According to this conception, victimization does not so much as 
happen ‘to’ someone as arise from the self—through the having of a ‘victim 
personality’, through the making of bad choices, though inadequate practice 
of personal vigilance and risk management, through the failure to practise 
the rigorous discipline of positive thinking. 
Neoliberal victim theory positions victimization as originating from internal causes that 
merit internal solutions and sidestep investigations of social and political facets of 
violence (Stringer, 2014). This framing of victimization complicates the meanings 
associated with survivorship as it relates to victimhood. 
 Stringer discusses survivorship in the context of rape crisis feminism as a radical 
articulation of capable and resistant identity in contrast to its use by anti-victimists, who 
frame survivorship as an antidote to the victim mentality. In a neoliberal context, 
survivorship has been subjected to “mainstreaming and recuperation”:  
‘survivor’ no longer refers to overcoming self-blame, but rather to 
overcoming the self-pitying deflection of responsibly presumed to constitute 
 119
victim identity… the ‘survivor’ is praised for replacing other-blame with 
personal responsibility. (Stringer, 2014 p. 80) 
In a neoliberal context, survivorship negates self-pity and the victim mentality by taking 
responsibility for adverse events through subsequently coping well. Such anti-victim 
framings of survivorship conflict with the use of the survivor label in rape crisis 
feminism, which, according to Stringer (2014), acknowledges victimization while 
emphasizing resistance and countering stigma. I discuss this further in the next two 
chapters, where I address the nuances of the survivor label and its resonance with 
discourses of posttraumatic growth. 
 While NVT deals with the imperative to safeguard oneself and maintain 
personal safety, the survivor imperative adds a framework for considering post-violence 
identity struggles as they are shaped by neoliberal ideologies and values. This is the 
subject of Chapter 5, but the foundational findings that undergird my argument are the 
subject of the current chapter. I grapple with victimhood to comprehend survivorship. 
 At the core of my analysis, I find that in my experience of sexual violence, I 
endured a double bind: the volitional imperatives of neoliberalism, the correlative 
erasure of external causes of suffering, and the bolstering of agency as antidote sat in 
tension with the assumed demands of victimhood to be meek and suffer passively. 
These contradictions ensnared me in a spider web of opposing imperatives. Put another 
way, I comes up against walls no matter which direction I sought to move (Ahmed, 
2017). 
 I argue that the double bind forms a type of secondary victimization, that 
manifests in interpersonal relationships and everyday interactions in the period 
following sexual violence. Tensions and contradictions play out in the social world; one 
site of such tensions is in dialogue with others, where we hit walls and come to feel 
under pressure. Victim/survivors depend on others to listen, empathize, and reestablish 
bonds of trust as an important feature in posttrauma self-restoration (Brison, 2002). 
When assumptions about the world are shattered (Janoff-Bulman, 1992), and the 
fragility of the self is made apparent in such immediate and palpable ways (Ahmed, 
2017), the consequences of these pressures and tensions can be catastrophic. As I 
discovered in my own case, people responded poorly, since no matter what kind of 
victimhood I enacted, I was breaching one or another set of norms or expectations. 
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According to Ahmed (2017, p. 163), “When we come up against walls, how easily 
things shatter. To be shattered can be to experience the costs of our own fragility: to 
break, to reach a breaking point.” It can be too much to bear. 
 Over the next three chapters, I challenge the categories of victim and survivor 
and problematize their formulation in a narrative arc. My efforts formulate my response 
to the call from several feminist scholars to exert caution so as not to perpetuate these 
binaries in further research (Dunn, 2004; Kelly et al., 1996; Proffit, 1996; Wood and 
Rennie, 1994). I suggest that reworking the victim/survivor categories requires 
understanding that they are not neatly parsed apart, nor are they mutually exclusive. I 
observed significant complexity throughout my own negotiation of identity categories 
after my experiences of sexual violence. That I had been victimized, and was therefore a 
victim, seemed common sense to me. Yet, as detailed below, self-identification as a 
victim would elicit strong, adverse reactions from others. 
 In my own experience, and in qualitative accounts, I find tension and fluidity in 
how victim and survivor identity are discussed by those who have endured sexual 
violence. I explore these findings throughout this chapter. My findings support 
McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance’s (2011) argument that victim/survivors often seek to 
form novel articulations by defaulting to available discourses; I engage their 
conceptualization of tightrope talk ongoingly, since it offers a framework for 
comprehending novel articulations by familiar terms in contradictory ways. 
 My findings and analysis highlight the extent to which lived experience is 
inconsistent with dominant discourses of victimhood and survivorship. Overlooking 
these divergences neglects the complex manner in which victim/survivors engage with 
discourse; it is a perilous slip toward the phenomenon identified by Alcoff and Gray 
(1994), in which experts recuperate subversive speech to maintain compatibility with 
hegemonic discourse, thus diminishing or negating its subversive potential. 
 I use autoethnographic fragments, which are woven throughout this chapter, to 
demonstrate the prevalence of rape myths in how others made sense of my 
victimization, thereby shaping their responses and social feedback to my account. I 
considered how this shaped my navigation of victim and survivor identity over time, as 
well as how this shaped my experience of the social world as I negotiated my identity 
post-rape. 
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Singing in the Dark, 2013 Draft 
 In the middle of October, I began referring to my experience as rape. The 
vacancy, the shame, the sense that I was sullied, the feeling of being trespassed against 
was not enough; I demanded a rational explanation to account for why I called it rape. I 
wanted to be ready for hard questions I thought [sic] sure to come. Above all, I needed 
to convince myself. 
 “But did he force himself on you?” 
 “Was he physically violent?” 
 As though most rape involves visible, physical force. Which it doesn’t. 
 My personal favorite came from a friend, a man named Eli. 
 “You’re scaring me right now, Lily. By calling it rape you give up all your 
power. You have to claim your power and responsibility in the situation, or else you’re a 
victim.” He spoke with such authority, such conviction. He was also telling me how to 
heal. By then I was suspicious of anyone who thought they had a better grip on my 
circumstances than I did. 
 “I’m not a victim.” I replied, testing the waters, hoping to sound more assured 
than I felt. “Not now, anyway. But I had the experience of being a victim; the 
experience of being powerless. And it takes courage to face that. Owning the victim 
qualities of the experience helps me move on.” 
 “But you created this so you could learn something.” He sounded so strong, so 
wise and even toned. “And look how much you’re learning and growing. Take 
responsibility for that.” 
 Oh no you did not just say that. I was starting to get angry. The conversation was 
starting to shift in the direction of “you create your own reality”, which is a school of 
thought that I find to be morally callous and completely devoid of compassion. I create 
my response, Eli, I create my relationship to the story, my actions, my internal 
landscape. But I do not control reality. 
 “Look,” I said, distaste lingering on the tip of my tongue as I tried to swallow 
what I did not feel ready to say. It was like swallowing a live bird. “I can promise you 
few things, Eli, but I can promise you this. One day the person closest to you will die, 
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and you will feel powerless. And you will be. We aren’t in control here. Things happen 
in life that are beyond our control.” 
 “But do you ever think he did this to you knowing that it would catalyze your 
healing?” 
 “What?” Are you fucking kidding me? 
 “You said so yourself, Lily, this has been one of the richest growth opportunities 
of your life.” 
 “Eli, the technical term is AFGO: another fucking growth opportunity.” I let the 
bird fly on fucking. An emotional onomatopoeia. “What I make of this is my doing. 
Mine. It has nothing to do with him and it certainly does not excuse what he did to me.” 
 “What he did to you? But you put yourself in that situation. You created it.” 
 “I put myself into a situation to learn and grow as an activist. I said yes to an 
entirely different project than the one currently at the center of my world. I did not ask 
for this.” 
 Eli paused for a moment and looked into the distance, like he was wrestling with 
something deep inside his gut. “I guess I just hate the word rape. It’s so ambiguous. I 
feel like people use it all the time and it doesn’t mean anything, it just sounds an alarm.” 
 The room got quiet as I took in his words. There was a tenderness in his voice 
and I wanted to be gentle in my response, wanted to afford him more sensitivity than he 
had offered me. After a few moments, I responded. 
 “That’s exactly what it needs to do. Crying rape, crying abuse, these things 
sound an alarm and create a refuge, a shelter—sometimes literally—but at the very 
least, intellectually. Suddenly a victim can say, ‘Hey, this has been happening to me, 
someone has been hurting me.’ It opens the door for escape and creates a protected 
space for a victim to lick their wounds and come to terms with the experience. The 
nature of the beasts we call rape and abuse is that the victim often feels that it’s their 
fault, that they are doing it to themselves. But calling out those terrifying words 
acknowledges that there is a perpetrator. 
 “It comes down to this, Eli. Rape is sex without consent. That’s not ambiguous. 
My ability to give consent was compromised. By power, by brainwashing, and by 
circumstances. I did not want to be having sex with X, but I did not know how to make 
it stop. I was raped. Period.” 
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 He was quiet. In the stillness that had settled between us, I realized how 
exhausted I had become talking to him. Self-doubt was creeping in. I was feeling 
nervous and drained, afraid of what I’d said, afraid that I’d been wrong. It was time to 
leave, time to be alone and reflect. 
 We wrapped up our tea date. Walking home, his words hung in me as though 
hooked to my skin. The sense this was my fault was percolating to the surface. It cut 
past the scar tissue, past the barricades of intellect. As we parted that early November 
evening I felt sick. I’d responded well, but I hadn’t believed my own words. Not 
completely. 
 The dam was breaking. I was reaching the limits of intellectual control over the 
process. It was coming time to feel my way through. 
(Failing) To assert victim identity 
 My conversation with Eli transpired in November 2012, five months after my 
escape from the Amazon. I’d been raped at least five times, drugged, subdued, and 
manipulated beyond the point of recognizing myself. The only aspect of my personality 
I could identify for the nearly month-long duration of the abuse was my sense of humor. 
One woman I met in the village remarked, some years later, that her impression of me in 
his village was of a dazed and somewhat stupid girl, enamored of the man who, she 
later learned, was raping me. Years later, she thought I was bold, assertive, clever. That 
it was as if she had met two different people. 
 My rapist, I would later discover, had a reputation for drugging women with 
scopolamine and raping them. He was also internationally wanted for multiple murders, 
and had been subject to allegations of fraud, embezzlement, gun trafficking, and selling 
human body parts on the black market as art. I thought his track record bolstered my 
claims of victim status by illustrating the kind of man I was up against. I was wrong. 
 I imagined that my position framed me as what Christie (1986) calls an ideal 
victim, perfectly innocent, attacked by a clearly bad person in the midst of altruistic 
tasks. I was a Harvard Divinity School student in ministry, raped by a wanted murderer 
while engaged in a project of solidarity and activism to support indigenous communities 
and resist environmental degradation. I imagined that my victimization would be seen 
as legitimate. Instead, in response to my rape I was confronted with the racist notion 
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that I ought to have known better than to be alone with an indigenous man. Rape, or 
rape attempts, were framed as inevitable; therefore, I should have done more to protect 
myself. As I discuss below, the blame came at me from every direction. So, too, did 
attacks on my character stemming from rape myths (see Payne et al., 1999): if I let it 
happen, I must have secretly desired it; I was asking for it; it wasn’t really rape; I was 
lying about or exaggerating the consequences of his actions. 
 I had only named the incident rape one month prior to my tea with Eli, in 
October. That was the same week in which I later sought rape crisis support. In my case, 
the naming of the incident as rape was stalled until my anxieties about having 
contracted HIV or hepatitis C had been alleviated: I started counseling a week after 
obtaining conclusive test results, which required waiting three months after the last 
rape. 
 There are several focal points in this conversation that I wish to foreground as 
avenues into my analysis in this chapter. The first point is Eli’s neoliberal rhetoric of 
personal responsibility, warped to a magico-religious extreme. I consider how his 
understandings of responsibility demonstrate elements of a victim-hostile social climate 
(see Burt, 1980) and gave rise to secondary victimization. I also explore how Eli’s 
approach exerted pressure on me to avoid the victim label and to reframe the events as 
positive. I examine the mandates of the victim label and the negative reactions (i.e., 
reactive victim scapegoating, see van Dijk, 2009) that ensue when one fails to achieve 
these mandates.  
 The second focal point is the various implications of Eli’s training as a 
psychotherapist, and the role of our conversation in mediating my identity negotiation. 
Third, I analyze the assertions I made in real time, at the age of 25 and some years 
before embarking on a formal study of the subject, regarding victim status. Fourth, I 
consider what is recorded as inner dialogue regarding my having creative power over 
my relationship to the incident and my own inner landscape, if not the incident itself. 
These focal points enable analysis of the victim category, which will eventually segue 
into analysis of survivorship and the assumed narrative arc of “transformation” between 
victim status and survivor identity, which I develop further in Chapter 5. 
 First, with regard to neoliberal rhetoric, I find that Eli’s comments elucidate the 
social context in which I would “negotiate victim and non-victim identities” post-rape 
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(Wood and Rennie, 1994, p. 125). It is important, for context, to understand that Eli, at 
the time of our conversation, was in training as a psychotherapist, with spiritual 
elements incorporated into his practice. He was building a career as an expert and 
clinician. He also espoused—in this conversation and more generally—ideas about 
people “creating their own reality” as promulgated by Oprah and pop New Age figures. 
These beliefs contoured his statements, and textured his unique articulations of 
prominent pop psycho-spiritual self-help discourses. His attitudes, as expressed in the 
above passage, also synthesized well with rape myths: he suggested that victimhood 
was inherent to me and my character, that I wanted or asked to be raped, and that my 
articulations of the impacts of rape were exaggerations. These discourses likely 
continue to infuse his approach to therapeutic work and his general worldview; further, 
his promulgation of these ideas likely influences the clients who would turn to him for 
help and support. 
 In the above passage, Eli suggests that, in a metaphysical and material sense, I 
enacted agency and chose to subject myself to the rapes as part of a larger enterprise 
toward personal improvement and growth: valued stalwarts of neoliberal citizenship. 
This is a fascinating distortion of the rape myth that I was “asking for it”, in that it 
provides a distinctly self-entrepreneurial motivation behind “asking for it”: Eli contends 
that I asked to be raped based in the aspiration to grow as a person. This echoes Baker’s 
(2010a, p. 188) insight that, “Women are required, to a greater degree than men, to be 
engaging in improving and transforming the self.” Eli postulates that I actively (if 
unconsciously) got myself raped to catalyze self-actualization, and that my rapist was 
more than willing to accommodate this conspiracy in service to bettering my person. 
The history of the term victim deriving from the Latin victima, a sacrificial animal, and 
the insinuation of the sacrificer (in this case, my rapist) functioned as a priest doing 
some holy service (van Dijk, 2009), rings here with a bitter irony.  
 Eli suggested that I ought to take responsibility for choosing to place myself in 
circumstances so conducive to growth. Implicit in this assertion is the assumption that I 
would grow from the experience, and that it would have a generally positive effect on 
my self and my life. He insinuated that I should be proud of myself for having taken 
such bold measures to catalyze growth. Undoubtedly, he fundamentally blamed me for 
the events, although he granted the events a positive appraisal, reconfiguring and thinly 
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veiling blame as positive responsibility for achieving a personal learning opportunity. 
This is particularly insidious: the invitation to accept responsibility is made all the more 
enticing by casting the thing for which responsibility is assumed as positive: a growth 
opportunity. Blame is temporarily left out of the picture, but necessarily returns to the 
frame when grappling with the negative impacts of the events for which responsibility 
has already been claimed; had I accepted responsibility on the grounds that the 
experience was a net positive, I would presumably have to extend that personal 
responsibility to my suffering, too. 
 Eli’s emphasis on personal choice, in this case to undergo adversity in the name 
of self-actualization, is another stalwart of neoliberal discourse. Baker (2010a) notes 
how neoliberal ideologies encourage evading vulnerability or victimhood in favor of 
agency, thereby erasing structural or social causes of suffering or struggle. Stringer 
(2014, p. 40), adds to this, observing that: 
Victims are presented as self-made: victimization is not the result of 
embedded systems of violence, inequality, and discrimination, but of bad 
choices, irresponsibility or pathology on the victims part; and victims are 
solely responsible for ameliorating the negative conditions of life. 
(Emphasis in original) 
Baker (2010a, p. 192) argues that denying victimhood maintains compliance with 
neoliberalism’s “volitional imperative”. This upholds neoliberalism’s valuation of 
agency, and exemplifies Stringer’s (2014) victim bad/agent good formulation; those 
who suffer from oppression are expected to assert agency and find individual avenues 
for overcoming victimizing realities. In Baker’s research, she notes that, in “accounting 
for circumstances that might be interpreted as disadvantaging, [participants] found ways 
to avoid any appearance of victimhood” (Baker, 2010a, p. 192). Baker’s participant pool 
includes young women in lower socioeconomic strata, many raising children and 
situated within problematic or even abusive relationships. She notes how these women 
make sense of their economic and relationship struggles in a manner that disavows 
victimhood, and resists acknowledging causes of harm, struggle, or suffering outside the 
self—with the exception of one participant. Her findings suggest that victimhood is 
constructed as a terrain to avoid, even when the cost is casting oneself as responsible for 
her own struggle (Baker, 2010a). 
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 In allocating the responsibility for the rape events to me, Eli endorsed neoliberal 
discourse and sought to infuse it into my sense-making and identity-negotiating process. 
In addition to affirming his own stance through our relational interaction, Eli’s 
allocation of responsibility allowed him to circumvent viewing my rapist as a criminal, 
and showcased his resistance to acknowledging my rapist’s propensity for causing harm 
to others. His general argument, which is consistent with Stringer’s (2014) analysis of 
the victim mentality, was that victimization came from within me. His erasure of my 
rapist’s responsibility and harm is too common in discourses around sexual violence. 
 Furthermore, Eli rejects my naming of the events as rape. His denial further 
delegitimizes my claim of an external cause of harm, and contributed to internalization 
and blame. Eli’s remarks suggest that what rendered the events rape is my naming of 
them as rape, rather than the events themselves. The converse is that, had I not named 
the events as rape, they would not constitute rape. If my naming the events is what 
makes those events rape, then my labelling becomes the site of harm and injury more 
than the actual events. I consider this notion further, especially in scholarship that 
locates harm in the labelling process more than in worldly events, below. 
 Eli argued that I should have circumnavigated victim status entirely for the sake 
of personal empowerment and agency, even if doing so required positioning myself at 
the extreme end of a magico-religious discursive framework. His insistence that I claim 
volition, even in an abstract metaphysical or unconscious psychological sense, suggests 
the degree to which neoliberal imperatives toward volition and choice have saturated 
sense-making frameworks. For example, he did not ask me to have faith in God, or 
more generally assert that “everything happens for a reason”. Nor did he seem open to 
the possibility that my rapist was intent on harming (and controlling) me. Any such 
comments would suggest that a power outside myself was responsible for the events, 
and would be anathema to neoliberal logics, as outlined in NVT. However, his reliance 
on a magic religious interpretation of events demonstrates the lengths to which he was 
willing to stretch his sense-making to maintain continuity with neoliberal ideologies and 
assimilate my experience into his existing worldview. 
 The above conversation fostered my internalized self-blame for the rapes. 
According to my documentation, I struggled in the aftermath of the conversation with 
emergent feelings of self-doubt in response to Eli. Specifically, Eli’s words aggregated 
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with existing self-doubt: I already doubted my own abdication of blame and refusal to 
assume responsibility. According to Wood and Rennie (1994, p. 127), self-blame 
“maintains the myth of women’s masochism or indicates a woman’s seductive 
contribution to her assault”. It can also foster a sense that such events can be actively 
prevented in the future. According to Mardorossian (2002, p. 756), 
getting raped always elicits an investigation into the ways in which a victim 
might ultimately have been responsible for what happened. Bad judgment 
becomes cause, and victimization becomes manipulative or concealed 
agency. 
The notion of victims as manipulative erases a rapist’s responsibility for harm, and 
promotes the notion of concealed agency and desire on the part of the victim. In this 
instance, Eli gestured toward my ultimate responsibility, and rather than emphasizing 
behavior or bad judgment, he took the notion of concealed agency to an extreme: he 
suggested that I wanted and deserved to be assaulted on a characterological basis—
within his discursive framework, not as a punishment, but as a gift. 
Finding the words 
 This conversation with Eli demonstrates the relational dimensions and social 
pressure of making sense of sexual violence and working to restore my sense of self 
after sexual violence (see Brison, 2002). While Baker’s work deals with women’s sense-
making around oppression and struggle, Eli offers an example of how these ideas can 
come at a victim/survivor from others, through relationships and conversations, to exert 
pressure and shape identity negotiation. However, in saying that, the ideas don’t solely 
come from “outside”: I struggled with self-doubt in the wake of the conversation, 
because part of me had been conditioned to believe that what he was saying was true.  
 I attempted to claim victim identity to Eli, to maintain an honest evaluation of 
the powerlessness endemic to my experience of violence. Eli rejected my identity 
claims. That rejection contributed to an ongoing, fraught relationship to my identity, as I 
sought to formulate it after rape via relational processes. In the years after the assaults, I 
tried on various identities vis-à-vis the incidents, often to have them rejected by others
—even others with my best interest at heart and no malicious intent. As I discuss in the 
next two chapters, many people expressed that the victim label itself was bad for me. I 
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sought words that felt true to my experience, only to find my language choices inciting 
harmful social reactions. 
 Now, it is apparent that I was attempting McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance’s (2011) 
tightrope talk. I sought to convey an experience using the available language, while 
being all too aware of how those attempts fell short of what I was attempting to say. I 
endeavored to label the experiences as victimization and claim the victim label for 
myself. I defaulted in different ways at different times to dominant discourses about 
victims, responsibility, and eventually survivorship, to evade blame, express agency, 
and manage others’ perceptions of my identity. I explore this further in the next two 
chapters. Yet in doing so, I was all too aware that my efforts were misunderstood, that 
the contradictions I was attempting to convey in novel articulations were often not 
comprehended by my listeners. 
 Speaking about my experience, even (and especially) as I struggled to find 
adequate language, felt necessary: I was emboldened and influenced by Lorde (2007b), 
who addresses the fears that keep women silent and all that is to be gained by finding 
and using language in the face of fear. She names the fears present in speaking up—“of 
contempt, of censure, or some judgment, or recognition, of challenge, of annihilation”, 
and also of visibility (Lorde, 2007b, p. 42). In addition, she addresses the consequences 
of silence, of living in fear:  
Because the machinery will grind you into dust anyway, whether or not we 
speak. We can sit in our corners mute forever while our sisters and ourselves 
are wasted, while our children are distorted and destroyed, while our earth is 
poisoned; we can sit in our safe corners mute as bottles, and we will still be 
no less afraid. (Lorde, 2007b, p. 42) 
I faced fears as I developed raw articulations of my experience and my theorization of 
that experience as I lived it. While speaking and theorizing aloud created situations that 
were difficult, which hurt, which likely delayed my stabilization after the rapes, it also 
gave me a chance to come up against walls, and to learn (see Ahmed, 2017). It gave me 
ample opportunities to develop theory as I lived, to observe patterns, and to understand. 
 In the early stages of finding language, speaking, and then observing and 
theorizing responses, I blamed both myself and my listeners for various failures in 
communication; I imagined I must have misspoken to elicit such troubling responses. 
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Now, I understand these interactions, in part, as a consequence of tightrope talk, and as 
examples of what happens when such talk is made sense of in terms of rape myths and 
dominant discursive frames. 
 In reviewing my contemporaneous notes and memoir drafts, I locate a great deal 
of tightrope talk. I remember the frustration of attempting to convey things for which I 
did not have adequate language. I found solace in the feminist company of texts by 
Lorde and Anzaldúa. It is no wonder to me that Ahmed (2017, p. 240) includes books in 
her “Killjoy Survival Kit”: “You need your favorite feminist books close at hand; your 
feminist books need to be handy.” These books helped me endure. 
 Through engagement with feminists, I have found new intersubjective domains 
that validate and nurture my identity as a victim, and as a survivor, as both and as 
neither. These relationships have nurtured, supported, and affirmed me throughout the 
process of identity negotiation. This is an example of a positive experience of identity 
negotiation in a relationship context. Notably, these feminist others helped me forge an 
analysis and awareness of the role of neoliberal ideologies in my experience. Awareness 
of NVT was altogether lacking in the social milieu that surrounded me in the critical 
period after the rapes, which was so well exemplified by Eli and Georgina, whose 
reactions I discuss in Chapter 5. 
On expert analysis and the recuperation of dominant discourse 
 In light of Eli’s chosen profession and training, I wish to consider his reactions 
in light of Alcoff and Gray’s (1993) insights around confession and the roles of experts 
in reshaping victim/survivor speech to recuperate dominant discourses around sexual 
violence. Eli’s professional role entitles him to interpret the narratives of future patients. 
His responses to me indicated his propensity to restructure and analyze stories of sexual 
violence in a manner that subsumes these stories into hegemonic discourses. According 
to Alcoff and Gray (1993, p. 268), “The tendency… will always be for the dominant 
discourses to silence such speech or, failing this, to channel it into non-threatening 
outlets” and, failing this, to reshape and manipulate these stories in a manner that 
renders them no longer disruptive. Such processes may include casting the victim/
survivor as mad, hysterical, or deceptive (Alcoff and Gray, 1993).  
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 Eli’s comments implied that I was mad, albeit in a veiled, subtle, and insidious 
manner. He alleged that my unconscious self was seeking improvement (growth, 
healing), or that there was some deep flaw in my innermost self to be repaired by way 
of subjecting my body to rape. This parallels a point made by Stringer (2014, p. 40) that 
within neoliberal victim theory, “…suffering seems to arise out of the sufferer’s inner 
world, rather than out of worldly power reactions. Victimhood becomes a quality of the 
sufferer, rather than something that happened to them” (emphasis in original). Eli’s 
assertions went further, ascribing a masochistic impulse on my part. As a 
psychotherapist, it is within the framework of his training to diagnose such maladies. 
This strategy is in close proximity to identifying madness and mental illness as the 
underlying cause of the events, or situating me as a “victim type” who perpetually 
places myself in victimizing circumstances. Worse still, his logic implied that I 
(unconsciously) wanted and therefore precipitated the rapes. In a novel twist, he 
positioned my having chosen that experience as a righteous path to healing, rather than 
a personal failure (see Ehrenreich, 2009). 
 Eli’s response represents an unusual application of the rape myth that I was 
asking for, or secretly desired, the rapes; it is unusual because it was not a sexual desire, 
so much as it was a desire to achieve personal growth through suffering. This rape myth 
also discredits suffering by suggesting that my suffering was exaggerated; therefore, I 
was hysterical, deceptive, and misrepresenting my own pain. Eli framed suffering as 
inherently worthy or acceptable because it caused growth. This framing also draws from 
the myth that rape is a trivial event and that women lie about the consequences of rape 
(see Payne et al., 1999). 
 Eli’s attempt to assimilate my experience, or render it consistent with his 
worldview, was a common pattern in individual responses to my claims of victimhood. 
Trauma researchers distinguish between the assimilation and accommodation of 
traumatic experiences. According to Joseph and Linley (2006, p. 1045), “The 
confrontation with an adverse event has a shattering effect on the person’s assumptive 
world, and following the completion principle, there is a need to integrate the new 
trauma-related information.” Assimilation involves integrating trauma into one’s 
existing worldview, while accommodation involves a changing of worldview based on 
traumatic experience—which can be positive or negative (or both) (Janoff-Bulman, 
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1992; Joseph and Linley, 2006). An assimilative approach, which bypasses a need to 
reevaluate one’s assumptive worldview, is less likely to foster the very growth in which 
Eli was so invested. Furthermore, it demonstrates a centering of his own worldview 
over mine. 
 Within the discourses shaping confession and speech about an experience of 
sexual violence, both victim/survivors and experts draw on hegemonic discourse to 
create language for the event and its consequences (Alcoff and Gray, 1993). These 
forms of speech may be consistent with or resistant to dominant discourses; they may 
both embrace and resist different dimensions of these discourses, and they are subject to 
change and inconsistency over time. In instances where dominant discourses are used in 
contradictory ways to try and articulate something outside of dominant discursive 
frames, victim/survivors are deploying what McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance (2011) refer 
to as tightrope talk. However, experts may ignore the generative tensions of tightrope 
talk, and instead emphasize speech consistent with dominant discourse, thus enacting 
recuperation and undermining subversive victim/survivor speech. 
 Hegemonic discourses frame victims as meek, powerless, passive, lacking 
agency, and, in many instances, as having an internalized victim mentality. Such 
framing erases the victim self as articulated by a victim/survivor. Often, the victim/
survivor is placed into dialogue with mediating experts upon whom they purportedly 
depend to help interpret their experience and work through it in a manner that eschews 
victim identity. Experts may encourage victim/survivors to deny or evade victimhood 
(see Baker, 2010a), and disavow the victim mentality (see Stringer, 2014). According to 
Alcoff and Gray (1993), expert and therapeutic analysis may reinscribe dominant 
discourses. The expert may listen to novel articulations and force them into preexisting 
categories (see Page, 2017), thus reducing possibilities for self-definition vis-à-vis 
sexual violence and hindering self-restoration. 
 The dynamics with Eli undermined and deflected the generative possibilities of 
tightrope talk, of trying to speak beyond hegemonic discourse in the available language. 
Further, Eli’s approach circumnavigated my own uncertainty, hesitation, and 
ambivalence (see Page, 2017), as I sought to make sense of my own life experiences on 
my own terms. Embracing uncertainty was an approach that I found adaptive and 
manageable. Eli’s words did violence to that process. I contend that Eli was assuaging 
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his own discomfort in our exchange. On the whole, his response had significant 
deleterious effects on me and how I thought and felt about the rapes. It made me wary 
and defensive when reaching out to others for support. 
 In this case, my credibility in claiming victim status was undermined by 
someone who, although not an expert in the context of our relationship, was and is 
trained as such. Alcoff and Gray (1993, p. 280) also observe that “the survivor—
because of her experience and feelings on the issue—is paradoxically the least capable 
person of serving as the author or expert. The survivor’s views on sexual violence will 
often enjoy less credibility than anyone else’s.” While their analysis is specific to talk 
shows, the logic they identify is visible in this conversation. It is common for both talk 
shows and everyday speech to assume that experts have the authority to interpret victim 
speech. Eli’s response challenges any authority that I might have had over my 
interpretation of events. Further, it undermines my assertion (which I struggled to make 
at the time) that responsibility for the events lay outside myself, and with the man who 
chose to rape me.  
 Eli’s response to my claims of victimhood involved a problematic and twisted 
analysis of my experience, to make it fit his preexisting views. This exchange offers an 
example of recuperating dominant discourses of victimhood, victim mentalities, and 
rape myths in conversation. I argue that the manifestation of rape discourse in 
conversations such as this constitute an intimate, everyday form of secondary 
victimization. 
Incidents between January and December 2014, recorded January 2020
 Prior to the NYMag piece, the story of my rapes and abuse reached over one 
hundred thousand people via podcasts and radio shows. A talk I gave on sexual violence 
was viewed ten thousand times on YouTube, in addition to several hundred live viewers. 
I sat on multiple panels and was featured in events across the USA and Canada, where I 
discussed the problem of sexual violence in our community. In live events, I did not 
share my story in depth, but I did situate myself as a victim/survivor of the type of 
abuse I was discussing, and attempted to argue for more widespread action on the issue. 
I had a large volume of people reach out to me to share their stories or comment on 
mine, although I deleted much of that record when I left the USA. I also had significant 
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professional and social ties in this particular community, including with most of the 
individuals who feature in this thesis. I was therefore able to observe and experience 
dozens of face-to-face reactions. 
 When I was approached by a journalist at NBC and another at The Atlantic, I 
met with fifteen of the world’s leading professionals and leaders in the community. I 
sought advice about how to proceed in sharing the story. My question was not “should I 
do this?” but rather, “how do I do this well?” In nearly all these instances, I was met 
with victim blame, chastisement for claiming victim status, the survivor imperative, and 
assumptions that I would pursue and achieve personal growth through trauma. Two 
prominent figures, whom I had known for four years and trusted as confidantes, offered 
the perspective that if I shared the story of what had been done to me, it would destroy 
the movement our community had spent decades building while positioning me as an 
eternal victim.  
 In the same time period, I had close friends and elders within the same 
community—who framed themselves as my family—urging me to stay quiet about the 
rapes. Their argument was that speaking out would cast me as a victim, which was an 
identity I would never be able to shed; it would tarnish me and everything I sought to do 
in my professional life; they reasoned that if sexual violence was the first topic on 
which I wrote and spoke publicly, I would mark myself as a victim forever. They 
pressured me—explicitly, implicitly, and at times manipulatively—to keep quiet, keep 
my head down, and move on. Once I got over the rapes, the logic was, I would have 
other things to say, other things that were more important, on topics that didn’t pose a 
risk to me. The explicit message was clear: don’t be a victim. The implicit message 
became clear in retrospect: the mark of victimhood was a stain that I would put on 
myself, and I would do so by not following their instructions. My encounters with these 
trusted others erased the reality of victimizing events and obfuscated the real source of 
harm: the rapes.

 In analyzing some of the discourses which constituted my experience, I deploy 
sweeping statements to mark my feelings at the time that certain sentiments were 
commonplace. My basis for statements about the widespread prevalence of the 
discourses under scrutiny in this thesis derive from the wide range of interactions I had 
with others regarding my rapes, and the plethora or responses to which I was subjected. 
 135
These sweeping statements are meant to demonstrate the extent to which my 
experiences were publicly visible, and the large number of personal reactions I 
encountered. They are also meant to capture the emotional reality of feeling 
overwhelmed and inundated by harmful responses nurtured by dominant discourses, 
responses which sparked the feeling that there were walls on all sides. 
Negotiating victim identity in relationships 
 The discourses at work within my conversation with Eli were present in dozens 
of interactions I had in the years after the rapes. I recorded the conversation with Eli in a 
working draft of my memoir, because it stood out as a remarkable and clear example of 
dynamics and discourses at work in a multitude of conversations. These discursive 
frameworks shaped, and at times impeded, my making sense of the sexual violence I 
had endured. They bore heavily on me through relationships (see Brison, 2002). Eli was 
by no means the only person to actively resist my labeling the event as rape, or labeling 
myself as a victim, arguing that to do so would strip me of personal power. 
 Wood and Rennie (1994) examine the discourses informing the process by 
which persons name their experience and negotiate their identity following rape. They 
point out that the naming process occurs in a social context, fueled by common sense 
and shared ideas about rape and its victims. Further, identity construction happens in 
relationships (Brison, 2002), and is constituted by discourse. To borrow from 
Mardorossian (2002, p. 747),  
victims’ accounts of their experiences do not exist in a vacuum of 
authenticity awaiting a feminist revolution to be able to safely express 
themselves, since victims, like all of us, get their cues from the intersecting 
and conflicting discourses through which the world is understood and 
shaped.  
In my own experience I have found that one site in which these discourse are most 
evident—and become reified and reconstructed—is in conversations. In these 
interactions, victim/survivors and those who dialogue with them draw on and reify 
dominant discourses. The articulations of a victim/survivor are subject to judgment and 
appraisal based on how well they fit with preexisting sense-making structures.  
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 The framework of tightrope talk developed by McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance 
(2011) is vitally important as an interpretive lens. As victim/survivors draw on existing 
discourses, their speech and comportment pulls from available discursive repertoires. 
Such speech is often contradictory, ambiguous, and difficult to interpret; the default for 
making sense of such speech may be to grasp at one discursive thread or another. 
Tightrope talk suggests considering these contradictions as articulations for which there 
is no adequate language.  
 In the conversation above, my reply to Eli opens several avenues for analysis 
regarding victim status, and is an entry point to identifying overlaps and paradoxes 
within the victim/survivor binary or dichotomy. I address this in depth in Chapter 5, and 
have outlined relevant discussion by Dunn (2004, 2005), Proffit (1996), Kelly et al. 
(1996), and Schneider (1993) in Chapter 1. In response to Eli’s claims, I state that:  
I’m not a victim… Not now, anyway. But I had the experience of being a 
victim; the experience of being powerless. And it takes courage to face that. 
Owning the victim qualities of the experience helps me move on. (Ross, 
2013) 
In my response, I assert victim status as temporally bound and impermanent, which is a 
direct challenge to the notion of victim status as “eternal”, “perpetual”, an internalized 
mentality, and a self-fulfilling prophecy (see Le Monde letter 2018, a response to the 
#MeToo movement that reiterates anti-victim rhetoric from the early 1990s).  
 My response echoes Kelly et al. (1996), especially the insight that claiming 
victim status is a statement of fact regarding an event, while survivorship relates to how 
I responded to the event. I also perform what Stringer (2014, p. 30) identifies as the 
distinction made in rape crisis feminism “between victimization as an experience and 
victim as a social identity arising out of experience”, in an effort to “ensure 
victimization does not define” my identity. The quotation above is also an example of 
McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance’s (2011) tightrope talk, in that I simultaneously accept 
and reject the victim label, and attempted to apply it in a novel manner, which both 
acknowledges victimization and seeks to establish some form of agency. 
 In dialogue with Eli, I expressed victim status as tied to a specific experience, 
one with a beginning and an end. Placement of temporal boundaries neglected the 
ongoing trauma in the form of secondary victimization, which would only later become 
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evident to me. In addition, I situate acknowledgement of my diminished agency at the 
time of the rapes as courageous, which is a trait usually associated with the survivor 
label, and note how embracing victimhood enabled me to “move on”. There were 
intimations of my own movement toward and exploration of the survivor label, 
although I had yet to directly engage the term “survivor”. My tightrope talk 
demonstrates an attempt to link victimhood to something akin to survivor status. It also 
maintains consistency with the neoliberal obligation to “get over” what happened, 
resists allowing the experience to define me, and reasserts individual agency over the 
long term. My attitude and conceptualization demonstrated neoliberal victim theory at 
play, as an apparatus in my sense-making process as a victim/survivor of sexual 
violence. 
Paradoxes of victim speech 
 Wood and Rennie (1994) point out a contradiction: claiming victim status makes 
a bid for justice and can serve to legitimize requests for support, while asserting the 
right to not be victimized in the first place. However, as Stringer (2014, p. 40) points 
out, our current framework around victims involves “supplanting the historical 
emphasis on rights with a new emphasis on citizens’ responsibilities” (emphasis in 
original). These rights are undermined by neoliberal values: 
The term victim implies a lack of blame and responsibility that should 
engender support and sympathy. But the lack of blame means a lack of 
control, a negative characteristic in a society that values independence and 
control. (Wood and Rennie, 1994, p. 127, emphasis in original) 
Tensions related to claiming the victim label—the hope of obtaining help and support, 
and the dangers of stigma—are taken up by a range of researchers whom I introduce in 
Chapter 1. Further, Stringer (2014) notes that in claiming victimhood, victims become 
suspect. These tensions elucidate the walls (see Ahmed, 2017) that a person who has 
experienced victimization is bound to hit, no matter how they negotiate and perform 
victimhood. It also harkens back to my previous discussion of Eli, in which he invited 
me to take positive responsibility and assert agency, which would also inevitably 
involve embracing self-blame for injury.  
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 Loney-Howes (2018) maps the double bind in attempting to speak about rape. 
Her research involves activists and bloggers who are “out” online, who tell subversive 
stories that challenge dominant rape scripts. She criticizes the framing of rape as 
unspeakable, noting the impact of such framing on victim speech. According to Loney-
Howes (2018, p. 32), credibility hinges on a “clear, linear and concise account”, while 
paradoxically, framing of rape as unspeakable challenges such accounts as suspect for 
the precise reasons they might otherwise be seen as credible: “if she presents her story 
in too calm, rational and calculated a manner (i.e., if she does not appear to be 
sufficiently traumatized) she may be perceived as lying.” These discursive constraints 
around victim speech create a context in which speaking in the wrong way risks harm; 
this risk stems from discursively informed, harmful interpretations and responses from 
listeners, witnesses, and others. Brison (2002) highlights the need for victims to be 
listened to and empathized with in the wake of trauma. Double binds with regard to 
victim speech, presentation, and behavior create significant, at times insurmountable 
limits to speaking. It’s hard to find an audience that can compassionately hear a victim’s 
account of sexually violent events and their sequelae.  
 Potential harms outweigh possible gains such that victims are limited in their 
ability to articulate and claim victim status. Often, rather than being heard and 
supported in novel and nuanced articulations of victim status, a person who has been 
victimized is forced into preexisting categories and made to negotiate their relationship 
to those categories. It is common for victim/survivors to remain silent to avoid these 
problems, and such silence may be both strategic and potentially deleterious. As I argue 
in the following two chapters, the potential untenability of the victim category can lead 
to victim/survivors urgently positioning themselves on a path to survivorship. 
 Many scholars note that victimization does not cease at the end of an acute, 
sexually violent event, but rather continues as a victim’s identity takes shape in their 
public life and identity (see also Leisenring, 2006; Minow, 1993; Proffit, 1996; 
Thompson, 2000; Wood and Rennie, 1994). The issues presented in this section 
demonstrate some of the challenges inherent in deciding whether and how to speak or 
seek help. Further, the process of seeking support is complicated by stigma and 
assumptions regarding victim presentation, which I discuss further in Chapter 6. These 
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issues form another way in which victimization is ongoing, nurtured by discursive 
framings of victims and the promulgation of rape myths. 
Reactive victim scapegoating 
 Should victim/survivors attempt to articulate their victimization or victim 
identity, the manner in which they present themselves and articulate their narratives may 
be met with what van Dijk (2009) refers to as “reactive victim scapegoating”. Reactive 
victim scapegoating may be enacted by professionals, the media, or in everyday 
interactions, such as the numerous reactions I introduced above, to constitute secondary 
victimization. Scapegoating (in the traditional or colloquial sense) refers to outcasting 
from a community and subsequent social isolation. It involves the vilification of the 
victim, and recasting them as the problem, rejecting their claims to victim status, and 
even framing them as an accomplice to their own victimization. Such phenomena were 
present in my experience of sharing the story publicly and seeking advise for doing so. 
 Reactive victim scapegoating was initially developed by van Dijk (2009) to 
address the media vilification of victims. The media’s framing of an event influences 
how the public reads and interprets it, and media narrative tropes become readily 
available templates for individuals to make meaning of various events. However, 
scapegoating also has social and intimate consequences. In the multiple experiences 
outlined above, I have found that scapegoating happens one person at a time, in 
interpersonal contexts. 
 For example, when Eli and others rejected my claim to victim identity and 
insisted that I had collaborated with my rapist, I felt hurt and defensive. These dynamics 
led to relational strain, argumentation, and disagreement as I sought to assert myself and 
my interpretation of events. My defiance was yet another manner in which a good 
victim ought not to behave. Had I passively accepted Eli’s feedback and meekly 
confirmed his framing of events and its implications for my identity, it might have 
endeared me to him and avoided strain. However, the cost of earning his support would 
have been to abandon control of my own interpretation and telling of the story. The 
pattern of refusing to accept my claims of victim identity was apparent across a range of 
interactions with dozens of individuals and in group settings. 
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 The blame and pressure to take responsibility, as espoused by Eli and others, 
was also a form of scapegoating. I was saddled with the burden of responsibility for 
what had been done to me, which I rebuffed. There were long-term consequences for 
my rebuttal, for claiming the victim label and resisting others’ interpretations of my 
experiences. As I continued to share the story of what had happened to me, longstanding 
friendships dissolved, and I was eventually ostracized from the wider community. I 
have found that my experience exemplifies a dynamic pointed out by Ahmed (2017): in 
identifying the problem, I became the problem. Subsequent relational tensions 
developed, based in part on others’ rejections of my victim claims, their deployment of 
the survivor imperative (which I discuss in Chapter 5) and their directives that I strive 
for posttraumatic growth (which I discuss in Chapter 6). The hurt caused by such 
reactions eventually led to my departure from the community. The link between 
victimization and scapegoating—a term that, historically, denotes the burdening of a 
sacrificial animal with the sins of the community and casting it out to carry those sins 
away—became surprisingly literal. 
 Christian history infuses the term victim, which has now been expanded to 
encompass any person harmed by crime or disaster. Victim is etymologically bound up 
with expectations to be passive, to accept one’s own suffering, and to immediately 
forgive one’s abusers as Christ did his captors (van Dijk, 2009): turn the other cheek 
and submit. However, this expectation is not often met by victims in their social 
contexts and relationships, inciting scapegoating and other detrimental responses. (This 
is not to say that it is a victim’s responsibility to manage problematic dynamics—I 
argue in the following two chapters that a victim’s self-presentation is not the focal 
point for remedies; rather, responsibility ought to be dispersed across the social world).  
 There is an obvious and instructive parallel between victima—the sacrificial 
animal—and the scapegoat as a creature imbued with the sins and ills of a community 
and banished to carry away those sins in a collective catharsis or exorcism. In the case 
of rape victim/survivors, scapegoating involves locating the problem internally, in the 
victim (in their supposed ‘victim mentality’) rather than in the event or the perpetrator. 
In my experience, I found that the subsequent vilification and casual ostracism (in the 
form of social isolation) seem aptly termed scapegoating. Scapegoating occurred one 
person at a time, rather than in a formal, collective, and ritualized moment. However, it 
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was a form of social rejection, and caused undue harm at a time when I most needed 
support. 
 Based on the Christian genealogy of the term, victims, by van Dijk’s reckoning, 
are expected to present as broken, passively accepting their victimization; shows of 
strength or resilience contradict existing imperative and incite antipathy. According to 
van Dijk (2009, p. 3), 
The analysed victim narratives tell a very different story to conventional 
representations of passive suffering. They also reveal how society’s 
response to crime victims tends to turn from sympathy into antipathy when 
victims defy the expected victim role. 
However, it is not the victim who incites antipathy, although such antipathy is directed 
toward them. Instead, it is the unmet, unrealistic expectations permeating discourse and 
the social world that incites these harmful responses from others. The problem is recast 
as residing in the victims themselves—now as suspects and masochists—who failed to 
adequately enact agency and protect themselves from rape (Stringer, 2014). Victims are 
chastised for being unable to uphold the unrealistic demands of victim identity. 
 Reactive victim scapegoating is especially evident when victims are poised and 
self-possessed, as highlighted in van Dijk’s (2009) examination of the global media 
backlash to Natascha Kampusch (see Kampusch, 2010). Kampusch’s story, and van 
Dijk’s (2009) analysis, elucidate the stakes involved in a victim’s ongoing performance 
of victimhood and the pressure to conform with discursive norms. The media backlash 
involved a mass-scale rejection of her claim to victim identity, and vilification of the 
victim as a co-conspirator. The media reaction was piled atop the baseline trauma of her 
captivity experience, including extreme isolation, forced labor, and sexual violations. 
 For those who have been victimized, as they struggle to make sense of adverse 
events, reestablish trusting relationships, and seek support, the stakes are extraordinarily 
high. The period after sexual violence is sensitive, and failures to respond in an 
informed manner can deter victims from seeking further help (Paul et al., 2013; Ullman, 
1999). Yet, as victim/survivors attempt to garner support and make sense of their 
experience with others, there remains an ever-present risk that a misstep might incite 
antipathy and rejection. These multiple risks support Ullman’s (1999) findings that 
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victims face a dilemma in disclosure, since negative responses can do significant and 
lasting harm. 
An agglutinative web of contradictory imperatives 
 In light of my discussion above situated in my own experience of victim 
identity, I find that my experience of the terrain of victim identity is and was fraught 
with contradicting expectations. The theories developed by van Dijk (2009) and 
Stringer (2014) highlight two opposing discourses regarding victims: van Dijk 
highlights expectations to suffer meekly and passively, while Stringer demonstrates 
neoliberal imperatives to assert agency. Tensions between the Christian mandates of the 
victim role and the imperatives of neoliberalism to ‘not be a victim’ bound me within an 
agglutinative web. Linking my personal experience to the analyses of Stringer and van 
Dijk, it seems that victim/survivors risk a serious and deleterious backlash if we fail to 
appear sufficiently weak and passive, while weakness and passivity are deemed 
unacceptable under hegemonic neoliberal discourse, which reveres strength and agency.  
 I argue that the confluence of conflicting imperatives creates a context in which 
victim identity became untenable for me. There was little room to manoeuvre in the 
web. Moving too far in any direction risked either failing neoliberal expectations or 
becoming the focus of reactive victim scapegoating for failing to fulfill the expected 
victim role. Indeed, moving at all seemed to tighten the web’s grip. 
 This finding is based on my broader, ongoing experience of sharing the story 
publicly. While many of the specific incidents of public sharing and reply are not 
recorded in my writing from the time (and therefore not part of the data set), the array of 
interactions gave rise to complex feelings about the victim label and, for me, its 
untenability. This untenability was something I felt long before I could articulate it. In 
seeking to understand some of the discourses which constituted my lived experience, I 
found that Stringer (2014) and van Dijk’s (2009) theories, and the tensions between 
them, offered explanatory value. Juxtaposing their work has allowed me to articulate 
something I had felt, based heavily on my experience of interacting with dozens of 
people, but for which I lacked language prior to my research. 
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Victimhood as totalizing  
 The negative traits associated with victimhood, and themes of victimhood as 
eternal and total, are recurring and consistent across a range of feminist, psychological, 
and victimological research. Wood and Rennie (1994) offer a concise summation of the 
victim category: 
In general, it appears that the status of victim is undesirable—to be a victim 
represents a loss of control, a loss of self-esteem; it involves categorizing 
oneself with other stigmatized individuals, it entails aversive social 
consequences such as pity and rejection, and it is difficult to change. (Wood 
and Rennie, 1994, p. 127) 
Control and self-esteem are especially prized in a neoliberal context, where claiming 
victimhood is stigmatizing, and leads to relational consequences. Wood and Rennie’s 
comment that “it is difficult to change” suggests that victim status is permanent: 
victimhood leaks into a victim/survivor’s future, and into other facets of their life. 
 The discourse of the permanent, perpetual, and totalizing victim is especially 
pernicious. It situates failure to escape victimhood as a deficit in character and inner 
strength. The discourse of the perpetual victim is exemplified in the words of Barb, who 
was a participant in the study of Wood and Rennie (1994). In response to questions 
about her identity post-rape, Barb states:  
…that means I’m a victim, so that must mean that I’m a victim in all areas 
of my life, therefore, you know?… I can’t be successful, I can’t be this, I 
can’t be that, it’s as if this is going to permeate my whole life… I’m going 
to be a mess… because of being this victim. (Wood and Rennie, 1994, p. 
137) 
Interestingly, Barb does not locate the problem in any particular event (e.g., rape) or its 
aftermath: any specific incident is excluded from her comment. Rather, the focus is 
entirely on her status as a victim. 
Internalization
 The Oxford English Dictionary offers insight into colloquial use of the victim 
label. It offers four definitions for the term victim:  
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(1) A person harmed, injured, or killed as a result of a crime, accident, or 
other event or action; (2) A person who is tricked or duped; (3) A person 
who has come to feel helpless and passive in the face of misfortune or ill-
treatment [as modifier] ‘a victim mentality’; (4) A living creature killed as a 
religious sacrifice. 
Each of these definitions is brought to bear in the process by which those subjected to 
sexual violence come to negotiate their identity after the event, especially the first and 
the third. The first definition highlights victimhood as the result of a specific event—
there is no internalized aspect to this definition, nor any kind of characterological 
judgment. Rather, echoing Kelly et al. (1996), it is linked to a statement of narrative 
fact: something caused a person harm, ergo they are a victim. The emphasis in on the 
harm done unto the person, which was caused by an external source.  
 The third definition gestures toward the internalization of victimhood, as 
exemplified in Barb’s quote above. This definition suggests that there is an inciting 
event or ongoing ill treatment, but foregrounds the internalized meekness, helplessness, 
and passivity that results from that incident; the one who has been injured has become 
weakened and developed a pathetic state of mind. The tension between these two 
definitions is consistent with Mardorossian’s (2002, p. 770) observation that, “The 
meaning of the term victimization itself has simultaneously changed from an external 
reality imposed on someone to a psychologized inner state that itself triggers crises.” 
Her argument demonstrates the turn toward internalization and depoliticization. 
 These two Oxford definitions are visible in the words of Kim, who was a 
participant in the study of Wood and Rennie (1994). Kim articulates the difference 
between victimization and victim identity:  
But, so I just have two feelings for the word [victim], one is just in the, you 
know, one who receives an injustice and the other one is just a completely 
helpless shell of a human being. So, I’m not comfortable using the word for 
myself (Wood and Rennie, 1994, p. 137–138).  
Kim rejects victim identity on the premise that it would render her hollow and somehow 
less than human. It is interesting to note that, echoing Barb, her statement makes no 
reference to the violent event and its negative impacts: rather, the source of any negative 
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impact seems to lie within the choice of words one uses to describe themselves after the 
incident, while the incident itself is erased. 
 The overlap between the first and third definitions is exemplified in the third 
point of analysis that I wish to take up in regard to my conversation with Eli. The record 
of my internal dialogue reads: “I create my response, Eli, I create my relationship to the 
story, my actions, my internal landscape. But I do not control reality.” First, this 
statement demonstrates an internal reclamation of agency, based in an 
acknowledgement of its loss and subsequent reestablishment—a manoeuver predicated 
upon acknowledging some degree of diminished power at the hands of an abusive other. 
Second, in retrospect, I would challenge my own assertion as to the ability of any 
person to maintain creative control over their personal relationship to events, including 
their “internal landscape”. Such a perspective fails to account for the far-reaching 
implications of PTSD and rape trauma syndrome, and overlooks the impact of social 
discourse pervading the aftermath of sexual trauma. 
 Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) inhibits claims of control over one’s inner 
life: feeling a loss of control is part of what makes it such a frightening lived reality. The 
symptoms of PTSD highlight the lack of control any one person might claim to have 
over their internal reality. Symptoms of PTSD include intrusive thoughts, memories, 
and flashbacks, as well as depression, anxiety, and a sense of being out of control. In 
addition, internal landscapes are nurtured and constructed in light of cultural norms and 
prevailing discourses. As highlighted above, I have found that there is a range of 
dominant discourses that bear heavily on an individual’s reckoning with sexual 
violence. There is no way to maintain independence from these discourses; one may 
react to them and resist them, but even resistance hinges on its connections with, and 
roots in, hegemonic understandings of victimhood. 
Getting help 
 Since the category “victim” is a stigmatized and undesirable identity category, 
victims are encouraged, either tacitly or (as in my case) actively, to resist identification 
as victims, and especially to resist being labeled as a person with a “victim mentality”. I 
contend that these pressures inhabit a victim’s ability to display the harmful impacts of 
victimization. This potentially barricades a victim’s access to support, by urging victims 
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to surrender access to support; after all, support is allotted only to genuine and 
legitimate victims, who are defined by cultural expectations and norms as sufficiently 
innocent, blameless, and visibly injured (see Christie, 1986; van Dijk, 2009).  
 As I discuss in Chapter 5, I find that victim status is framed as a thing to be 
overcome. Escape from victim identity is supposedly achieved by healthy coping and, 
as the colloquial phrase would have it, refusing to be a victim. Emi Koyama (2011) 
observes that:  
The society views victimhood as something that must be overcome. When 
we are victimized, we are (sometimes) afforded a small allowance of time, 
space, and resources in order to recover—limited and conditional 
exemptions from normal societal expectations and responsibilities—and are 
given a different set of expectations and responsibilities that we must live up 
to (mainly focused around getting help, taking care of ourselves, and 
recovering). 
Koyama gestures toward the neoliberal discourse that victims should “move on” and 
overcome; that those of us who have been victimized should demonstrate individual 
resilience in the face of social injustice. I discuss the notion of resilience in greater 
detail in Chapter 6.  
 Furthermore, the enterprise of overcoming often requires drawing on the sorts of 
resources that are available only to those who classify as victims, or who have the 
economic resources to pay for additional help and support. Access to these resources is 
an intersectional issue, as Crenshaw (1991, p. 1250) discusses in her section on 
structural intersectionality:  
counselors who provide rape crisis services to women of color report that a 
significant portion of the resources allocated must be spent handling 
problems other than rape itself… uniform standards of need ignore the fact 
that different needs often demand different priorities in terms of resource 
allocation, and consequently, these standards hinder the ability of counselors 
to address the needs of nonwhite and poor women. 
It also costs more to serve women from marginalized communities, whose needs are 
different (Crenshaw, 1991). This understanding is part of what necessitated “me too” as 
a grassroots movement. Tarana Burke was responding to the needs of girls and women 
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of color, especially the need for designated spaces for healing and solidarity (Guerra, 
2017). 
 Even when victim support is accessible, it is often framed as temporary: 
available for a limited amount of time until one is sufficiently recovered and able to 
resume participation in society as a self-responsible, neoliberal citizen. At the rape crisis 
center where I sought treatment, I was allotted 12 sessions, which was extended based 
on the severity of my case. However, the goal was to get me out the door: not only in 
the interest of my swift recovery, but to open up a space for the next person who needed 
to deal with the adverse consequences of sexual violence. In Dunedin, where I live and 
study, our local rape crisis center has a counseling wait list that is several months long. 
Rape crisis resources struggle with funding (Beres et al., 2009). The support available is 
temporary: its goal, in part, is to inoculate against victim status becoming permanent. 
Conclusion 
 Thus far, I have sought to explore dominant discourses that shape victims’ 
experiences following sexual violence. I have found that Stringer’s (2014) arguments 
map accurately onto my experience of how neoliberal discourses shape attitudes and 
assumptions about how victims should evade the victim label and to position 
themselves as non-victims. Simultaneously, van Dijk’s (2009) work elucidates aspects 
of my experience, where I was expected to suffer meekly and passively, in light of the 
Christian etymology of the term and how that history constructs its present 
connotations. Their theorizations highlight different aspects of my experience and 
tensions therein. I found that my failure to comply with the contradicting expectations 
set out by Stringer and van Dijk led to reactive victim scapegoating, while failure to 
deny the victim label and demonstrate sufficient strength led to negative character 
assessments of my having a “victim mentality”. In light of this finding, I argue that my 
experience of victimhood is and was laden with stigma and contradictory imperatives, 
rendering the victim label untenable. 
 Further to the victim label’s untenability, I found that these contradictory 
imperatives infused conversations in a manner that did further harm through an 
everyday form of secondary victimization. These imperatives were brought to bear both 
via relationships with others: in the conversations through which I sought to negotiate 
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victim and non-victim identity labels. They created barriers to further support-seeking, 
since it inhibited my claims to victim status, which would have opensed possibilities for 
help and support. Therefore, avoiding the victim label foreclosed support options. 
 Blame is also a crucial variable in claiming or evading victimhood. Neoliberal 
victim theory blames victims and encourages victims to accept responsibility. For 
example, Eli wanted me to claim positive responsibility for the events as growth 
opportunities, which would also force me to assume responsibility for the harm I 
suffered. I found that evading blame and claiming the victim label can lead to charges of 
having a “victim mentality”, in which victimhood is cast as totalizing and arising from 
internal shortcomings rather than worldly circumstances. 
 I have also begun to explore the perils of internalization, which feeds into the 
depoliticization of sexual violence, and instead saddles victims with the burdens of 
coping with harmful social problems. I find that the victim label is cast as a source of 
harm, when the real source of harm is sexually violent events. I consider this further in 
the following chapters. 
 In recalling this conversation and reviewing my record of it, I find neoliberal 
discourses at work in my efforts to lay claim to any agency I could muster, to avoid the 
accusation that I was evading responsibility and becoming a pathetic victim. I find that I 
used tightrope talk (McKenzie-Mohr and LaFrance, 2011) as I struggled to demonstrate 
agency while claiming legitimate victim status and placing responsibility for the events 
on the man who chose to assault me. I attempted to claim agency after the fact, in what I 
would do in response to actions and events outside my control. These are intimations of 
my early movements toward “survivorship”, which I went on to explore with 
trepidation. The emphasis I placed on my response to trauma was bolstered by a 
dominant discourse that trauma is fertile ground for psychological growth. I examine 
this further in Chapter 6. In the next chapter, I turn to survivorship as a destination 
toward which one must journey, including its imperatives and limitations. 
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Chapter Five 
The Survivor Imperative  
 According to dominant neoliberal discourse, those who endure sexual violence 
should strive to evade victim status. They are encouraged and directed to claim 
responsibility and turn misfortune into an enterprise of personal growth and 
empowerment. As I argued in Chapter 4, the terrain of victimhood is so fraught as to 
limit the viability—and increase the risk—of claiming the victim label. Victimhood is a 
walled-in identity category, in which adhering to one set of stereotypes (passivity, 
meekness) means failing at the other (to overcome victimhood). The consequences of 
these failures range from reactive victim scapegoating to the charge of having a ‘victim 
mentality’. Thus, these hazards impede identification as a victim, even when doing so 
seems accurate to the harmed person and might help them obtain resources and support. 
 Having established my experience of untenability of the victim label, in this 
chapter I map out the relationship between victimhood and survivorship as it has been 
discussed by feminist scholars and sexual violence researchers. I begin by engaging 
with the historical use of the word survivor, which gained purchase after the Holocaust. 
I explore the survivor as political, and connected to public perception and visibility, and 
its subsequent depoliticization alongside uptake in therapeutic discourse. I then consider 
the way my politically motivated storytelling was reduced to personal healing. 
 Next, I delve into constructions supporting the binary formulation of victim and 
survivor. I find that the binary construction of the survivor as a self-restored, strong, and 
capable person who copes well with rape is defined in contrast to the weakness of 
character and poor coping skills associated with victims. The possibility for 
survivorship is predicated upon the existence of victimizing experiences; those who 
endure victimization are thus positioned, by virtue of victimization, to distinguish 
themselves as non-victim types, or as lacking a ‘victim mentality’. I then consider 
agency, ‘knowing better’, and blame as stalwarts of the survivor imperative, and 
introduce the notion of “feminist snap” (Ahmed, 2017). 
 Defining survivorship on the basis of rejecting, evading, or overcoming 
victimhood requires active distancing from victims. Distancing includes distancing 
oneself from a former victim self, or from other victims who are ‘not as over it’. I argue 
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that distancing logic fosters the recurring metaphor of the ‘journey’ away from 
victimhood, which is common in sexual violence literature (see Jordan, 2013).  
 In light of these considerations, I introduce the survivor imperative. I define the 
survivor imperative as social pressure to escape or evade victimhood and strive for 
survivorship, which has been constructed as a more socially acceptable identity 
category. I demonstrate different ways that the survivor imperative takes shape in 
conversations and interpersonal relationships, where pressure is exerted to eschew the 
victim label and heroically overcome adversity by way of personal responsibility. I 
examine how conversations and relationships shape post-rape identity negotiation, and 
how these interactions are influenced by dominant discourse. 
 In putting forward the survivor imperative, I explore its internalizing, 
individualizing, and depoliticizing dimensions. I argue that the survivor imperative 
saddles victims with the responsibility for surmounting social ills by individual efforts, 
and in a context where social remedies are sorely lacking. Further, even where those 
who experience sexual violence successfully transcend or sidestep the victim category, 
they must learn to survive and endure in a culture where gendered victimization 
persists. Such violence is normalized and fostered by rape myths (see Burt, 1980; Payne 
et al., 1999) and the cultural scaffolding of rape (Gavey, 2019). 
 I do not wish to imply that agency and personal responsibly are entirely moot; 
help-seeking, talking to trusted others, personal coping strategies, and a range of 
everyday behaviors require forms of agency and will. Many of those who have been 
victimized can and do live well, or at least function, after victimization. Agency is part 
of what enables functioning. Nevertheless, such agency is enacted in a climate that is 
hostile to victims, where contradictory imperatives for victim comportment shape how 
others respond to victim/survivor agentic actions or speech. Agency occurs in 
relationship to others, in between people, and does not exist in a vacuum (see 
Abrahamsson, 2014). I argue that the pendulum has swung too far toward emphasizing 
individual agency and personal responsibility, at the expense of recognizing, and 
resisting, the role of hegemonic discourse and social realities. These discourses include 
rape myths, the cultural scaffolding of rape in proliferating sexual harm, contradictory 
expectations around the victim label, the survivor imperative and, as I discuss in the 
next chapter, posttraumatic growth. Further, I suggest that the survivor imperative 
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functions to obscure harmful social realities and contributes to the continued 
stigmatization of the victim label. 
 Finally, I consider a conversation in which my interlocutor collapsed the victim 
survivor binary, and utilized the terms in non-normative ways. I explore how victim/
survivor speech challenges and moves beyond dominant understandings. I apply 
McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance’s (2011) notion of tightrope talk to contextualize and 
examine complex, nuanced, and novel articulations. By challenging recuperative 
analyses of victim/survivor speech, I suggest that it is incumbent on those listening to, 
interpreting, and studying victim/survivor speech to attend to and analyze that speech 
with greater sensitivity to tightrope talk. 
The Holocaust survivor  
 The language of survivorship predates feminist discourse on sexual violence. 
Historically, the term has been used in a legal context to denote outliving others. For 
instance, a deceased adult may be survived by their children or spouse who stand to 
inherit part, or all, of their estate. Colloquially, the term suggests continuing to live in a 
variety of circumstances. Its meaning expanded and evolved in the early 20th century, 
and the application of the term to political contexts of extreme suffering came about in 
response to the Holocaust. Its emergence in that context offers significant insights into 
the use of the term today, and provides some alternative conceptualizations. 
 The Oxford English Dictionary (2018) presents two definitions of the term 
survivor. The first definition resonates with historic use of the term, while the second 
definition deals with newer conceptualizations of the survivor: 
(1) A person who survives, especially a person remaining alive after an 
event in which others have died: ‘he was the sole survivor of the massacre’; 
(1.2) A person who copes well with difficulties in their life: ‘she is a born 
survivor’  
The first definition implies passivity, and does not frame the survivor as active and 
agentic, but rather reflects chance in having survived: they remain alive. In the context 
of the first definition, survivorship does not hinge on agency, let alone heroism. The 
main focus of the first definition is the inciting, life-threatening event. It is akin to the 
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first definition of victim, as someone injured or killed as a result of some event (Oxford, 
2018).  
 The second definition emphasizes the act and capacity to cope well, and 
therefore to respond adaptively to victimizing or life-threatening events. Coping is 
active; it requires agency, action, will, and choice. Although coping involves a set of 
behaviors and actions, coping has characterological associations: one has the 
constitution to cope well. Hence, coping well signals strength of character. As I discuss 
in depth below, coping well is a revered quality in neoliberal contexts, demonstrating 
resourcefulness, resilience, and responsibility in the face of adversity. The example 
provided by Oxford (2018) about being a “born survivor” implies inherent 
characterological traits, independent of circumstances.  
 However, looking at historical use of the term, individual coping as a sign of 
character has not always been key in conceptualizing the survivor. In considering the 
history of the term, I draw heavily on Des Pres (1976) and Orgad (2009), who each take 
different approaches in conceptualizing the survivor. Des Pres (1976) emphasizes the 
moral authority—and burdens—of the survivor, as well as the social and political 
aspects of the term. Orgad (2009) focuses on divergences and consistencies between use 
of the term after the Holocaust and in contemporary discussions of sexual violence. She 
also considers the survivor in reality television, and takes on the adaptations and 
complexities of the survivor label in a neoliberal context. 
 The meaning of the survivor label evolved in the decades following the 
Holocaust. According to Orgad (2009, p. 137), the Holocaust is “a key site that 
consolidated the idea of the survivor as a visible discursive object”. In the first two 
decades after the Second World War, only active resisters to fascist regimes were 
publicly visible and valorized as survivors; these figures were part of what Chaumont 
(2000; cited by Orgad, 2009, p. 137) terms “the cult of the hero”. Those who had 
endured internment in the Nazi camps were not categorized as survivors; rather, they 
were labeled victims. 
 During the two-decade period immediately following the Second World War, the 
victim label was applied with stigma and shame, to connote submissive consent by Jews 
to their own destruction in the Nazi camps. Chaumont (1997, 2000; cited by Orgad, 
2009) uses the term “secondary victimization” to refer to the repression of Jewish 
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realities and stories: Jews were blamed for their own deaths and lack of resistance. Even 
their survival strategies were condemned. Victims’ voices and stories were systemically 
repressed, including in Israel, through the 1950s. 
 Orgad (2009) tracks how the perception of Holocaust victims shifted over 
several decades, as they gained public and political viability. During the 1960s, victims 
were glorified and renamed survivors. From the 1970s onwards,  
Holocaust survivors gradually moved from the realms of exclusion 
and invisibility to public recognition and moral authority. This shift, 
often framed as a transformation from victim to survivor, was a key moment 
in the cultural production of the survivor. (Orgad, 2009, p. 138–139) 
The transformation was a public and political phenomenon rather than a personal 
triumph; the survivor label denoted a change in public perception, not in the individuals 
who had survived the Nazi camps. The change depended on public visibility and 
discourse. Orgad (2009) points out that visibility was achieved in part via the 
proliferation of memoirs detailing individual experiences during the Holocaust and 
which, taken as whole, served to change public conceptualizations of the past and 
present realities of victim/survivors. 
 While public and political transformations occurred, a therapeutic discourse of 
victimhood and survivorship was underway. Orgad (2009) discusses early intimations of 
dichotomizing victimhood and survivorship. The victim/survivor binary was most 
visible in psychotherapeutic perspectives in the mid-20th century, which maintained that 
individual recovery from the Holocaust was supported by “the transformation from 
victim to survivor as the desirable goal” (Orgad, 2009, p. 138). It would appear that the 
narrative arc from victimhood to survivorship predates the application of the idea to 
sexual violence. 
 Some, including Bettleheim, resisted the individualizing, therapeutic discourse. 
Orgad (2009) draws insights from Bettleheim’s (1979) essay “The Survivor”, in which 
he argues that to construct and present survivors as “active agents responsible for their 
own survival” (Orgad, 2009, p . 139) is a “complete ly mis leading 
distortion” (Bettleheim, 1979, p. 288). According to Bettleheim (1979), surviving had to 
do with luck, with others’ choices about who died and who was freed, who was helped 
and who was not. For Bettleheim, there is a banality of survivorship that is unrelated to 
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resistance in the face of life-threatening situations or acts of heroism. Langer (1995, p. 
6, cited by Orgad, 2009, p. 138) criticizes talk of survivors, calling it “a language 
designed to console instead of confront”, thus deflecting the realities of the Nazi camps. 
I suggest that the critique of survivorship as deflecting is a pertinent criticism in the 
contemporary context of feminist discourse around sexual violence. 
 Des Pres’ (1976) book The Survivor takes a different approach to discussing 
Holocaust survivors, and lays the groundwork for an alternative conceptualization of 
survivorship regarding sexual violence in the current context. The aim of the book is to 
outline the structures and ontologies of survival in the death camps: “ways of life which 
are the basis and achievement of life in extremity” (Des Pres, 1976, p. v). Core to Des 
Pres’ work is a survivorship that hinges on maintaining humanity and spirit (in the most 
general sense) in extremity, independent of whether one succeeds in staying alive: for 
Des Pres, those who perished but maintained their humanity are survivors. Victims are 
the dead, in body or in spirit. Des Pres’s notion of survivorship deals with the resources 
mobilized to avoid literal or metaphorical death.  
 Des Pres highlights that survival was a collective enterprise: an exercise in 
solidarity. He makes visible the extent to which the predicament of surviving was 
outside the control of victim/survivors. In one situation, some might resign, while others 
might rally to oppose. Even for those who resisted, there were moments of nearly 
succumbing to death or despair, and it was the help of others that carried these people 
through. Here, agency and will are collective, and are deeply relational. These 
understandings also echo Lorde’s (2007b) insights that we need one another to speak, to 
act together, to survive, and Ahmed’s (2017) statements about the need for feminist 
solidarity for survival in a world that still needs feminism. These feminist women are 
writing about survival in a different context, and yet the need for solidarity in order to 
survive resonates across the divide. 
 In Des Pres’ framework, there is nothing heroic about survival. “[A]lthough to 
be human under pressure takes extraordinary effort, there is really no alternative… Hard 
as it is, therefore, the survivor’s struggle is without glamor or special destiny” (Des 
Pres, 1979, p. 9). His conceptualization of survival involves the simple fact of knowing 
one is alive when others are not, that no one is immune. This may seem hopeless and 
grim, but even the grief-stricken person remains alive, with sufficient humanity to 
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grieve. To live after such an ordeal—life, with one’s humanity and spirit intact—is the 
prize. According to Des Pres (1976, p. 14), “Men and women can sustain enormous 
damage and still go on as human beings.” Here, what is highlighted is the simple and 
profound ability for humans to endure, and to remain human in extremely cruel 
conditions. Endurance is a powerful, modest, and achievable alternative to the 
individual heroism and strength often associated with the survivor today. Des Pres’ 
work provides scope for an alternative conceptualization of the survivor that emphasizes 
the ability to live on and retain humanity after violence. I return in to Des Pres’ 
conceptualization in Chapter 7. 
 Des Pres (1976) offers a poignant essay on the survivor as witness, and details 
recollections of Holocaust survivors who report making a decision to fight and live for 
the express purpose of telling their stories. He describes the imperative to bear witness, 
and highlights the extent to which many survivors credit bearing witness as motivating 
their efforts to stay alive: “For many survivors the chance to speak comes later. To bear 
witness is the goal of their struggle” (Des Pres, 1976, p. 31). Embedded in this goal is 
resistance to forgetting the terrible realities of the Holocaust. Des Pres (1976, p. 36) 
offers a poetic discussion of bearing witness. He suggests that silence is death: it is the 
sound of the dead, and of the horror that follows atrocity. The silence is empty and void 
of meaning. From that silence comes a wail, a scream, which can make the horror of 
that silence felt and heard. It has the power to incite a scream in listeners. The scream 
becomes a vessel for carrying and dispersing the burden of remembering and speaking 
for those who did not survive, who are therefore unable to speak (Des Pres, 1976).  
 Here, Lorde’s (2007b) perspective on transforming fear and silence into speech 
and action comes to mind: finding language for our suffering and oppression, and 
crafting ways to share that experience with others, carries potential for solidarity. Lorde 
(2007a) emphasizes the need for poetic language to accommodate speech where other 
forms of language fall short. Des Pres (1976), too, writes about the need for poetic, even 
religious language in writing about the Holocaust: he suggests that extreme suffering 
requires a different kind of language. Speech efforts fall short of adequately expressing 
lived reality. 
 For example, Des Pres talks about the erroneous application of the label of 
“survivor guilt”, arguing that concern for the dead has been often misread, “taken as 
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evidence of something irrational and therefore suspect in the survivor’s behaviour” (Des 
Pres 1976, p. 36). He challenges survivor guilt as a meaning making frame, used to 
interpret and analyze survivor speech and to treat survivors in a therapeutic context. 
Survivor guilt was considered an attempt to justify why or how one survived. According 
to Des Pres (1976), survivor guilt is too dependent on psychotherapeutic language and 
the notion of neurosis. Summarizing Lifton, Des Pres challenges the interpretation that 
carrying the dead is a form of neurosis. According to Des Pres (1976, p. 39), “The aim 
of psychiatric treatment is adjustment, acceptance, forgetting—goals which constitute a 
condition the survivor rejects.” In therapy, forgetting is conceptualized as healing, and 
the survivor’s need to remember and bear witness is antithetical to therapeutic goals. 
The survivor experience is beyond the psychoanalytic frame. Perhaps survivor behavior 
and experience is beyond any interpretive frame: it is disruptive and difficult to hear. 
The survivor experience is inherently disruptive, personally and politically, and resists 
forgetting even the most painful memories.  
 Resistance to forgetting figures prominently in my experience of victimization 
and its aftermath. I felt a need to remember and narrate my own story, and the 
possibility of doing so was a lifeline through the most painful periods after the rapes. 
Further, the history of women’s speak-outs and consciousness raising, the feminist 
rallying cry of “breaking the silence”, suggest to me that the imperative to witness and 
verbalize stories of victimization and survival are important to many women who 
experience sexual violence. I discuss this in greater depth below. 
 To resist the notion of survivor guilt, Des Pres (1976, p. 40), borrowing from 
Lifton (1972, p. 519), puts forth “the anxiety of responsibility”. Such responsibility is 
the moral authority and burden shouldered by the survivor, as one who remembers what 
they have seen and suffered, and feels passionate about telling the truth about it (Des 
Pres, 1976). Des Pres (1976, p. 40) frames this as “the capacity for response to deeds 
and events; as care for the future; as awareness of the interdependency of human life, it 
becomes simply conscience”. In these conditions, the silencing of the survivor does 
great personal harm, for it barricades the realization of their responsibility. It also does 
social harm, since it infringes on the ability to hear and right wrongs, and to learn from 
history.  Silence becomes depoliticizing. 
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 Still, there are those who remain unwilling or unable to listen. Des Pres (1976) 
addresses resistance to hearing survivor accounts; the knowledge borne by survivors is 
too disruptive, too disturbing, too far outside the confines of everyday experience. Des 
Pres (1976) also recognizes the extent to which cultural symbolism is dedicated to 
deflecting harsh realties, including notions about finding meaning in and redemption 
through suffering. 
 The meaning of the survivor label has shifted in the decades since the Holocaust, 
and it has been increasingly applied to the context of sexual and domestic violence. 
Consistent across both contexts is the need to bear witness and speak. However, the 
meaning of survivorship increasingly connotes individual, therapeutic transformations, 
rather than political changes or shifts in public perception. I consider this in depth 
below. 
Survivors of sexual and domestic violence 
 Some early connotations of the survivor label carry over into feminist contexts. 
Since the late 1970s, survivor has been applied to the context of sexual and domestic 
violence. The initial goal of implementing a new label was to resist the stigma of the 
victim label and its connotations of passivity and inaction by recontextualizing actions 
taken during violent events as survival strategies. However, the meaning has evolved to 
suggest a personal narrative arc of transformation from victim to survivor. Further, the 
victim and survivor labels have been dichotomized. Both the media and 
psychotherapeutic discourse have contributed to the construction and proliferation of 
survivorship in opposition to victimhood. 
 Orgad (2009) discusses prevalent themes associated with survivorship in 
feminist contexts. First, public claims of survivor status coincided with consciousness-
raising efforts to acknowledge and reveal the extent of sexual victimization as a social 
and political problem. Such efforts to increase public visibility mirror the political and 
social context of survivor discourse following the Holocaust. Orgad (2009) argues that 
survivorship has historically been contingent on speaking out and making violence 
visible: it has been public, political, and performed, rather than a private, personal 
triumph. Feminist politicization of survivorship was a reaction to violence that had long 
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been presumed personal, and kept secret and silent. Speaking out opened possibilities 
for mutual support, and rendered painful realities politically meaningful.  
 Therapeutic and individual conceptualizations have become increasingly 
prominent. The psychotherapeutic frame holds that “Recovery must involve speaking 
the unspeakable” (Orgad, 2009, p. 140). Therapeutic framing reflects a turn toward the 
internalization and individualization of survivorship, and speaking up is often framed as 
an inherent part of a recovery journey. In the vocabulary of psychotherapy, talk therapy 
is the means by which one recovers from trauma. It is the path by which one moves 
beyond victim status toward survivor status; survivorship is the desirable end of an 
identity continuum.  
 Orgad (2009) notes the 1990s efforts to recast victims as agentic survivors, and 
suggests that the survivor label might foster hope for life after a rape experience. 
However, Stringer (2014, p. 79–80) complicates this claim: 
In the wide variety of contexts in which the concept ‘survivor’ is invoked 
today, the unique meanings rape crisis feminism ascribes to ‘victim’ and 
survivor’ are rarely visible or visible only in depoliticizing ways. Along with 
the other ‘best ideas’ of second-wave feminism that Nancy Fraser (2009) 
argues have been ‘resignified’ in neoliberal times, the concept of 
survivorship has been mainstreamed and recuperated (see McLaughlin, 
2012; Alcoff and Gray, 1993; and Bumiller, 2008). Even as the ethos of 
survivorship continues to powerfully inform the ongoing work of rape crisis 
feminism, in many contexts today, notions of survivorship and resilience 
operate on behalf of neoliberal victim theory… feminist meanings have 
been evacuated from the concept of survivorship and replaced with a credo 
of enforced resilience and personal responsibility. 
While hope for living well after sexual violence is important, I argue that such hope 
should be about social change and transformation at least as much as it is about 
individuals’ ability to overcome, conquer, or make peace with traumatic experiences. 
Stringer’s notion of “enforced resilience” resonates with my discussion of posttraumatic 
growth in the following chapter. 
 Orgad (2009) is critical of the 1990s recasting of victims as survivors, noting 
that psychotherapeutic framing privileges personal transformation while omitting social 
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realities. According to Orgad (2009, p. 144), “The celebration of agency, personal 
empowerment, self-responsibility, and self management has contributed to deflect 
discussion away from the responsibilities of the community, the state, and the society at 
large.” She also discusses backlash to the term survivor, where some mark it as:  
destructive, disturbing, and even dangerous… survivorship is legitimate and 
desirable as long as it is devoid of anger or criticism, as long as agency is 
directed to harmonious and peaceful forums and activities. (Orgad, 2009, p. 
145) 
Here, Orgad elaborates and expands on the depoliticizing power of survivor discourse. 
A certain type of survivor is revered: a survivor who is politically passive, individually 
focused, and embarking on a therapeutic journey of self-knowledge, self-enterprise, 
aspiration, and improvement. The disruptive capacity of the survivor, as one who bears 
witness and speaks up, is undermined by individualizing discourses. Internalized 
therapeutics subvert Lorde’s (2007b) notion of transforming silence into language, 
action, and political solidarity. Excessive personal emphasis obscures social realities, 
and places responsibility on individuals rather than dispersing it across social and 
political domains. Again, there is scope for some amount of personal responsibility and 
agency, but not to the extent that it is valorized by these depoliticizing 
conceptualizations. 
Political resistance dismissed as personal journey  
 Changes in the meaning of the survivor label through the later part of the 20th 
century increasingly reinforce neoliberal victim theory. The original emphasis on 
transformation from victim to survivor as a matter of public perception and visibility 
has morphed to underscore a personal therapeutic journey, which depends on 
denouncing victimhood. In the years immediately following my rapes, the imperative I 
felt to tell the story and bear witness to ongoing realities of sexual harm was frequently 
identified by others as part of a personal healing journey. In the majority of instances 
where people discovered I was writing a memoir, their response assumed that I was 
doing so for the purpose of personal healing and the therapeutic power of writing.  
 In contrast, I found that the act of writing was anti-therapeutic: it forced my 
sustained confrontation with the facts of my trauma, and left me swimming in horrible 
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memories. It exacerbated what was, at the time, worsening PTSD. It triggered 
flashbacks and depressive episodes. It gave me no joy, no healing, no satisfaction. From 
a clinical perspective, it was retraumatizing. I was attempting to record the story in 
meticulous and honest detail, especially in places where my story diverged from 
socially acceptable narratives. Practically speaking, I felt a need to record as soon after 
the events as possible, while the memory was vivid. I hoped that the constant, obsessive 
rumination and repetitions of the events in my mind—a symptom of my PTSD—would 
support an accurate record. Any healing capacity of narration lay in the possibility that it 
might help me resist harmful social norms and politicize my experience. My experience 
of being a ‘survivor’ is consistent with Des Pres’ (1976) framework, which centers on 
staying alive, retaining humanity after trauma, and the imperative to witness. I found 
hope in the possibility of bearing witness, not only to sexual victimization but also to 
secondary victimization. 
 Despite what I felt were explicit social and political commitments, I was 
frequently subjected to the assumption that writing was nothing more than a healing 
project. This reduction fostered tension and contradiction: writing the story was 
presented to me as both therapeutic and harmful to myself and others. I was told 
committing the story to paper would render me an eternal and total victim, and that it 
would do harm to others. These claims about eternal victimhood were a form of reverse 
victimology (Stringer, 2014). I was also encouraged to write if it was therapeutic to me. 
These paradoxes and contradictions contributed to an atmosphere of tension in my 
relationships after sexual violence. When I was asked, often accusingly, why I wanted to 
speak out, the social and political motivations I offered were met with suspicion. I was 
charged with begin a source of harm. In foregrounding personal healing, my political 
and social intentions were either ignored or else challenged. 
 My experience of attempting to draw attention to the issue of sexual violence 
resonates with insights from Ahmed (2017, p. 34), that to name the problem is to 
become the problem.  
Not naming a problem in the hope that it will go away often means the 
problem just remains unnamed. At the same time, giving the problem a 
name does not make the problem go away. To give the problem a name can 
be experienced as magnifying the problem… when we give problems their 
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names, we become the problem for those who do not want to talk about a 
problem even though they know there is a problem. 
By complaining, I became the source and cause of trouble, bypassing the actual cause—
sexual violence—about which I was complaining. Mentors and trusted friends made 
sweeping and harsh comments about my character and self-interest for wanting to write 
and speak out. They told me that raising consciousness was clearly for personal 
financial gain. I was accused of seeking fame on the basis of my trauma. Their focus on 
my character failings was hurtful, and fed my own concerns that I might harm others. I 
also worried that I was not comporting myself graciously as I suffered. Crucially, the 
focus on my motivations and character obscured the real problem: the proliferation of 
sexual harm, and the protection of those who chose to enact it. 
 Throughout that period, I did not think of myself as a survivor; I was too 
immersed in the project of remembering, recording, and telling. I was cognizant of 
others’ resistance to that telling, and often felt subject to rejection and judgment for 
suffering. Although the term survivor was not central to my lexicon, the discourse of 
survivorship, and the survivor imperative, cast a shadow over the initial years after the 
rapes. I felt constant pressure to evade or overcome victim status, to become something 
else, to take responsibility and enact agency. The only permissible story to write was 
one in which I was not a victim, one in which I had overcome.  
The victim survivor binary 
 Shifting focus from the victim/agent binary to the victim/survivor binary enables 
deeper understandings of everyday terms used to discuss and identify those who have 
endured sexual violence. Considering the victim/survivor binary allows for analysis of 
the history of the survivor label in the context of sexual violence, which I discuss above, 
and for engagement with the journey metaphor, which I detail below. First, I wish to 
map the feminist debates regarding victimhood, survivors, and agency. 
 Survivorship has long been entwined with notions of individual agency. 
Schneider (1993) titles her work “The false dichotomy of victimization and agency,” 
and discusses the mutually exclusive framing of victims and agents with regard to 
battered women. She critiques this frame as reductive and overly simplistic. Echoing 
Barry (1979), Schneider argues that the binary formulation neglects areas where the 
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victim and survivor categories overlap, and the ways in which survival strategies are 
deployed in victimizing situations. After Schneider (1993), several researchers discuss 
what they term the victim/survivor dichotomy. Kelly et al. (1996) develop the victim/
survivor dichotomy to elucidate the mutually exclusive use of terms and their 
oppositional positioning. Echoing Schneider and Barry, Kelly et al. (1996) advance a 
critique of how binary formulation erases acts of survival at the time of victimization. 
According to Kelly et al. (1996), the impetus behind establishing the survivor label was 
to alter the stigma associated with the victim label. However, Kelly et al. argue that 
survivorship as a valorized alternative has actually reinforced the stigma of victimhood. 
They highlight how the dynamics between victim and survivor labels reduce the social 
and systemic to the individual and psychological. 
 Proffit (1996) contributes to the debate and dialogue by highlighting the extent 
to which survivorship, like victimhood, overemphasizes violence with regard to identity. 
Proffit (1996) makes several vital points that apply to sexual assault: no matter the 
name, the material reality of violence and victimization persists; survivorship is 
discursively linked to coping; and, overemphasis on singular, totalizing identities is 
troubling. However, Proffit (1996) slips into a common assumption that the victim or 
survivor category might subsume victim/survivors’ identities. Proffit’s concern mirrors 
the extent to which victimizing experiences and subsequent suffering may come to 
dominate a victim/survivor’s life and sense of self for some time after the events. 
However, concerns about the victim label as totalizing, which I address in Chapter 4, 
misplace the cause for trouble in the process of identification, rather than victimizing 
events. 
 The distinction between a victim and a survivor, or the different connotations 
within dominant discourse, might be summed up thus: the survivor copes well and 
moves on from the event and its harm, while the victim copes poorly and remains 
trapped in a self-fulfilling prophecy of perpetual (internalized and total) victimhood. 
Hockett, McGraw, and Saucier (2014, 84) note that the two labels for those harmed by 
sexual violence, victim and survivor, “have the same denotation but different 
connotations… denote the same referent, but convey different meanings about the 
referent.” The similarity between the terms is the inciting incident—sexual violence of 
some kind—and identifying the person who has experienced it. Dominant 
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conceptualizations valorize the survivor and devalue the victim, and are further 
enhanced by the construction of a narrative arc, a personal journey metaphor, by which 
one moves away from being a victim, toward becoming a survivor. 
 In the period spanning the 1990s to the present, the survivor is presented as 
authentic, sovereign, and powerful: their suffering is, to some extent, simultaneously 
affirmed and plastered over. Victimization is minimized, and focus is placed on positive 
attributes, including courage, self-sufficiency, and admirable efforts to overcome 
(Orgad, 2009). According to Orgad (2009, p. 150), 
The survivor constitutes a desirable mode of being or identity that people 
are encouraged to comply with and take on. It is not a given identity or role, 
but one that must be achieved: one becomes a survivor. The survivor is a 
self-responsible individual with a considerable degree of agency who 
emerges from a struggle involving some kind of suffering, through a process 
of self-exploration and styles of self-management. The self is both the 
source of the survivor’s suffering and the solution to the suffering. 
Orgad (2009) discusses the prevailing notion that a survivor is something one strives to 
become, rather than something inherent. Orgad (2009) also notes how the striving 
associated with survivorship contributes to delegitimizing the victim label, especially 
since they are constructed as binary opposites. Binary framing perpetuates the 
construction of the victim category as undesirable, while survivorship remains “a 
desirable role that individuals are encouraged to assume” and strive to achieve (Orgad, 
2009, p. 132). 
 Hockett, McGraw, and Saucier (2014, p. 84), whose studies I address below, 
note that these two names for those harmed by sexual violence, victim and survivor, 
“have the same denotation but different connotations… denote the same referent, but 
convey different meanings about the referent”. The similarity between the terms is the 
inciting incident: sexual violence of some kind.  They also treat the victim and survivor 
categories as mutually exclusive. It seems that the difference between a victim and a 
survivor, as conceived in dominant discourse, might be summed up thus: the survivor 
copes well and moves on from the event and its harm, while the victim copes poorly and 
remains trapped in a self-fulfilling prophecy of perpetual (internalized) victimhood, and 
does harm to others by doing so.  
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 The positive connotations of survivor vis-à-vis victim status have been well 
documented by a range of researchers (see Dunn, 2004, 2005; Kelly et al., 1996; 
Leisenring, 2006; McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance, 2011; Proffit, 1996; Schneider, 1993; 
Thompson, 2000; Wood and Rennie, 1994). The survivor formulation recognizes 
strength and the ability to cope (Proffit, 1996). Kelly et al. (1996, p. 90) point out how 
survivor identity may serve as “a source of positive self-identity in women”. Several 
scholars cite Barry (1979, p. 39), who wrote that, “Surviving is the other side of being a 
victim, it involves will, action, initiative on the victim’s part.” Survivors make 
decisions, they recover and move on, they cope well (Leisenring, 2006, citing Naples, 
2003). According to Jordan (2013, p. 49), early use of the survivor labels “sought to 
place emphasis on the woman’s actions and responses, recognising not only their 
victimisation but also their strengths and resilience”. Furthermore, survival is ongoing: 
a myriad of circumstances and ordeals, including police interviews and trials, must be 
survived (Jordan, 2013). Survivors symbolize resilience. However, I argue that whether 
survival is offered as a de facto status for having survived or whether it hinges on 
coping well and characterological assessments is significant. 
Valorizing agency and devaluing victimhood 
 After the rape, I felt pressured to manage the construction of the narrative of 
what happened, and who I was in relation to the events, in a manner that valorized 
agency and survivorship. Others directed the construction of the narrative. Yet I desired 
to name the events as an expression of my agency, in a manner which mirrored my inner 
dialogue in response to Eli: “I create my response, Eli, I create my relationship to the 
story…” The onus sat squarely on my shoulders to craft a narrative of the events and 
their aftermath that highlighted my personal strength and agency in any way possible. I 
had been victimized by another person, who chose to victimize me. Yet, whether or not I 
became a victim was constructed as my own choice, my own responsibility.  
 Here, Stringer’s (2014) victim bad/agent good formulation is an apt analytic 
frame. Victims are suspect, and a victim is expected to uphold agency adequately by 
demonstrating empowerment and strength. To borrow from Baker (2010a, p. 187), “No 
matter what obstacles and disadvantages are experienced, the neoliberal subject must 
live their life as though they are free to choose its trajectory.” I was expected to choose 
 165
a trajectory that involved upholding my own agency. Furthermore, I was explicitly told 
that if I told the story at all, I could and should tell my story (and live my experience) in 
a manner that could be viewed as uplifting. 
 As I remember it now, I engaged in a semi-conscious effort to accommodate the 
contradiction of these demands with my lived reality, while maintaining some sense of 
agency and will in developing an understanding of events. The tensions in managing 
these contradictions demonstrate another permutation and example of the 
intersubjective and relational aspects of identity negotiation, and demonstrates the 
internal ramifications of these dialogues. I identified victimization as transitory: I placed 
what Wood and Rennie (1994, p. 138) call “temporal boundaries on the experience”. I 
had been victimized by victimizing events, but that did not make me a victim. Thus, I 
could evade victim identity. The prospect of evading vicim identity, at the time, felt like 
a revelation, a way forward. In retrospect, it appears to be a product of social directives 
fostered by dominant discourse. 
 Parul Sehgal, writing for The New York Times, discusses the survivor imperative 
in a piece she titles “The Forced Heroism of the Survivor”. She tracks the subversive 
beginnings of the survivor label in pop feminism as a way of highlighting 
resourcefulness, and critiques what survivorship has evolved into: a romanticized 
mandate. Sehgal (2016) writes that, “The pendulum swings from one extreme to the 
other: from casting rape as insurmountable pain to casting the survivor as possessing 
superhuman strength.” Seghal’s critique, echoing Koyama, combines an attitude of 
heroic overcoming with positive and effective coping styles to catapult the survivor 
toward a more realized neoliberal self. In so doing, they demonstrate their strength and 
determination to get past victimhood and prove themselves superior to a ‘victim 
mentality’. 
June 2013 incident, recorded December 2017 
 We found a place to sit just out of earshot from the rest of the conference. We sat 
in old wooden chairs, neither across from each other nor beside one another, more at an 
angle. It felt safer not to be face-to-face; that would feel too confronting. Better to look 
in the same general direction. The woman with me, Claire, did not have direct power 
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over me, but had seniority in the community, and I wanted to see how her perspective 
compared to that of Georgina, who was in a position of power in our relationship. 
 Georgina wanted me to figure out what I might have done differently, how I’d 
let it happen, where and how I might have stopped it or escaped. She wanted me to 
identify when my intuition had kicked in that something was wrong, and consider why I 
hadn’t heeded it and fled. Georgina focused on what I ought to have known, and how 
that should have prompted appropriate action to manage risk and avert the rapes. 
Indeed, among the first things she said upon learning of the rapes was “you knew 
better”. Mere days had elapsed since the most recent rape and my escape. I was too tired 
to push back. When I tried to challenge the victim blame, she kept telling me it wasn’t 
blame; she said would never blame the victim. 
 It went on for months like that, mostly because I trusted her; I knew she wanted 
to see me heal, recover, and be well, and this was the way she thought to do it. I was 
loyal to her, I needed her help. But I was getting tired. To tread down the path of her 
line of inquiry felt like admitting it had all been my fault, that the pain I was enduring in 
the aftermath was an exaggeration; that it was all in my head. 
 Too much of my time and energy went to resisting her line of questioning. 
 Something wasn’t right: the conversations would hurt and stress me out—
especially when we lived together. There was no escape from the pervasive sense that 
she found me at fault. Georgina would push her blame insidiously and constantly, 
subsequently denying my resistance to her veiled blame. She criticized me for resisting 
her care. The denial that it was victim blame was part of the nightmare of it. It made me 
feel crazy for feeling attacked, for feeling defensive, when I wanted to rely on the 
guidance of a person whom I had trusted for so long. I knew she wanted me to recover, 
and I wanted—needed—to trust that her method would work, but it was excruciating.  
 Georgina kept emphasizing choices: the ones I’d made then, the one I was 
making now. She wanted me to heal. She wanted me to grow from this, to get past it, to 
“choose life”. She wanted me to move on and shut up about it—her active, if 
manipulative, role in keeping me from speaking out wouldn’t become clear for another 
eighteen months. Only then did I realize she didn’t want to have to look at what had 
been done to me. She wanted it over with. She wanted me to get over it. 
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 Anyway, I sat under trees, and sunlight with Claire, and I told her about my 
struggles with Georgina. I told her how pressured I felt to assume responsibility for 
what had happened, and to overcome and arrive on the other side, to stop hurting and 
stop suffering. I wasn’t there yet. And the pressure didn’t help. 
 I don’t remember everything about the conversation—it was nearly five years 
ago, after all. I remember Claire telling me in no vague terms that the experience of 
victimization, of feeling like a victim, needed to be ridden out, needed to be experienced 
fully in order to let it go.  
 I remember feeling safe for the first time in a long time, as if I didn’t have to 
defend my right to hurt, like my pain was reasonable. I wasn’t crazy; someone 
understood. It felt like I could suddenly rest, knowing it was normal for me to feel how 
I felt. It was permissible to be a victim, to feel confused and powerless over the past, to 
be struggling in the present. The pain was at its most severe then; the PTSD had taken 
hold. Sleep evaded me, nightmares of my rapist persisted, and his face lurked 
everywhere I went. I was in a constant state of physically painful anxiety, as though my 
head and chest were stretched and over-full. And there were the flashbacks. I carried the 
burden of knowing that I might close my eyes at any time and be underneath him again. 
On top of all that, I couldn’t stop telling the story: not only did people want to know the 
details of how I’d ended up in the grip of an alleged murderer, but once I got going, it 
steamrolled out of me, like a compulsion. I could not stop. I’d narrate from beginning to 
end while a headache grew and spread across my body.  
 By the time I spoke to Claire, I’d already dropped out of Harvard. I couldn’t 
function.  
 On that day, in the sunshine, Claire did not urge me to get over it and past it. Not 
immediately anyway. My experience was allowed, accepted. I felt relieved. The 
difference between her and Georgina was an allowance of ‘victimhood’ to manifest and 
express itself fully. Yet the assumption that I would and should get past it was still 
present. It felt encouraging. Talking with Claire, I thought that I’d found a way to get to 
the place I felt I was supposed to get to: over it. I could become a survivor on the other 
side of this minefield. I would do it by embracing the state I was in: victimhood. It was 
temporary. I had to embrace it to transcend it, but I would transcend it. 
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 It was a powerful and freeing moment to be accepted by Claire, to have 
permission from an elder I respected to be where I was and not need to defend my right 
to suffer from the pain someone else had inflicted on me. It was the beginning of the 
end of my relationship with Georgina as well. Eventually, she hit the mark of one 
betrayal too many. It was under those trees with Claire that I started to doubt Georgina’s 
guidance. In time, I came to see Georgina’s actions and words as harmful, despite her 
best intentions. In contrast to Claire, Georgina could not accept the place I was in, the 
pain I felt, my identification with the victim label. In retrospect, it became clear that not 
only was Georgina pressing me to handle myself and my suffering in a particular 
manner, she was victim blaming, gaslighting, and making it my problem that I resisted 
seeing things her way. She was a feminist—a point she reiterated often—and she 
wouldn’t dare blame the victim. To her mind, my resistance was the problem. 
Knowing better 
 Georgina’s obvious emphasis was on my claiming agency for the rapes. I read 
her line of inquiry as insinuating that I should have listened to my intuition and known 
something was amiss—that I should have used that information to act differently and 
avoid the rapes. Georgina framed me as responsible, at least in part. I was negatively 
evaluated, framed as an agent, and blamed. 
 Emphasis on what one should have known is common in discourse around 
sexual victimization. Wood and Rennie (1994, p. 136) discuss how, “The women 
[participants] talk not only about what they should have done, but what they should 
have known.” Further, Wood and Rennie (1994) note how the idea of what one should 
have known denotes a standard against which a victim is judged for the events. While 
Wood and Rennie observe the theme of knowing better among victim/survivors of rape, 
my own example highlights such ideas being articulated by those around me.  
 From the earliest days after my escape, I internalized blaming statements from 
others because they were consistent with cultural norms. I experienced blame as a 
rejection of my efforts to claim legitimate victim status. The rejection of the rape and 
victim labels highlights the relational component of the identity negotiations that shaped 
and influenced my process of self-identification vis-à-vis the rapes (see Brison, 2002). 
These responses impacted the way I made sense of what had happened; I either did not 
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know what I should have known, or that I knew better but permitted the assaults to 
occur nonetheless. These forms of blame constitute manifestations of the rape myth that 
I was “asking for it” (Payne et al., 1999), in a different permutation than arose in 
dialogue with Eli in Chapter 4. Neither permutation allowed for a compassionate view 
of myself in relation to the rapes.  
 Mardorossian (2002) draws the link between the expectation of ‘knowing better’ 
and the depoliticizing, internalizing discourses of sexual harm. She writes that: 
Responsibility is laid on the victim. Years of educating the public about 
these issues seem to have resulted only in the expectation that women 
should now know better than to let themselves get raped. Popular discourse 
is more than ever invested in transforming a social problem into a personal 
transaction… (Mardorossian, 2002, p. 753) 
Mardorossian highlights how emphasizing what individual women ought to know 
obscures social roots of the issue and maintains excessive focus on the individual. 
Consistent with indivudalization, Georgina treated my rapes as isolated and atypical 
incidents; she drew on the rape myth—which Panye et al. (1999) term “rape as a 
deviant event”—to overlook the larger social pattern of gendered and sexual violence 
among our friends, colleagues, and wider community. 
 The focus on rape as deviant and on my failure to have ‘known better’ parallels 
the survivor imperative. If I did not ‘know better’ at the time of the rapes, the onus was 
on me to ‘know better’ after the rapes: to learn from the events, to claim agency where I 
could, and to ensure I was never victimized again. Georgina emphasized choice in the 
aftermath, spurring me toward socially acceptable and ‘empowered’ coping strategies 
that she endorsed as legitimate. In resonance with the survivor imperative, Georgina’s 
attitude was that I should take care of myself and get on with my life. She suggested 
that I remain silent in the interest of self-protection. I suggest that silence as agency, had 
I taken it up, would have inhibited addressing my “anxiety of responsibility” (Des Pres, 
1976; citing Lifton, 1972).  
 Had I acquiesced to Georgina in my relational negotiation of identity, had I 
admitted to ‘knowing better’ and accepted the agency she advocated, it would have 
undermined my claims of victims status and my labeling the events as rape. In this 
sense, her particular form of blame, her directing me to claim agency and admit to 
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‘knowing better’, are stalwarts of the survivor imperative, which I expand on below. It 
is a slippery slope from here to the assertion (made by Eli and others) that I had wanted 
the rapes to happen, for otherwise I would have prevented them. Mardorossian (2002) 
calls this a “manipulative or concealed agency” foisted on victims. It is also another 
articulation of the rape myth that I was asking for it. 
 Furthermore, had I given in to Georgina’s assumptions and pressures, in the 
name of asserting agency over the present, I would have lost agency and control over 
the post-rape process of working through the trauma and its sequelae; I would have 
been acquiescing to her terms and acting in contradiction to my own will. On the most 
basic level, her pressuring me to claim agency ran against best practice in victim-
centered care, which supports victim/survivors in managing and controlling their own 
recovery process (see Orchowski et al., 2013). 
 In response to Georgina, I rejected an individually-focused form of agency. 
Instead, I took up what Judith Herman (1994) calls a “survivor mission”, in which 
traumatic events catalyze efforts for social change and solidarity. The tensions that arose 
with Georgina grew in the years after the rapes. Eventually, they hit a breaking point. 
That breaking point coincided with my “feminist snap” (Ahmed, 2017). 
The snap 
 In resisting Georgina, I was also resisting dominant discourses and norms about 
rape and victims. Ahmed (2017) eloquently addresses the tiresome effort to go against 
the flow of dominant norms in her chapter entitled “On being directed”. Ahmed (2017, 
p. 45) says, “A crowd is directed. Once a crowd is directed, a crowd becomes directive.” 
Discussing the momentum and flow of norms, especially around heteronormativity and 
compulsory heterosexuality, she writes that: 
To sustain a direction is to support a direction. The more people travel upon 
a path, the clearer the path becomes. Note here how collectivity can become 
a direction: a clearing of the way as the way of many. Perhaps there is 
encouragement just in this: you are encouraged to go in that direction when 
progression is eased. When it is harder to proceed, when a path is harder to 
follow, you might be discouraged; you might try to find an easier route. 
(Ahmed, 2017, p. 46) 
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The dynamic Ahmed illuminates highlights the power of discourse in shaping my post-
rape reality and sense-making. The tide and swell of social pressure urged conformity: 
to perform brokenness or denounce the victim label, as well as to enact the narrative arc 
of transcending or evading victimhood and take up survivorship. Submitting to 
Georgina’s ideas about how I ought to recover preserved our relationship amidst these 
tensions. 
 However, I had feminist thinkers ringing in my ears. The work of Audre Lorde 
insisted that I find new language to articulate my experience.; that through language I 
might imagine alternative worlds and build solidarity through a commitment to 
speaking in the face of fear. Her work encouraged me to trust my inner knowledge and 
power, and draw upon it to go against the normative tide. My commitment to Lorde’s 
philosophy contributed to my feminist snap. 
 Feminist snap refers to the willingness to break bonds that are harmful (Ahmed, 
2017). Ahmed critiques how resilience affirms the development of strength to endure 
more pressure, and how these pressures (from others, in a relationship) can become too 
much. We snap: 
You can experience a relief from pressure by being willing to go in the 
direction you have been pressured to take. That’s one way. You can also 
experience a relief from pressure by snapping a bond, by ending a 
connection to those who put you under pressure to go in a direction you are 
not willing to take. (Ahmed, 2017, p. 194) 
Ahmed discusses the long processes by which feminists might reach a breaking point, 
how a snap is a particular moment, and how that moment is the result of pressures 
building over time. In the case of my experience of secondary victimization, I was 
under pressure to develop a particular identity and a normative interpretation of my own 
experience. What I was directed to do felt anathema to me. It went against what “felt 
right to me” (Lorde, 2007a, 2007c). Ultimately, as I discuss in Chapter 7, I snapped 
these bonds. But before the snap, I learned a great deal. 
The journey from victim to survivor 
 The notion that victim status is something to transcend, avoid, or evade situates 
victimhood as the necessary starting point of a transformative journey toward 
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survivorship. Thus, a narrative arc is mapped out in which a victimized person moves 
away from victim status and toward survivor status. In the passage above, Claire 
indicates tolerance of my state as a victim, and couches it a necessary part of healing or 
moving beyond victim status. Her framing thrives in a context wherein victim and 
survivor are positioned as two extremes on a continuum, in a binary, mutually exclusive 
opposition to one another. Jordan (2013) clearly resists a binary formulation: her work 
considers how victim/survivor accounts challenge the linear progression from victim to 
the survivor and collapses the binary by pointing out how survival is ongoing. 
 I now turn toward discourses that position survivorship (and agency) as the 
idealized outcome of a post-rape narrative arc. The use of a journey metaphor is noted 
by a plethora or scholars (see Joseph, 2011; Kelly et al., 1996; Thompson, 2000; Wood 
and Rennie, 1994; Young and Maguire, 2003). Thompson (2000) identifies “the process 
from victim to survivor” (p. 330) as a major theme in her interviews, and notes that 
journey metaphors also hinge on the language of distance. Thompson analyzes her 
participants’ responses, stating that “The women seemed to move from victim to 
survivor identity, with victim firmly placed at the beginning of the journey and survivor 
as the final stopping point in terms of identity” (Thomson, 2000, p. 331). Wood and 
Rennie (1994) also note the shift from victim to non-victim identity and the use of a 
journey metaphor by their participants. Young and Maguire (2003, p. 48) note how their 
participants: 
Use a ‘journey metaphor’ to describe their transformation from their past 
selves (i.e., a victim) to their current selves (i.e., a survivor)… our 
interviewees used the victim and survivor labels along a continuum from 
victim to survivor. 
The recurrence of this theme in research with victim/survivors demonstrates the 
ubiquity of the discourse of the journey as an active frame. I contend that the journey 
metaphor is not only descriptive of experience after rape: it constructs and shapes those 
experiences. The journey metaphor provides clear example of the extent to which 
discourse does things in the world: I suggest that the promulgation of a journey 
metaphor contributes to how victim/survivors conceive of their experiences. 
 The pervasiveness of the journey metaphor reflects and contributes to 
assumptions about how one is supposed to process, behave, and identify after a violent 
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event. The demand to distance from victimhood contributes to the construction of 
survivorship as an imperative, furthering the binary construction of victim and survivor, 
and contributing to a context in which those harmed by sexual violence are urged away 
from identification as victims. Thompson (2000, p. 331, 338) calls this “the process of 
moving from victim to survivor”. Survivorship is taken as the desired destination of a 
personal journey away from victimhood. As I discuss through the thesis, many feminists 
have critiqued this construct, especially the positive valence of survivorship and the 
negative connotations of victimhood. However, it has also been propagated and upheld, 
often as an unquestioned assumption—to problematic ends. I critique this further in the 
following section. 
 In one study, Hockett, McGraw, and Saucier (2014) examine non-victims’ 
perceptions of persons who have endured victimization. Participants engaged with a 
rape story and identified a raped woman as either a victim or a survivor. Their 
methodological choice reflects the researcher’s core assumption that the victim and 
survivor labels are mutually exclusive. Hockett et al. (2014) find that 82% of 
participants labeled the women in the story as a victim, rather than as a survivor, and 
draw a conclusion consistent with the victim/survivor binary and narrative arc. They 
note that:  
Our participants seemed to perceive ‘victim’ as a de facto status that one is 
on the basis of preexisting personological characteristics, and ‘survivor’ as 
an earned status that one becomes by engaging in adaptive coping strategies. 
In other words, they perceived that a woman is a victim, but she becomes a 
survivor. (Hockett et al., 2014, p. 90)  
According to the logic of neoliberalism, with its emphasis on personal responsibility 
(see Stringer, 2014) and resilience (see Anderson, 2006), one should always strive to 
cope well—on their own and of their own volition. By doing so, they gain distance from 
rape and its effect, and eschew victim identity. 
 The mutual exclusivity of the victim and survivor categories is endemic to the 
journey metaphor. Mutually exclusive formulation is problematic because victim/
survivors often do not parse themselves neatly and exclusively into these separate 
categories (Leisenring, 2006; Thompson, 2000; Wood and Rennie, 1994; Young and 
Maguire, 2003). Rather, they are more likely to engage in tightrope talk. As Schneider 
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(1993) and others suggest, we must strive for more complex and nuanced 
understandings that allow for ambiguity and contradiction. Further, building on 
McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance (2011), scholars must take up points of tension and 
incongruity for further consideration and analysis, to apprehend novel articulations that 
use contradictory dominant discourses to get at meanings beyond hegemonic frames. 
 The mutually exclusive frame of the categories is foundational in constructing 
the journey metaphor. Kelly et al. (1996) cite the popularity of the journey metaphor, 
especially its influence in therapeutic settings, and the ways in which victim and 
survivor are often framed as stages or phases in a longer process. They link the stages-
based framing to the proliferation of self-help and therapeutic approaches to discussing 
survivorship, and are critical of a stages-based conceptualization of sexual harm and its 
effects. Kelly et al. (1996, p. 94) deem the recovery journey template “naive and 
inappropriate”, and critique the medical framework around recovery, which promotes 
false hope that one can be cured. Echoing this, Dunn (2005) critiques the “victim 
industry” (although she does not specify what that industry is) where therapeutic 
discourses dominate understandings of sexual harm. Dunn (2005, p. 15) argues against 
a “therapeutic framing in which victims are assumed to need to  ‘move on’ from 
victimhood to survivorhood as part of a healing and empowering process”. The medical 
approach privileges survivorship, strength, and positivity in service to recovery or a 
cure. 
 According to Kelly et al. (1996), the idea of complete resolution or “getting past 
it”, promulgated by survivor discourse, is not realistic; therefore, it leads to hindrances, 
desperation, preoccupation, and the frustration of being unable to achieve recovery or 
sufficiently overcome adversity. Instead, they acknowledge the processual and lifelong 
aspects that are common to working through sexual violence. They suggest that 
victimization is a statement of fact regarding an event, and survivorship pertains to what 
was done in reaction or response to that event, immediately or over the long term. 
 If identity negotiation after sexual violence is taken as fluid, continuous, and 
relational, it follows that those listening to accounts of sexual violence and subsequent 
identity negotiation may benefit from new interpretive frameworks, based on deep 
considerations of tightrope talk. I contend that researchers have a duty to take up critical 
analysis, to cease the uncritical dissemination of analyses that promulgate binary 
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formulations of victimhood and survivorship and perpetuate the medicalizing metaphor 
of a recovery journey. The study by Hockett et al. (2014) is one example of a trend in 
research in which dominant discourses are perpetuated without thorough consideration 
of their construction or critical analysis of their effects: they are not alone in 
thoughtlessly propagating dominant assumptions, nor is research the only site of the 
problem. Rather, it is one of the many contexts in which dominant discourse is 
reproduced and expressed, and exemplifies experts recuperating domains discourse 
(Alcoff and Gray, 1993). Discourse shapes how victim/survivors behave—and how 
others respond to them—after sexual violence. 
Researchers propagating dominant discourse 
 The researchers I discuss in this section default to dominant discourses to 
construct problematic arguments about positive outcomes to sexual violence (based on 
troubling questions), and fail to examine those discourses even as they put them to 
work. In light of my discussion of the victim/survivor binary, I offer a critique of 
Thompson (2000), Hockett and Saucier (2015), and Hockett et al. (2014). Their work 
provides an example of some of the phenomena I have been working to elucidate in this 
chapter. I take up this critique because the ideas espoused by these researchers are clear 
articulations of wider assumptions relating to the victim and survivor labels.  
 Thompson (2000) interviews five women who each report positive outcomes 
related to their experiences of sexual violence. Thompson (2000) opens her article by 
articulating a lack of research on positive outcomes, and finishes her introduction by 
stating that  
The knowledge that some women experience positive growth and find 
increased purpose and meaning in their lives as a result of overcoming the 
trauma of rape may be encouraging and motivating for all women who are 
raped. (Thompson, 2000 p326)  
She claims that her study has “highlighted the need for linguistic resources on positive 
outcomes of rape” (Thompson, 2000, p 341). These claims are not borne out by the data 
or her analysis. 
 For example, under theme two, Thompson (2000) cites positive outcomes from 
her participants. Examples include enhanced creativity due to pain, greater sense of self, 
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more self love/acceptance, enrichment and knowledge acquisition. These examples 
encompass the bulk of her engagement with “positive outcomes”. However, these 
examples illustrate an existing linguistic repertoire to discuss positive outcomes, rather 
than the development of a new one. Further, none of the examples provided here 
involve participants articulation of the need for more linguistic resources.  
 Further, other data and analysis in the article contradict her claims. Thompson 
(2000) engages with some of the literature about difficulty assimilating rape, the extent 
of its possible devastation, and considers “blocking” as a coping mechanism. She does 
not, however, explore the tensions these negative outcomes pose to her desire to focus 
on positive outcomes and open up hopeful possibilities. In offering clinical 
recommendations, she talks about “conflicting reactions of clients” (Thompson, 2000 
p340) and how recovery is recursive and ongoing, with episodes of reflection even 
years after. This statement does not square with assertions about positive outcomes. 
 Thompson (2000 p341) further makes the claim that overemphasising pathology 
limits discursive possibilities and “potentially denies them alternative options” and 
articulations. She states her desire to avoid generating another dominant discourse and 
prescribing women’s reactions to rape, stating the “[such a] position could be as 
damaging as the current position, which denies other experiences of women who have 
been raped (such as positive outcomes)” (Thompson, 2000 p341). Thompson implicitly 
charges those who emphasises negative outcomes with doing harm to victim/survivors.  
 Thompson’s work is cited as providing basis and rationale for Hockett and 
Saucier’s (2015) article entitled “A systematic literature review of ‘rape victims’ versus 
‘rape survivors’: Implications for theory, research, and practice”, which omits and 
misrepresents a number of the studies that I discuss in this thesis. Hockett et al. (2014) 
also engage the victim and survivor labels and explore how these relate to perceptions 
of raped persons, while omitting a wide range of relevant research and feminist theory. 
 These writings on the victim and survivor labels fail to engage with critical 
feminist or victimological literature on the subject, neglecting the work of van Dijk 
(2009), Baker (2010a, 2010b), Mardorossian (2002), Schneider (1993), Kelly et al. 
(1996), or Stringer (2014). Yet, they make sweeping claims about sexual violence 
research. 
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 In their respective investigations of the victim and survivor labels, these authors 
fail to note the social construction or history of the terms, let alone critically engage 
with those constructions. They consider general perceptions of the victim and survivor 
label and what those perceptions mean for researchers, yet they fail to adequately 
engage with the complexity of the labels as they are deployed by victim/survivors (see 
Wood and Rennie, 1994; Young and Maguire 2003). Nor do they acknowledge calls 
from the researchers for more nuanced, complex views (see Kelly et al., 1996; Minow, 
1993; Proffit, 1996; Schneider, 1993). 
 Most insidiously, they frame identification with the victim label as an inciting 
event that itself causes harm, rather than rape itself. Fixating on the label erases the 
material reality that the primary cause of harm is the occurrence of sexual violence. 
Modes of emphasizing internality are noted and criticized by Mardorossian (2002) and 
Stringer (2014), and have serious, deleterious, and depoliticizing effects. Viewing the 
label as a source of harm shapes how sexual violence and associated harms are 
conceptualized and articulated in media, research, and everyday speech to make sense 
of sexual violence. Fixation on the label has even permeated several rape crisis centres 
where I have worked or sought services, where victim talk was forbidden as though the 
label itself strips agency and does harm. 
 Thompson (2000), Hockett and Saucier (2015), and Hockett et al. (2014) argue 
that focusing on the negative repercussions of sexual violence causes harm to victims, 
and that an alternative focus has an inherent liberatory capacity. For example, Hockett 
and Saucier (2015, p. 10) suggest that, “The positive experiences of women who have 
been raped are cloaked in invisibility, and the possibilities for resistance are erased.” 
However, their broad statement confuses positive outcomes with resistance; the 
argument that rape can have positive outcomes does not challenge cultural tolerance for 
rape, nor does it resist contexts that contribute to secondary victimization. Positive 
outcomes in their frame are individual positive outcomes that are related to strength and 
resilience, rather than social or political positive outcomes, such as curtailing sexual 
violence or improving social responses to victims. 
 Furthermore, as I argue in the following chapters, neoliberal discourse and 
posttraumatic growth provide strong directives for victims to forge empowered 
identities and demonstrate positive outcomes. For example, Baker (2010a, p. 188) finds 
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that the vast majority of her participants go to great lengths to frame their experiences 
within the framework of a “post-feminist sensibility” that “is intimately connected to 
neoliberalism because it shares a focus on individualism, choice and autonomy, and 
deflects notions of social and political forces constraining individuals”. Baker (2010a, p. 
192) finds that it is normative under neoliberalism to default to “putting a positive spin 
on difficult circumstances” and “identifying useful learning experiences”. In tension 
with Thompson’s (2000) claims that there is a lack of linguistic resources for positive 
outcomes, Baker (2010a) shows that there is precedence for seeking positive outcomes. 
Further, whether seeking those positive outcomes is helpful or an unfair burden remains 
a crucial question that I explore further in Chapter 6. 
 Thompson (2000), Hockett and Saucier (2015) and Hockett et al. (2014) build 
their arguments on the notion that existing research does harm by limiting discursive 
possibilities for victims. They overlook meaningful engagement with the victim label 
within feminist discourse, and cast the victim label as a self-fulfilling prophecy: 
… the oppression-oriented focus of the rape victim literature demonstrated 
so far may hold implications regarding how the research itself may 
shape individuals’ reactions to women who have been raped. (Hockett and 
Saucier, 2015, p. 5) 
Their argument resonates with power feminist arguments that discussing sexual 
victimization and its harms are a more real source of suffering than victimization and 
rape. 
 Further, these approaches locate a ‘victim mentality’ in research as the problem 
to contend with. Hockett and Saucier (2015, p. 2) write that: 
…focusing solely on the ways in which women who have been raped 
are initially traumatized and socially revictimized—does not produce any 
indication of how one may escape from or step outside of oppression. 
They misplace responsibility for managing oppression, and individualize the problem. 
In the quote above, Hockett and Saucier (2015) frame oppression as a thing that 
individuals must find ways to “escape” or remove themselves from, rather than 
something to resist collectively. In stating that, “The victim literature emphasizes 
oppression and the rape survivor literature emphasizes resistance to oppression and 
empowerment”, Hockett and Saucier (2015, p. 4) fail to consider what the distinction 
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may stem from, and do not recognize the need to examine oppression to resist it. Worse, 
they present research related to victimization as actively blocking “escape from” 
oppression. They frame oppression as something that individuals can escape, rather than 
as a monumental social force demanding collective resistance. 
 Hockett and Saucier (2015) and Thompson (2000) critique sexual violence 
research for reifying secondary victimization as the only possibility for women who 
have been raped. However, grassroots feminist agencies have been providing 
alternatives for decades. Hockett and Saucier (2015) and Thompson (2000) make 
unsubstantiated statements, and their points lack careful argumentation: they cast a wide 
swath of research related to rape victims as contributing to the negative experiences of 
victims. 
 There are various discourses pertaining to victimhood which are deployed and 
negotiated in complex ways by researchers who seek to analyze and study sexual 
violence. In particular, as I discuss in Chapter 1, feminist literature has tussled with the 
victim and survivor labels for over three decades; yet none of this research is engaged 
by Hockett and Saucier (2015 p10) when they state that: Research taking a victim-
only perspective may fail to provide alternative models for conceptualizations and 
social treatment of women who have been raped, instead risking reinforcement of the 
status quo to view them as perpetual victims. 
It remains unclear what entails a victim-only perspective in research, nor is there any 
mention of the history of survivor discourse. Further, dominant discourses about 
resilience—about women pulling ourselves up by our bootstraps and overcoming 
adversity—are left unacknowledged and unscrutinized; the vast array of literature on 
posttraumatic growth (examined in Chapter 6) is largely omitted. As I will argue, 
posttraumatic growth is heralded as a viable and desirable path or outcome at the most 
broad levels of popular discourse, so its omission from their critique discredits these 
authors’ claims. 
 The articles in this section highlight how the discourses of survivorship and 
‘positive outcomes’ to adversity permeate academic research and writing, contributing 
to a social context that spurs people to consider the positive dimensions of victimization 
and move toward survivorship. 
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 My argument in this chapter is that neoliberal discourses valorize strength and 
survivorship after rape, and pressures victims to adopt the survivor label. The risk of 
failing to achieve survivorship is that one may be chastised for the characterological 
flaw of having a ‘victim mentality’. A person who has been victimized may be written 
off as a total victim, whose victimhood leaks into every facet of their life. The costs of 
failing to become a survivor are high. Further, as I discussed in Chapter 4, being a 
survivor means failing to adhere to victim stereotypes of meekness, passivity, and 
brokenness; failure to adequately play the victim role may limit access to support, 
sympathy, and legal recourse and, in the most severe instances, incite reactive victim 
scapegoating. 
 Thus far, I have demonstrated how the categories of victim and survivor have 
been formulated as a binary, and how consideration and research on victimization has 
been cast as harmful. Next, I consider examples that blur the binary of victim and 
survivor and challenge their construction as mutually exclusive, using McKenzie-Mohr 
and Lafrance’s (2011) notion of tightrope talk. I conclude by considering subversive 
ways of working within and beyond the identity categories of victim and survivor. 
Singing in the Dark, 2013 Draft 
 Megan opened the door at 10:29. “Hi Lily, come on in.” She was welcoming and 
warm. I was nauseated. 
 Having already hung my coat on the coat rack in the waiting room, I grabbed my 
bag and walked in. Her office was spacious, filled with books, some of which were 
very, very old. It wasn’t the first time I’d been there, but it seemed unfamiliar save for 
the familiar perfume of books.  
 “How is your healing? It’s been a wild journey, I imagine.” 
 “That’s for sure.” I paused. Little time for easing in, this needs to come out. 
“There’s something I wanted to talk to you about.” 
 “I gathered from your email.” Her eyes met mine with a firm patience. I called 
deep on my courage and remembered the Harvard Divinity School Field Education 
Handbook. Sexual abuse on the part of the supervisor… 
 “Megan, in my time in the Amazon, X and I had a sexual relationship. He... 
well... he was raping me.” 
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 Megan took a deep breath, but she did not look away. “Lily, I am so sorry to 
hear that. So sorry. But I’m not surprised.” 
 “Really?” 
 “Usually when someone is willing to cross boundaries A, B, and C, they are 
willing to cross boundaries D, E, and F as well.” 
 “So you suspected it?” 
 “I knew it was possible.” She paused. “But it was something you needed to be 
able to tell me on your own terms.” 
 “It’s been quite a journey just getting here today. I’ve barely slept since we 
scheduled this meeting.” 
 “I can only imagine.” 
 I had said it, I had said the words. And she understood. She really understood. 
Suddenly, the weight of memory began to fold in around me, I could feel myself starting 
to sink in my chair. This really happened. This really happened to me. 
 Megan saw me sinking, and she broke the silence with perhaps the only question 
that could change the game: “So, what are you doing with it?” 
 I sat up, coming alive, having remembered some spark inside me. “A lot of 
really great stuff, actually,” I replied. “I’ve found that I can use this as an avenue for 
deep healing. It’s guiding me into and through the deepest and most painful recesses of 
myself and my story—my story from before the Amazon and after.” 
 And so I went on for a few minutes as I searched to find words for the 
amorphous place I’d been inhabiting for months. The key was that I was doing 
something with it, something meaningful. X's violation, his manipulation, had revealed 
to me the blind spots of my psyche, and I was determined to find and strengthen the 
vulnerable places where he had managed to get his hooks in. It was as much a quest to 
learn myself as it was a determination to never let someone do this to me again. But 
there was a residue of self-blame lurking in that mission. It would take time to sort that 
through. 
 After a few moments, Megan chimed in. 
 “Can I share some of my thoughts?” 
 “Please!” I said, eager to hear. 
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 “You are a survivor. You survived the accident when your mother died 22 years 
ago—I cannot stress to you how easy it is to take a three-year-old out of her little body
—and you survived this. Be proud of yourself for that.” 
 Whoa. I never thought of it that way… 
Megan went on, “There is no judgment for any of the choices you made in the Amazon. 
You were in a survival situation: and the only measure of your success is that you 
survived to tell the tale. Your strategies worked. Period.” 
 Aghast at the clarity and poignancy of her words, I took a moment to soak it in. 
Suddenly, so much was clarified. Layers of haze and confusion were sliced through in a 
shockingly gentle and effective handful of skillful sentences. All I could manage was, 
“Well, that sure clears some things up.” But she wasn’t done.  
 “Lily, you could have gone into the Amazon so much more vulnerable than you 
were and this not happen. It happened because you were with an abuser.” 
 This time, the arrow of her words cut straight though the blame that had been 
gnawing at me. It wasn’t my fault… 
 “Have you thought about pursuing legal action?” 
 I told her about BARCC (Boston Area Rape Crisis Center), about what my 
advocates there had learned from international law enforcement, about how unlikely it 
was that anything would come of it. 
 “In the end, I’m scared to do anything that puts me on his radar. For now, I’m 
off it... I don’t want to do anything that keeps me connected to him. It feels too 
dangerous.” 
 “I understand. And it’s up to you. Just... will you think about it?” 
 “Yes.” 
Collapsing the Victim/Survivor Binary 
 Megan’s words suggest a collapse in the victim/survivor binary. In this section, I 
unpack a few of her comments and demonstrate how she undermines the binary 
formulation of victim and survivor, to alleviating affect. Then, I consider the complex 
ways in which victim/survivors deploy the victim and survivor labels. I conclude with 
possibilities for resistance generated by attending to tightrope talk. 
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 The conversation above took place in October 2012. Four months had passed 
since the rapes began. Mere days before, I had started rape crisis counseling and named 
the events as rape. For years after, I clung to Megan’s words, repeated them to myself, 
took refuge inside them. Like Georgina, Megan was in a position of power in our 
relationship, which added to the tenor of the exchange and its weightiness. I first 
recorded them in December 2012, but I repeated them to myself so often that they 
became etched in my mind as a source of comfort, a lifeline threading its way through 
my ongoing struggles against victim blame, rape myths, and silencing. Her words 
helped inoculate me against victim blame. 
 To begin, I want to briefly acknowledge some of the distinctions between 
Georgina’s responses to me, which I discussed above, and Megan’s handling of my 
disclosure. Megan placed responsibility squarely on my rapist’s shoulders, not mine, 
and worked to challenge my self-blame. She showed respect for the choices I had made 
to survive and commended them, in a manner consistent with Barry’s (1979) initial 
deployment of the term survivor. Megan sought to uphold the strategic choices made at 
the time and the efficacy of those choices in keeping me alive. 
 Megan believed me and acknowledged the severity of my situation. Further, she 
allowed me to speak with her about it in my own time and supported my moving 
forward (legally, personally, professionally) on my own terms. Finally, in asking what I 
would “do with it”, she gave fostered hope that something meaningful could be made 
from the trauma, that my suffering was not in vain. By framing this thought as a 
question, she minimized the sense that doing something productive was an imperative. 
 To challenge the victim survivor binary formulation, I begin by unpacking the 
spaces where they overlap. Two comments from Megan demonstrate their overlap 
vividly:  
You are a survivor. You survived the accident when your mother died 22 
years ago—I cannot stress to you how easy it is to take a three-year-old out 
of her little body—and you survived this. Be proud of yourself for that.  
She goes on to say that: 
There is no judgment for any of the choices you made in the Amazon. You 
were in a survival situation: and the only measure of your success is that 
you survived to tell the tale. Your strategies worked. Period. 
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Here, Megan’s use of the word survivor is as a de facto status, linked to having survived 
two, life threatening incidents. Her words are consistent with the first Oxford definition 
of survivor. In Megan’s statement, survivorship is independent of coping skills or 
personal character. She urges pride for surviving as an accomplishment—a pride that is 
independent of how I well coped with the events after the fact. 
 In contrast to earlier discussions of the terms by Hockett et al. (2014), 
Thompson (2000), and others, there is no sense of survivorship as earned or as the end 
of a journey away from victimhood. Victim status is not rejected. Megan emphasizes 
surviving without undermining claims of victim status or erasing the severity of the 
impact of my abuser’s choice to commit rape. 
 Second, Megan goes on to affirm positive agency during the events: I did what I 
had to do to survive. She echoes Barry’s (1979) notion of the survivor as one who has 
deployed strategic means to stay alive. It undermines the myth that “rape is a trivial 
event” (Payne et al., 1999) by emphasizing the real danger I faced. She also contradicts 
the phenomenon observed by Mardarossian (2002) and Stringer (2014) in which victims 
are seen as suspect and charged with “manipulative or concealed agency”. The notion of 
manipulative agency, as observed by Stringer and Mardorossian, was a consistent theme 
in my experience, and was often linked to victim blame. Megan’s phrasing offered a 
productive alternative, and deployed discourses of agency in a more compassionate 
manner.  
 Megan’s use of the language of survivorship and agency exemplifies nuance and 
complexity in discussing these terms and labels. Orgad (2009, p. 132) argues that we 
need “to expand the range of explanatory frameworks through which individuals, 
especially those experiencing suffering, come to think, judge, and act”. By highlighting 
alternative usage of familiar terms, I hope to draw attention to novel articulations 
formulated with existing vocabularies, in a manner consistent with McKenzie-Mohr and 
Lafrance’s (2011) tightrope talk. Even though Megan uses words steeped in and 
constituent of dominant discourse, she is articulating something beyond and resistant to 
those discourses.  
 Megan’s affirmation of my agency in surviving the events is couched in a range 
of comments that affirm the severity of the victimization and place the responsibility for 
it on my rapist’s shoulders. Her allocation of responsibility is crucial. It points to 
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Megan’s fundamental assumptions about who was at fault (him) and my own strategic 
and willful efforts to survive, which infuse all of her statements and foster a supportive 
atmosphere. In contrast to my conversations with Georgina and Eli (among others), 
there was no need to defend myself from blame, and productive conversation was more 
easily facilitated. 
 Megan explicates that my rapist was responsible, that it could have happened to 
anyone in my situation because the risk was inherent to his willingness to rape. 
Consider her comments that: 
Lily, you could have gone into the Amazon so much more vulnerable than 
you were and this not happen. It happened because you were with an abuser. 
And: 
I am so sorry to hear that. So sorry. But I’m not surprised… Usually when 
someone is willing to cross boundaries A, B, and C, they are willing to cross 
boundaries D, E, and F as well. 
These comments affirm my claims of victim status, while using the term survivor. Her 
use of the term survivor as a de facto status does not read as an imperative to progress 
through a transformational narrative arc: indeed, I contend that it undermines such a 
notion. Survivorship has already been accomplished. Her tightrope talk subverts the 
journey metaphor, and undermines the survivor imperative. There is no directive to 
perform victimhood or survivorship in a particular manner. The acceptance she offered 
that day gave me strength in later struggles with Georgina, Eli, and others: it allowed 
me to know that something else was possible. Her words inoculated me, ever so slightly, 
against discourses of victim blame and rape myths that I would eventually face in my 
social environment. 
Victim and survivor speech 
 Megan’s comments demonstrate a blurring of the binary and a form of tightrope 
talk. Perhaps the most obvious and powerful challenge to the binary derives from the 
complex manner in which victim/survivors use and negotiate the terms. Some victim/
survivor comments (see Leisenring, 2006; Thompson, 2000; Wood and Rennie, 1994; 
Young and Maguire, 2003) disrupt the notion of a linear narrative path between two 
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identities in tension. Identity negotiation is often discussed by victim/survivors as 
ongoing, rather than a fixed process with a clear start and fixed end point. 
 For example, some victim/survivors indicate that reflection extends to the time 
before the rape, and is perceived as continuing indefinitely into the future. One of 
Thompson’s participants talks about her deficiency in self-love prior to the rape, which 
she has since ameliorated: 
A survivor is someone who’s come out the other end and regained, well 
done more than regained what they’d lost… I thought I’d lost myself and 
thought that would never come back. Well now I love myself whereas I 
certainly couldn’t after I’d been raped. I don’t think I did before, either. 
(Thompson, 2000, p. 336) 
This participant links her experience of rape, or of overcoming it, with the acquisition of 
self-love, which she claims to have lacked prior to the rape event. Her statement links to 
the neoliberal imperatives to frame negative events in terms of positive outcomes (see 
Baker, 2010a, 2010b; Ehrenreich, 2009). Furthermore, while the social context that 
directs victims to pursue personal growth—and which chastises failure to do so—merits 
critique, my aim is not to contest individual’s use of the terms, but rather to deconstruct 
and challenge dominant discourse which influence use of the terms. 
 The notion of recovery as ongoing is also demonstrated by two of Thompson’s 
(2000) participants. One states, “I think it’s still an evolving process… I don’t think you 
ever, you know, it’s not ever going to be closed” (Thompson, 2000, p. 332). Another 
suggests that, “You deal with it forever, like bereavement it’s normal to still have 
feelings about it” (Thompson, 2000, p. 332). These statements undermine the 
assumption that one “moves on” along an arc, distancing from the events and from 
victim status. They contest survivorship as a final arrival point. These insights stem 
from reanalyzing Thompson’s interview excerpts through the lens of McKenzie-Mohr 
and Lafrance’s (2011) tightrope talk. Their lens for reanalysis challenges the victim/
survivor binary and notions of resolution. I suggest that Thompson recuperates 
dominant discourse in making sense of her participant’s responses. She overlooks 
tightrope talk and moments when participants undermine the dominant formulations 
that Thompson (2000) advances.  
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 Hockett and Saucier (2015) and Thompson (2000) occasionally undermine their 
own arguments by offering passing acknowledgement of the complexity of victim/
survivor speech. According to Hockett and Saucer (2015, p. 2), “Women who have been 
raped sometimes experience themselves as victims, sometimes as survivors, sometimes 
as both, and sometimes as neither.” Their statement undermines their uncritical 
advancement of the victim/survivor binary.  
 Several months prior to my encounter with their work, I wrote, “I am a victim. I 
am a survivor. I am neither. I am both. It depends on the day.” In my own experience 
post-rape, victimhood and survivorship are not mutually exclusive, and evolve with 
time. In my experience, survivorship fits more naturally with the hardest days—days 
when the extent of my victimization and suffering are most evident, and I am most 
engaged in a struggle to survive. Here, my sense of victim identity is most acute, and 
yet I label myself a survivor on those perilous days because I am laboriously working to 
stay alive. The victim label feels the most available to me on days when I feel stronger, 
am less actively suffering, and when I feel a certain courage to accept what was done to 
me. My use of the survivor and victim labels inverts dominant meanings and 
conceptualizations of the term. 
 Discourse around sexual violence is deployed in complex ways, often involving 
tightrope talk; victim/survivors endeavor to use the language available to them to 
convey thoughts and feelings that might otherwise lack words (McKenzie-Mohr and 
Lafrance, 2011). There are stumbling blocks and high stakes in attempting novel 
articulations. For instance, women may be concerned about whether their formulation 
will be believed and accepted, which may prevent them from speaking and seeking help 
(Wood and Rennie, 1993). I suggest that ameliorating these concerns involves 
respecting the terms that victim/survivors use and fostering their negotiation process on 
their own terms. Victims and survivors are already doing the work of navigating these 
identities in complex ways.  
 The terms victim and survivor remain useful and important, and rather than 
reimagining them entirely, I suggest that it is fruitful to understand their complex 
history, current connotations, and range of uses in everyday speech. Wood and Rennie 
(1994, p. 144) note that the issue is not one of creating new terms or definitions, but 
rather recognizing that: 
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Women use discourse in complex ways to claim and reject various identities 
for themselves and others and to construct multiple versions of control, 
blame, and responsibility. It is critical to see the construction of selves and 
identities in the context of formulating the experience of rape… 
The notion of claiming and rejecting identities is apt. I would add that there is a fluidity 
to the process, and a certain creative self-definition that victim/survivors engage on their 
own terms, using the inadequate discourses available to them in novel ways. Wood and 
Rennie (1994) also note the possibility that more discursive options may be desired by 
and useful to individuals navigating these identity categories. They warn that the 
solution is not necessarily to develop a new category; instead, it may be useful to 
exhibit examples of the distant language used by victim/survivors. 
 The vocabulary of survivorship provides a narrative template through which 
victims endeavor to construct their stories and live after sexual violence. As a sense-
making apparatus, stories of victimization enter in and become transformed into tales of 
heroic overcoming, in a manner that recuperates neoliberal victim theory and the 
survivor imperative. According to Orgad (2009, p. 142), victims are guided to 
“transform their personal suffering into a validated recognized experience; to fight 
against invisibility and silencing; to remember, but at the same time, move on and look 
to the future—to become survivors”. The bar is set high for individuals struggling in the 
aftermath of sexual victimization. 
 Victim/survivors continue to forge creative and complex ways to speak beyond 
dominant discourses, and in ways that may resist it. McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance 
(2011, p. 64) refer to these as “complex and subtle discursive accomplishments”. Their 
notion of tightrope talk offers an analytic frame for embracing and exploring tensions 
and contradictions. Their approach resonates with Page (2017), who argues for 
vulnerable writing as a legitimate method that engages hesitation and ambiguity. The 
unchecked impulse to grasp at certainty in this terrain risks defaulting to dominant 
discursive frames, and may lead to overlooking significant, novel articulations rendered 
in familiar terms. Witnessing and engaging these discursive accomplishments requires 
training and ongoing consideration, and is a vitally important aspect of bearing witness 
to the experiences and achievements of victim/survivors on their own terms.  
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Conclusion 
 I began this chapter by exploring the history of the survivor label. In the 
mid-20th century, survivorship was linked to increased visibility for those who had 
stayed alive in the Nazi camps. Some, including Bettelheim, chastised therapeutic use of 
the term as antithetical to the moral obligations of victims of the Holocaust to 
remember, resist forgetting, and bear witness; the “anxieties of responsibility” (Des 
Pres, 1976; citing Lifton, 1972) that contribute to the disruptive capacity of the survivor. 
Des Pres (1976) emphasizes staying human and enduring in extremity in his 
formulation of the survivor, and offers a powerful alternative to neoliberal imperatives 
to heroically overcome adversity on an individual basis. 
 In the latter half of the 20th century, the language of survivorship was taken up 
by feminists in the context of sexual and domestic violence. Its meaning shifted from 
connoted acts of survival at the time of violence, to valorized agency after the fact, 
deployed in service to overcoming trauma and coping well. I argue that valorizing 
agency and devaluing victimhood fosters the formation of a victim/survivor binary. 
Among the deleterious impacts of the binary formulation is that it further denigrates 
victims and their association with poor coping skills, weakness of constitution, and 
characterological failures. Victim stigma is bolstered by the discourse of survivorship, 
and the survivor imperative. Furthermore, examination of the victim and survivor 
categories demonstrates the degree to which these constructions emphasize internality at 
the cost of politicization, and frame victims as responsible for solving the social 
problem of rape on a case-by-case, individual, and recovery-oriented basis. 
Internalization further undermines the politically disruptive potential of survivorship. 
 Building on the tension between the personal and the political, and trends 
toward depoliticization, I discuss my observations about how others reduced my 
narration of sexual violence and its consequences to a personal healing effort. Such 
reductions erased my political and social motivations for speaking. I also consider the 
notion that I should have ‘known better’, which bolstered subtle victim blame and 
contributed to pressure to learn my lesson and claim agency after the fact. I demonstrate 
the end result of these relational and interpersonal dynamics: the relationships broke, 
and I enacted Ahmed’s (2017) “feminist snap”. I broke free of harmful bonds and 
resisted directives to do victimhood and survivorship is prescribed ways. 
 190
 In furtherance to my considerations of the victim/survivor binary, I interrogate 
discursive constructions of a narrative arc by which individuals transcend victimhood 
and achieve survivorship as a display of personal resilience. I argue that the ubiquity of 
the journey discourse is not only descriptive, but actively shapes identity negotiation 
after sexual violence. Critically, the term survivor is utterly contingent on the victim 
label: survivorship requires victimhood as a basis for comparison, and as a target point 
from which one endeavors to move away. 
 Furthermore, the dominant discourses surrounding the terms undermine more 
complex and nuanced articulations of experience. Tightrope talk (McKenzie-Mohr and 
Lafrance, 2011) offers a powerful analytic lens to explore the manner in which victims 
and survivors use the terms. 
 The survivor imperative removes focus from the larger social context and places 
responsibility, unjustly, on individuals and their personal process. For the sake of 
justice, these discursive constructions ought to be reimagined by taking the accounts of 
victims and survivors more seriously, through examining their use of tightrope talk. It 
appears that in their lived experiences, victim/survivors are already doing the work of 
subverting these hegemonic constructs. Their complex and contradictory use of 
language illustrates the need for further autoethnographic texts involving victim/
survivor accounts of their post-rape realities.  
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Chapter Six 
Posttraumatic growth: imperatives, subversions, and 
recuperation 
I don’t tell you this so you think of me as a victim. I am not a victim. I tell 
you this because my story has value. My story has value. I tell you this 
because I want you to know, I need you to know what I know: to be 
rendered powerless does not destroy your humanity, your resilience is your 
humanity. The only people who lose their humanity are those who believe 
they have the right to render another human being powerless. They are the 
weak. To yield and not break—that is incredible strength… There is no way 
anyone would dare, dare test their strength on me because you all know 
there is nothing stronger than a broken woman who has rebuilt herself. 
– Hannah Gadsby, Nanette 2018 
 In the previous chapters, I discussed my experience of the untenability of victim 
identity, and the survivor imperative to overcome victimhood and journey toward the 
aspirational status of the survivor. Posttraumatic growth (PTG) is an important corollary 
to these discussions, for it demonstrates troubling norms and discourses at work in 
responding to and treating trauma. PTG and the survivor imperative are mechanisms for 
one another; within the survivor imperative discursive framework, PTG is an implicit 
part of the journey toward survivorship. Personal growth after trauma implies a de facto 
transcendence of victim status, and achieving survivorship is an emblem of 
posttraumatic growth.  
 For persons in close relational proximity to victims, whom Perry and Alvi 
(2012) call “proximal victims”, the prospect PTG in victims may assuage the emotional 
discomforts of proximity to a victim/survivor in the aftermath of sexual violence. 
Discourses around victimhood, survivorship, and posttraumatic growth work in concert 
to direct victims toward hegemonic and individualistic understandings of themselves 
vis-à-vis their experience of sexual victimization. These discourses encourage ‘moving 
on’, and growth following sexual violence, thus privatizing the effort associated with 
mitigating the consequences of sexual violence, and obscuring political and social 
issues. 
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 Posttraumatic growth is a burgeoning topic in psychology. PTG is nourished by, 
and nourishes, cultural discourse about the benefits that can be wrested from trauma by 
way of personal responsibility and psychotherapeutic processes. While some PTG 
researchers acknowledge the larger cultural context, the social construction of PTG 
merits more in-depth consideration in a feminist, anti-rape framework—especially as it 
pertains to victim/survivors of sexual violence. I suggest that PTG demonstrates one 
component of the survivor imperative in action, shaping responses to victim/survivors, 
as well as therapeutic and self-help interventions. 
 In PTG research, there are two glaring oversights: (1) the social and political 
contexts that influence and construct PTG; and (2) PTG’s co-occurrence with and 
relationship to ongoing distress (see Frazier and Berman, 2012; Hockett and Saucier, 
2015; Hockett, McGraw, and Saucier, 2014; Joseph and Linley, 2012; Joseph, 2011; 
Thompson, 2000). Some researchers take a more nuanced view, recognizing the 
ongoing struggle alongside possible growth outcomes, and maintaining modest, 
compassionate conclusions about growth and traumatic suffering (see Janoff-Bulman, 
1992; Tedeschi and Calhoun, 1995). However, prevailing psychological considerations 
of PTG fall short in their engagement with larger social and cultural contexts; PTG 
research emphasizes individual outcomes, and sidesteps harm and suffering.  
 My analysis in this chapter engages positivist approaches and critiques of PTG, 
since most PTG research is based in positivist measures. In the next section, I discuss 
more widespread critiques of PTSD diagnosis and treatment. My aim in this chapter is 
to examine positivist approaches in order to raise questions about the discursive 
construction of the categories and assumptions underpinning PTG research. I consider 
how PTG, and the discourses which shape it, gives rise to positivist research 
approaches. Furthermore, some of the positivist critiques I advance in this chapter draw 
attention to how cultural norms and values inflect self-assessments. Harm may be done 
by self assessments, especially when those assessments foster the denigration of the pre-
trauma self in order to elevate the post-trauma self.  
 In this chapter, I briefly examine definitions of posttraumatic growth, including 
multiple conceptualizations of PTG. PTG research focuses on self-reported, self-
perceived measures of PTG; I argue that reliance on self-perceived growth highlights 
the crucial link between social influences and self-reports: growth is framed as a 
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desirable—and publicly promoted—outcome, which may incentivize the perception and 
reporting of PTG. My aim is not to delegitimize reports of self-perceived growth by 
victim/survivors or make charges of false consciousness; rather, I wish to explore the 
discursive context that encourages victim/survivors to perform and report PTG. Self-
perceived PTG raises important questions about the possibility for harm when 
individuals face pressure to achieve growth outcomes, and report failure to do so. 
Further, I wish to explore how expert emphasis on PTG recuperates the survivor 
imperative and neoliberal values, and may overlook tightrope talk to the detriment of 
hearing and apprehending victim/survivor accounts. 
 On a terminological note, PTG literature references trauma and adversity 
interchangeably, and tends to subsume experiences of coping with illness and cancer 
under the umbrella of posttraumatic growth. Such broad use is a loose application of the 
term trauma, which the American Psychological Association (2019b) defines as: 
an emotional response to a terrible event like an accident, rape or natural 
disaster. Immediately after the event, shock and denial are typical. Longer-
term reactions include unpredictable emotions, flashbacks, strained 
relationships and even physical symptoms like headaches or nausea. While 
these feelings are normal, some people have difficulty moving on with their 
lives. 
These definitions hinge on traumatic events, rather than ongoing sources of distress, 
including illness. Therefore, I contend that the use of trauma as a floating signifier in 
PTG literature is problematic—it conflates a range of diverse experiences and neglects 
their distinctions. In my engagement with PTG literature in this chapter, it is difficult to 
tease apart these conflations. Therefore, I aim to address broader implications and logics 
of PTG as demonstrated in literature, while clarifying from the outset that I disagree 
with overly broad definitions of trauma. 
 In my analysis, I consider PTG’s cultural framing as an imperative and as a 
prized goal. I draw on the survivor imperative to argue that any merit to posttraumatic 
growth is distorted and cheapened by neoliberal imperatives to make hardship into 
opportunities for self-improvement and to focus on the positive outcomes of oppression. 
I argue that the directive to grow is a clear articulation of neoliberal values of personal 
enterprise and development. 
 194
 In this chapter, I examine some of the clinical recommendations in PTG 
research. I am not making clinical recommendations, as I am not qualified to do so. 
Instead, I hope to offer critical analysis with heuristic and theoretical value. I suggest 
that the pressure or expectation to grow, and to perform PTG in particular ways, may 
undermine self-determination and agency. Further it individualizes the burden of coping 
with sexual violence. 
 In deconstructing neoliberal and individualistic approaches to trauma, I do not 
wish to position agency against social and collective approaches: victim/survivor 
agency is a factor in post-rape sequelae. Instead, I wish to challenge fixation on 
personal responsibility and to consider the consequences of this fixation. In the 
concluding chapters of this thesis, I argue for an approach that disperses responsibility 
across the social world, including victim/survivors, but also stretching beyond them to 
collective resistance of rape myths and the cultural scaffolding of rape. A dispersed and 
collective approach does not eschew victim/survivor agency, but instead attempts a 
more nuanced framework that opens possibilities for collective agency, care, and 
resistance. 
 I challenge the term posttraumatic growth, and instead suggest centering 
ongoing coping in the face of traumatic suffering. I contend that no matter the degree to 
which a victim/survivor recovers from an assault, they must find a way to function and 
live in an unsafe world where rape remains a reality and a threat. I also explore 
subversive or transgressive alternatives, and compare them to outcomes that recuperate 
dominant discourses (see Alcoff and Gray, 1993), especially neoliberal victim theory 
(Stringer, 2014) and the survivor imperative. First, however, I wish to outline some 
critiques of PTSD more generally, and clarify why I focus on PTG. 
Critiques of posttraumatic stress disorder 
 Psychologists and psychiatrists developed posttraumatic stress disorder over the 
last century to address clusters of symptoms stemming from military combat; PTSD has 
also permeated analysis of sexual violence and its impacts (Herman, 1992). There is a 
range of literature critiquing PTSD as a diagnosis and the medicalization of trauma. 
Young’s (1995) challenge to classifications of PTSD as “timeless” underscores how 
PTSD is constructed and problematizes its subsequent univeralization as ahistorical. 
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Both Young (1995) and Summerfield (2001) provide useful frameworks for 
understanding the historic construction of the diagnosis and its political context. These 
critiques resonate with my aims and arguments in this chapter. However, I target 
posttraumatic growth, rather than PTSD, because PTG is apparent and available for 
critique in my data, whereas PTSD more broadly is not. 
 Critiquing PTG allows me to target my specific concerns with PTSD, especially 
the pressure to recover and grow in socially acceptable ways, and along prescribed 
trajectories which prioritise personal responsibility. I try to demonstrate how notions of 
personal growth and self-improvement in the face of adversity hinge on individual 
responsibility, like the survivor imperative. 
 Having engaged with a range of literature critiquing PTSD (Armstrong 1994; 
Young, 1995; Summerfield 2001; Pupavac, 2001; Burstow, 2003; McKenzie-Mohr, 
2004; Brunoskis and Surtees 2008; Davis 2005; Tseris, 2013), I see important parallels 
in terms of challenging how PTSD individualises social causes of suffering and 
privileges personal, therapeutic solutions. I think it is unethical to treat people for PTSD 
primarily to make them better equipped to function in a harmful context where sexual 
violence persists; therapies are not sufficient, and overemphasis on therapeutics 
contributes to depoliticization. I agree with McKenzie-Mohr (2004), Summerfield 
(2001), Tseris (2013) and Burstow (2003), who argue that solely emphasising individual 
treatments overlooks the wider social issues giving rise to some cases of PTSD. I agree 
especially with Tseris (2013) and McKenzie-Mohr (2004), who call for a feminist social 
analysis to be revived within trauma theory and practitioner education. 
 Burstow (2003) takes a radical approach and argues for scrapping psychiatry 
more broadly and emphasizing social and political causes of suffering. While I agree 
with her critique regarding overemphasis on individuals at the expense of social 
analysis, I disagree with Burstow’s (2003) calls to depart completely from diagnostic 
and medical models. Based in part on my own experience, I view the diagnosis and 
treatment protocols associated with PTSD as important for mitigating suffering, 
especially when coupled with resistance and efforts to transform society. I do not see 
individual treatment and social action as mutually exclusive. To the extent that the 
diagnosis and treatment protocols are alleviating suffering, I believe there is an ethical 
obligation to offer treatment. Simultaneously, it is necessary to address oppressive 
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social realities, and to realise that even the most effective treatment occurs within the 
context of a world where sexual violence persists.  
 I also wonder if those who have better symptom management may be well 
positioned for resistance and change efforts. The prospect of wellbeing fostering action 
has been markedly true in my own case. Medicalised approaches allowed me to break 
from, and later complete, my masters degree and achieve a state where I could function 
on a day-to-day basis. My access to therapies and treatment has enabled me to do 
various projects in sexual violence prevention, research, resistance, and response. 
Singing in the Dark, 2012 
 What can I say of this tale? I saved my own life, and not alone. Never alone. But 
always alone, somehow. 
 Apocálypsis, translated from Greek as apocalypse, refers to a lifting of the veil. 
A revelation. What I have undergone is nothing less than an apocalypse of the self. My 
self. Not an ending, not a beginning, but a moment when the world within me became 
and realized itself as a threshold. Everything became clearer then. I was shown my true 
face. A humbling thing, indeed.  
 Great illusions have been cut and broken by rain and storm and wind, have 
fallen to the ground to be eaten and made into branches again. But it’s all a bit more real 
now. More honest. More integrated. More true. 
 I would not change a thing. It was harrowing. I wish it upon no one. But it woke 
me up, made me live. I cannot undo what I have done, what I have seen, what has been 
done to me. Somehow, the struggle freed me of bonds I did not know existed.  
Defining posttraumatic growth and understanding its foundations  
 The excerpt above demonstrates a sense of change and liberation through 
suffering and trauma. I identify freedom from bonds and claim to have been woken up 
or brought to life by these experiences, which I also claim made me and my life more 
real and true. The above text is an example of self-reported posttraumatic growth, in 
poetic language. My self report was influenced by the pressures by those around me to 
perform and narrate growth, pressures I will explore throughout this chapter.  
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 Furthermore, these claims were made within six months of the sexual assaults; 
now, seven years later, my perspective has changed. Feelings of growth have been 
largely overshadowed by feelings of loss and a less optimistic assessment of the long 
terms impacts of these experiences. While possibilities for growth may have offered me 
hope in the initial timeframe following the abuse, in retrospect I would categorise these 
hopes as unrealistic and oversimplified. Furthermore, as I discuss below, self-reported 
growth hinges on denigration of one's previous self, and I have grown tired of thinking 
along the lines of Eli in Chapter 4. I did not need to experience rape to achieve self-
improvement. 
 Discussions of posttraumatic growth are situated within positive psychology. 
PTG is alternatively called post-adversarial growth, thriving, benefit finding, or stress-
related growth (Frazier et al., 2001; Zoellner and Maerker, 2006). There are a range of 
definitions or conceptualizations of PTG. At the core, posttraumatic growth involves 
self-improvement or an upgrade in circumstances due to trauma or victimization. 
According to Zoellner and Maerker (2006, p. 628),  
The term ‘growth’ underscores that the person has developed beyond her 
previous level of adaptation, psychological functioning, or life awareness. It 
signals that in people’s lives, there is something positively new that signifies 
a kind of additional benefit compared to pre-crisis levels. Those beneficial 
outcomes may include individual development, personal benefits, new life 
priorities, a deepened sense of meaning, [or] a deepened sense of connection 
with others or with a higher power.  
In the PTG framework, traumatic events are “regarded as an opportunity for self-
improvement and personal growth” (Sumalla et al., 2009, p. 29) and catalysts for 
positive change. 
 To understand some of the motivations behind PTG research, I turn to Stephen 
Joseph. I examine his framework of PTG throughout this chapter, as it is illustrative and 
foundational to the field of PTG research. Joseph has published over four dozen papers 
and edited several anthologies on PTG since 2001 and is considered an eminent 
researcher and clinician in the field, along with Linley, Tedeschi, and Calhoun. As far as 
I have found, he is the only academic to have written a mass-market book on PTG: 
What Doesn’t Kill Us (2011). Joseph’s (2011) introduction outlines superhero stories as 
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analogous to real-life stories of people who overcome trauma and suffering; he claims 
that heroic overcoming is attainable by anyone willing to take responsibility for their 
growth and recovery. Joseph (2011, p. xiii) frames adversity as inevitable and necessary 
for reflection on oneself and one’s priorities; he seeks to explore why “one may 
succumb but the other may thrive” in the face of suffering. 
 In describing the emergence of the field of PTG research and practice, Joseph 
(2011) chastizes the trauma industry—those professionals who, he claims, profit off of 
people’s suffering and overly emphasize the negative dimensions of trauma. Joseph 
(2011, p. xvi) criticizes the trauma industry as “part of the problem” for three reasons: 
(1) medicalization “takes away from patients the responsibility for their recovery”, (2) 
PTSD following traumatic events is framed as “inevitable and inescapable”, and (3) 
treatment is limited to distress management and overlooks growth. While there is merit 
in critiquing medicalisation, Joseph (2011) uses his critique to argue that patients are 
responsible for their recovery while overlooking political and social dimensions of 
trauma. He argues that medicalisation is disempowering because it  
takes away from patents the responsibility for their own recovery… in short, 
it subtly shifts the responsibility for the person’s recovery into the hands of 
the therapist. However, trauma is not an illness to be cured by a doctor. 
Certainly, therapists can offer people guidance and be expert companions 
along the way, but ultimately people must be able to take responsibility for 
their own recovery and for the meaning that they give to their experiences. 
(Joseph, 2011 p.xv) 
Joseph’s critique of medicalization is distinct from feminist and political challenges to 
medicalization, which I discuss above. For example, rather than highlighting scope for 
social support and the need for social change, he claims that “social support is probably 
at its most valuable when it motivates people to take responsibility for their 
lives” (Joseph, 2011 p123). His emphasis on personal responsibility is an example of 
the problematics examined in feminist critiques of PTSD. Joseph advances neoliberal 
values of personal responsibility and saddles victim/survivors with greater 
responsibility than existing medical models.  
 Joseph situates himself as subverting dominant therapeutic practice and 
discourse, raising interesting questions about the extent to which PTG is subversive 
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within psychology. Not only is PTG consistent with cultural values, (Coyne and Tennen, 
2010; Ford, et al., 2012), resilience and growth through adversity has also been 
championed by the American Psychological Association (APA) following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. While the APA uses the language of resilience rather than PTG, the 
underlying logic of improving through adversity and viewing challenge as opportunity 
resonates across the terms. I discuss resilience in greater depth in a section below. 
 In October 2002, The APA website featured a piece entitled “The road to 
resilience”, authored by Newman, who was the APA Executive Director for Practice. 
Newman (2002) discusses research among those affected by 9/11, indicating 
participants wanted to do better than cope, manage, or live with 9/11—they wanted to 
“be resilient”. Therefore, the APA produced a documentary with Discovery Health 
Channel to inform the public how to be more resilient, and aired it on the anniversary of 
9/11. According to Newman (2002), the TV special initiated a grassroots outreach effort 
including a brochure on “how to take steps to build resilience”, which he claims can be 
taught to “most anyone.” Newman (2002) claims that “After all, turning adversity into 
opportunity… is critical for organisations to thrive in this day and age.” It appears that 
Joseph may incorrectly position himself as subversive, at least in relation to the 
American Psychological Association. The APA is the dominant regulatory body for 
psychological education and practice in the USA. It is uniquely powerful within the 
trauma industry which Joseph challenges, and here the APA seems to espouse very 
similar ideas to those Joseph develops.  
 Joseph (2011, p. xvi) situates posttraumatic stress as “the engine of 
transformation”, and criticizes the “trauma industry” for “creating a culture of 
expectation and ignoring the personal growth that often arises following trauma”. His 
charge is that negative expectations are the culprit in increasing suffering, which 
insinuates that suffering is a product of failure to think positively. He delegitimizes the 
known effects of trauma as demonstrated by decades of research. Further, in naming 
posttraumatic stress as an “engine of transformation”, he is locating cause and 
motivation for improvement and change in suffering itself; this is a slippery slope to 
justifying harm. Joseph (2011) argues that psychologists and therapists are 
disproportionately exposed to people who suffer and critiques professionals for aiming 
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merely to restore patients to baseline functioning, rather than to optimize functioning 
after trauma. 
 Posttraumatic growth is framed in different ways by researchers. Some see it as 
an ongoing process, while others see it as a coping mechanism that may be functional or 
dysfunctional; still others emphasize outcomes, either perceived or measured (see 
Tedeschi and Calhoun, 2004; Zoellner and Maercker, 2006). Zoellner and Maercker, 
(2006, p. 640) see PTG as a positive illusion, allowing for an adaptive, self-enhancing 
view in the face of adversity, and offering “distorted positive illusions that might help 
people counterbalance emotional distress” (see also Frazier and Berman, 2012). Coping 
based frameworks keep distress in view, and emphasize PTG’s functionality in the 
process of recovery from trauma, rather than framing it as an end goal. While self-
deception and avoidance can serve as a short and long-term palliative, it can also inhibit 
recovery insofar as it sidesteps confronting the event; avoidance may create barriers to 
approach coping, which involves actively confronting traumatic memories and may be 
necessary for processing trauma (see Frazier and Berman, 2012; Zoellner and Maercker, 
2006). Zoellner and Maercker (2002) explore how denial may contribute to 
dysfunctional, maladaptive and illusory PTG. 
What constitutes a ‘positive outcome’? 
 Findings around PTG are mixed, contradictory, and somewhat troubling. 
Problems persist with measures, definitions, instruments, and methods. There are 
questions as to whether growth is temporary or permanent (Ford et al., 2012; Frazier 
and Berman, 2012), which bore out in the excerpt of my own records, above. 
Furthermore, Zoellner and Maercker (2006, p. 638) point out “the problem of defining 
what counts as ‘positive’ or ‘growth’,” which is especially fraught when examining 
PTG through a feminist and critical lens. Many researchers do not address an over-
reliance on self-report measures or illusory versus the functional models of PTG. The 
possibility that perceiving growth may be a positive illusion in the face of shock and 
immediate distress is missing from many analyses.  
 For example, Frazier and Berman (2012) situate rape victims acting more 
cautiously post-rape as a positive growth outcome, and Joseph (2011) suggests that a 
woman who is assaulted might derive the lesson that not everyone or every place is to 
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be trusted. An increase in distrust and rise in caution is problematic in light of the 
possible limitations that this implies for women’s lifestyles and choices post-assault. 
More caution also suggests an increase in fear. It also assumes that women should 
maintain responsibility for their own safety in an unsafe world, and sidesteps 
consideration of wider social and cultural change. These ‘benefits’ individualize the 
responsibly of coping with danger.  
 Other changes include appreciation for life, better relationships, reprioritization, 
strength, assertiveness, better self-care, and choosing different men (Frazier and 
Berman, 2012). These changes would have been measured during a time of initial shock 
and upheaval, which I suggest confounds the data. These reports may be due to the 
initial euphoria of having survived a life threatening event. Further, self-reports of such 
changes, in such close proximity to traumatic events, offer little indication of change 
over the long term. 
 In another study, Frazier and Berman (2012) measured changes in women who 
had experienced rape at intervals of two weeks, then two, six, and 12 months after the 
incident. In the early stages, concern for others had increased for 80%, and 46% 
reported an increase both in regards to appreciation for life and better relationships. 
However, 95% reported negative changes at two weeks and 84% reported mental health 
difficulties. Over the four measurement periods, increased empathy was the most 
commonly reported positive change. Negative views about safety and fairness, and 
negative views of others’ goodness were present in about two thirds of participants.’ 
Positive outcomes like increased empathy and concern for others are difficult to give a 
positive value given the costs associated with them. In addition, empathy as a growth 
outcome is gendered, and consistent with expectations that women be caring, 
empathetic, and perform emotional labor in their professional lives, and emotion work 
in their personal lives. 
 Frazier and Berman (2012) also found that those who reported positive changes 
in the initial stage of recovery and over the first year had fewer PTSD symptoms. 
However, they overlook preexisting mental health issues that might shape various 
outcomes and self-reports. Whether positive change and PTSD are linked by correlation 
or causation remain unknown. I contend that it is potentially dangerous and misguided 
to correlate the immediate perception of positive outcomes to rape with later mental 
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health. These initial impressions misrepresent the cause and correlates of distress as a 
matter of self-perception. This perpetuates fixation on internalization and individual 
coping with trauma and suffering, and promulgates the notion that growth or distress are 
self-fulfilling prophecies. 
Posttraumatic growth, popular discourse, and the survivor imperative 
 Posttraumatic growth is widely researched in part due to its consistency with 
shared cultural values. Several researchers allude to these consistencies, but they are 
noted in passing and without elaboration (see Coyne and Tennen, 2010; Ford et al., 
2012; Frazier and Berman, 2012; Vázquez, 2013). For example, Ford et al. (2012) 
refrain from engaged analysis of the social construction of PTG; however, they note 
cultural acceptance of the idea that one should grow after trauma, and the prevalent 
belief that people gain wisdom and increase productivity after trauma. Coyne and 
Tennen (2010, p. 16), note that “Claims of positive psychology about people with 
cancer enjoy great popularity because they seem to offer scientific confirmation of 
strongly held cultural beliefs and values.” Situating PTG in relationship to biological 
phenomenon leverages the cultural currency of medical science to prove and validate 
discourses about the power of attitude in conquering material realities.  
 While Coyne and Tennen (2010) focus their critiques on cancer-related PTG 
studies, their insights are applicable to a range of different types of suffering related to 
illness or trauma. As I noted in the opening of this chapter, PTG research 
problematically treats cancer, illness, adversity, and trauma as equal, and uses them as 
base points for analysis without thoroughly considering their differences. PTG research 
seems to hold that tough situations offer possibilities for positive growth, and that a 
positive and growth-oriented attitude trumps biological and psychological realities. 
 Ford et al. (2012) raise concerns that the general population is primed to present 
in particular ways based on marketed ideas about PTG. According to Ford et al. (2012, 
p. 315) “The notion of growth following adversity has already infused popular culture, 
and this infusion, in turn, has for t i f ied people’s implic i t theories 
regarding this phenomenon.” Ford et al.’s comment is situated in their discussion of the 
APA’s Roads to Resilience campaign, and is among the more explicit (if brief) 
engagements with the cultural construction of PTG, resilience, and positive psychology. 
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Frazier and Berman (2012, p. 176) state that, “Self-reports of growth also may reflect 
adherence to a cultural script.” However, these authors fall short in identifying precisely 
what the cultural script is, and they do not engage in analysis of how these cultural 
influences shape conceptualizations and self-reports of PTG. 
 Janoff-Bulman provides an illuminating statement about the links between PTG 
and a cultural script. Writing about Tedeschi and Calhoun’s (2004) revised model of 
PTG, Janoff-Bulman (2004, p. 31) suggests that:  
Of the three models of posttraumatic growth, strength through suffering is 
most apparent in our cultural lore, specifically in our beliefs suggesting that 
whatever does not kill us makes us stronger. This is the message implicit in 
the redemptive value of suffering taught by many religions and is also a 
form of the more “no pain, no gain” conception of personal profit. 
I suggest that Janoff-Bulman’s identification how PTG fits into cultural lore, and her 
resistance to this logic, render her insight a form of understated critique. Her reference 
to suffering as a path toward “personal profit” links cultural conceptions of 
victimization to projects of self-improvement and, possibly, financial gain. 
 Jospeh, Linley, and many other researchers frame PTG in a manner consistent 
with what Stringer (2014) terms neoliberal victim theory. Neoliberal values of personal 
responsibility and the positive transformations of self through suffering are foisted upon 
victims in recovery, formulating a template for their identity, process, and presentation. 
Janoff-Bulman’s understated criticism provides a jumping off point for a more thorough 
analysis of PTG as compatible with neoliberal ideologies, including the fetishization of 
personal responsibility, self-entrepreneurship, and self-improvement.  
 Vázquez (2013) identifies an orientational shift from resilience (i.e., the ability 
to maintain stability and functioning amidst adversity) toward growth and positive 
change. Political theorists expand on the concept of ‘resilience’ in policy discourse, in 
which resilience is framed as the ability to withstand shock as well as bounce back from 
it (see B. Anderson, 2015; Jospeh, 2013). PTG is an individualized analog to the 
resilience of communities and societies, and the term resilience is at times applied to 
discuss personal adaptability in the face of trauma or adversity. According to political 
theorist Jonathan Joseph (2013, p. 40), 
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Resilience fits with a social ontology that urges us to turn from a concern 
with the outside world to a concern with our own subjectivity, our 
adaptability, our reflexive understanding, our own risk assessments, our 
knowledge acquisition and, above all else, our responsible decision-making. 
Emphasis on developing an adaptable self reflects expectations placed on victims of 
sexual violence to embark on a project of self-assessment and reflection in service to 
improvement. Victim/survivors are directed to gain knowledge that will enhance their 
status as good neoliberal subjects. This is a cornerstone of the survivor imperative. 
 Ahmed (2017) offers an insightful analysis on the logics of resilience in 
oppressive contexts. In writing about feminist snap, and the moments where we cannot 
take it anymore, she elaborates on resilience:  
If the twig was a stronger twig, if the twig was more resilient, it would take 
more pressure before it snapped. We can see how resilience is a technology 
of will, or even functions as a command: be willing to bear more, be 
stronger so you can bear more. We can understand too how resilience 
becomes a deeply conservative technique, one especially well suited to 
governance: you encourage bodies to strengthen so they will not succumb to 
pressure; so they can keep taking it; so they can take more of it. Resilience 
is the requirement to take more pressure; such that the pressure can be 
gradually increased. (Ahmed, 2017, p. 189) 
Ahmed unpacks how the language of resilience is used to direct individuals to bear 
greater and greater burdens, while promising that cultivating the ability to bear more 
will strengthen their character. Resilience as form of governance is an insidious tactic 
because it preys upon the human desire to be strong, independent, and able. I suggest 
that it distorts these desires, thus positioning individuals to take on dangerous, 
overwhelming, and dehumanizing social and cultural weights. Resilience becomes a 
means by which individuals might prove their character and superiority to a ‘victim 
mentality’, and demonstrate sufficient engagement in self-improvement. 
 Growth imperatives are present in the sense-making strategies explored by 
Baker (2010a) in her studies with Australian women. According to Baker (2010a, p. 
187), the neoliberal self is framed as a “choosing, enterprising subject who is obliged to 
construct a self-reflective biography in pursuit of self actualisation. Thus our identities 
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are not static but can be changed and improved.” Baker (2010a) goes on to argue that 
material challenges and barriers, including inequality, are overshadowed by the 
imperative to perform a freedom of choice about oneself and one’s life. 
 Baker’s observations is consistent with B. Anderson’s (2015) discussion of the 
resilient subject. According to B. Anderson (2015, p. 61), “The ‘resilient subject’ is 
constructed as an individualized subject charged with the responsibility to adapt to, or 
bounce back from, inevitable shocks in an unstable world.” Crucially, and parallel to 
PTG researcher S. Joseph (2011), such constructions suggests that an unstable and 
unjust world is inevitable, and turns focus away from working to change the external 
world. It becomes an individual’s responsibility to shape up, maintain strength, and 
survive in the face of injustices outside individual control. Political theorist J. Joseph 
(2013) frames his conceptualization as a critique, while PTG researcher S. Joseph 
(2011) situates the inevitability of harm as a fact and a testament to the hope-filled 
necessity of fostering PTG among those who suffer from trauma. J. Joseph’s insight is 
important to consider in the context of sexual violence: he is addressing the political and 
social ramifications of viewing resilience as an imperative and the responsibility of 
individuals who are situated within complex systems of injustice. 
 According to Baker (2010a, p. 188), post-feminism and neoliberalism both 
emphasize “individualism, choice, and autonomy” in a manner that keeps social, 
political, and economic realities and oppressions out of view. In her interviews with 
young Australian women, she finds that nearly all of them draw on language of personal 
choice and self-improvement in their storytelling and sense-making, even when their 
stories suggest social forces at play in generating those experiences (Baker, 2010a). I 
suggest that the phenomenon identified by Baker is an extension of the survivor 
imperative and neoliberal victim theory. 
 PTG proponents construct adversity, whether it is trauma, economic lack, 
illness, or violence, as a positive contributor to personal striving. Baker (2010a, p. 201) 
concludes her essay with the insight that, “Young women strive to make something of 
themselves not just in spite of difficulties but through them; representing a rather cruel 
accountability” (emphasis in original). Furthermore, the manner in which PTG 
researchers discuss trauma often slips perilously close to framing trauma itself as an 
opportunity. According to Vázquez (2013, p. 33)  
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The discussion of whether the perception of positive changes or benefits is 
related to positive or negative affect is also related to the discussion about 
the optimal dose of trauma for these changes to appear (emphasis added).  
Although some PTG researchers state they do not wish to glorify trauma, their 
statements are undermined by phrasing that talks about trauma in terms of optimal 
dosage. 
Problems with self-reported measures 
 A major methodological flaw in PTG literature is that it measures perceived and 
self-reported growth after trauma. Self-perceived growth carries risks to participants, in 
that it promotes denigration of the pre-trauma self, and may inadvertently promote 
dysfunctional coping (see Frazier and Berman, 2012; Zoellner and Maercker, 2006). 
Furthermore, the questions posed by researchers are constructed by discourses 
promulgating PTG as a desirable outcome. Building on Tennen and Affleck (2009), 
Vázquez (2013, p. 36) suggests that  
cultural bias may lead people in the U.S. to overestimate the amount of 
positive change that has occurred and also may lead to frustration and 
distress if changes, according to these expectations of psychological growth, 
are not perceived. 
Vázquez elegantly summaries my main concerns with PTG measures: they stem from 
dominant discourse, and may contribute to distress. 
 Posttraumatic growth studies involve asking participants to assess their state 
prior to trauma, their state at present, to then compare the two and, finally, to discern the 
degree to which trauma (and/or coping with it) was the causal factor for change (Coyne 
and Tennen, 2010; Ford et al., 2012; Zoellner and Maercker, 2006). The prevailing 
framework and methods of inquiry hinge on evaluating one’s current self compared to 
their self-perception prior to trauma. In light of a social context that privileges self-
improvement over time, there is risk of social directives to report growth and benefit 
over time, whether or not there has been a traumatic event. Furthermore, people develop 
and mature over time, whether or not trauma occurs, and normal psychological 
development can resume after trauma (Ford et al., 2012). 
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 Researchers have developed multiple scales. According to Coyne and Tennen 
(2010, p.23), questions remain as to “whether people can accurately portray the growth 
they claim to have experienced”. Frazier and Berman (2012, p. 176) suggest that “self-
reports may not represent actual life changes”. Several studies find that self-reported 
PTG is inconsistent with measures of external measure of growth and well-being over 
time. My quarrel here is not with what participants perceive and report, but with 
research questions which so clearly derive from dominant discourses of self-
improvement and individual outcomes of therapeutic treatment for social problems. 
Discourse shapes these measures and questions. In many studies, researchers pose 
questions to victim/survivors when they may be ecstatic at having survived severely 
traumatic events, or else in shock, or in a heightened state of coping. 
 I contend one possible improvement is in identifying existing measures as 
measures of self-perceived posttraumatic growth, since self-perception is essential in 
defining what is in fact under study. Perceived PTG is a phenomenon to study in its own 
right; perception of oneself as growing and adapting positively is linked to self-esteem 
and self-perception, and may have implications for recovery and coping (Zoellner and 
Maercker, 2006). Self-perceived growth is prevalent in a range of victim/survivor self-
reports and narratives (see Alcoff and Gray, 1993; Baker, 2010a; Thompson, 2000; 
Wood and Rennie, 1994; Young and Maguire, 2003); the mechanisms by which self-
perceived growth may advance or hinder relief from suffering after sexual violence 
merits further consideration. Assertions of self-perceived PTG by victim/survivors, 
where it stems from their own understanding of events as elaborated via qualitative 
methods, I contend is more credible than reports from measures designed by researchers 
who, as I discuss above, have troubling ideas of what constitutes positive outcomes. 
 PTG recuperates dominant discourse and undermines political resistance in the 
context of sexual victimization. The emphasis on self-reported perceptions of personal 
growth highlights that, in order to adhere to neoliberal values of personal responsibility, 
those who endure sexual violence face social directives to present themselves as strong, 
agentic, and working to get past victimhood. 
 In my relationships to others, I felt constant pressure to frame my experience as 
fostering self-mastery and self-improvement. In several conversations with trusted 
others, I came to view my writing of the story, and therefore my lived experience, as 
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necessitating an uplifting tone and message. For example, upon learning that I aimed to 
write a book, one trusted friend told me, “It has to be uplifting and inspiring. No one 
wants to read a downer.” He made no effort to conceal his expectations about how I 
should engage in and perform my recovery. I needed to be uplifting: I needed to live an 
inspiring story and be an inspiring person. The onus to make the story uplifting and 
inspiring became a directive that I struggled to fulfill. 
 Having ostensibly failed at agency in preventing the rapes, there was pressure 
from many sides to enact it in the aftermath by achieving posttraumatic growth. For a 
time, I denigrated and sought distance from my pre-trauma self. 
Singing in the Dark, 2013 
 The time has come to write an ending. 
 “The story will never be over. You will carry it as long as you live, and it will 
always be shaping you.” Georgina paused and took a sip of water. 
 “I’m ready to close this chapter of my life,” I replied. “Writing the book has 
always been analogous to the healing, and I’m ready to find the last page, the last 
paragraph, the last words.” 
 “You could always write a sequel.” 
 We laughed. 
 “Maybe. But I’m ready to move on. I can feel the end ripening.” 
 “Good,” was all she said in reply. 
 The fire was dwindling deep in its pit. We had no idea what time it was, only 
that it was late. Above us, the stars were burning through the black and cloudless night. 
We’d been praying for hours, my friends and I, in a temple dug deep into the earth. 
Jordan and I were whispering. 
 “Cherry tomato?” He asked. 
 “Um, yes. Clearly.” I popped one into my mouth and savored the seeded juice, 
singing silent praises to the seed savers of this world. 
 “Home grown?” I asked. 
 “Whole Foods.” 
 “Shut the front door! They taste home grown.” 
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 “'Tis the season,” he replied. 
 We stared into the fire. 
 “I heard you weeping in there. That guy. That fucking guy. You’re still getting 
him out of you.” 
 “Bless his heart, Jordan. Bless his human heart. And no, that’s not what the 
weeping was about.” 
 “That whole thing. So fucked up. A really defining moment.” 
 “Well, stories like this one shape a person, but they do not define her. I’m in a 
good place now. In the end, I live beyond. I move on. Because I chose to.” 
 “God, you know, I could kill that guy for what he did to you. I’ve said this 
behind your back, but I’ll say it to you now, I wish this had never happened. I hate what 
he did to you. But if something like this was going to happen...” his voice trailed off. He 
couldn’t quite find the words. “You of all people could make something good of it.” 
 How to respond? I thought. He stood and walked to the other side of the fire. 
Using a long stick, he manoeuvered a smoldering log back into the flame. 
 “Thanks, fire tender.” 
 He went on. “I guess that on some level you kind of called it in. I mean, I could 
kill that guy for what he did, but... this will impact everything you ever do.” 
 “Not everything. It’s had a huge impact. But it’s not me. It’s part of my story. 
And Jordan, I did not ‘call it in’. That’s victim blaming. I’m not a victim anymore, but I 
was. And I did not ‘create this reality’. I would have never chosen this for myself. Like 
so many things in life, it just happened. And I’m doing my best to do something good 
with what happened.” 
 I stopped, afraid to go further. It’s a hard thing to call people out on subtle victim 
blame. I didn’t want to overwhelm him. By the look on his face, I’d say he was more 
than a little taken aback. 
 Finally, he spoke. “How did you move on?” 
 I took in the question, paused for a long moment while the trees around us 
danced for a moment in the passing breeze, fresh green tips illuminated by the waxing 
moon. 
 “Well, it’s a long story. The key to unlocking a new chapter has been the 
willingness to lay the old one to rest. It’s not a purging of the old, it’s not a live burial, 
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it’s a peaceful thing, really. It has to happen in its own time. Putting the book down 
doesn’t burn it, it just makes for a lighter load. But it has to be complete. And it will be. 
The first step is the choice to unburden ourselves, the next step is taking the time to do 
it. Soon, rows upon rows of stories line the bookshelves of home, and we can read from 
them as easily as we can choose to let them sit, ripening between their covers. 
 “The risk I faced was that the trauma would never heal, and that I might 
grow comfortable in survival mode, that I might come to identify as a victim. It’s hard 
to change the tone of a story or belief. Victimhood takes a hold and tells the lie that “this 
is the only way it could be”. It locks away personal power and hides the key by 
making one think they cannot even ask for it. But all it takes is the question. That is 
where the healing begins. 
 “Victim is not an identity, it is an aspect of experience. It is contained in time 
and space. It is not eternal. In knowing that, I can reclaim my power, move beyond 
attachment to victimhood, and move on.” 
 “Damn girl, you really have a hold on this.”  
 “Yeah, it’s been a journey.” 
 “It sounds to me like you’ve really moved passed this.” 
 “You know Jordan, I have. I really have.” 
 A new day stretches its limbs across the silver morning sky. So this is the other 
side. I am not who I once was. 
 Georgina was right. “This is going to be a transformative experience, the kind of 
step forward from which there is no going back.” No going back. And by now there are 
new thresholds to traverse in meeting the dawn. It’s not an ending, not beginning, 
just another step. 
 Now I have crossed the threshold. I have come home. Laughter never left my 
side on this journey, but now it lives in fuller force. The road opens out before me, 
“curved like river’s labor toward sea”, and I know where I’ve come from, know well the 
ground beneath my feet. 
 I have found a mountain in me, carved and eroded by the great storm of this 
story. Shaped, but not defined, by the watery blade of this tempest. I am not “that 
woman who lived through that thing”. That thing shaped me, but I am so much more 
than a single story. 
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A more cautious approach 
 This narrative fragment demonstrates the complex ways in which I made sense 
of and articulated my ‘recovery’ from victimization, when speaking with someone who 
had expressed an expectation that I do something productive and good with the 
experience. I tried to put words to an amorphous cognitive, and emotional process that, 
by that point, had already spanned two years. In this conversation, my definition of 
recovery involved the remission of PTSD symptoms, a natural engagement with the 
process, and a willingness to put away an old story; embedded in these 
conceptualizations is a resistance to allowing trauma and victimhood to create a 
totalizing identity.  
 My effort to decentralize victim identity is interesting in light of posttraumatic 
growth research; researchers and clinicians anticipate that, in the absence of adequate, 
growth-oriented intervention, victims will develop a post-trauma identity that is 
centrally defined by the negative sequelae of trauma (see Joseph, 2011; Thompson, 
2000). Victims are criticized for allowing their trauma to generate an all-encompassing 
identity (le Monde, 2018). I have found that concerns about victimhood as totalizing are 
hardly unsubstantiated, as evidenced by the distinct shortage of people who introduce 
themselves as victims of sexual violence in everyday interactions. Qualitative research 
details numerous accounts of victim/survivors eschewing a total or central victim 
identity (see Thompson, 2000; Wood and Rennie, 1994; Young and Maguire, 2003; 
Baker, 2010a). It appears that the discourse of victimhood as totalizing is a myth. The 
myth of the total victim generates something victim/survivors may disavow, thereby 
bolstering assertions that they are survivors. It is another example of how survivorship 
depends on castigating victim identity.  
 The story above shows the complex ways I made meaning—both as 
comprehension and as significance (see Janoff-Bulman and Franz, 1997; Janoff-
Bulman, 2004; Joseph and Linley, 2006)—of my recovery process and my self. That 
victim/survivors engage in complex sense-making is consistent across feminist 
qualitative research into victim/survivor stories and identity construction post-sexual 
violence (see Thompson, 2000; Wood and Rennie, 1994; Young and Maguire, 2003). 
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 With the complexity of victim/survivor accounts in mind, I wish to draw 
attention to some of the more cautious, complex framings of PTG. Tedeschi and 
Calhoun are among the researchers who, while generally endorsing PTG and subject to 
the same critiques I outline above, are more measured in their assessment of it. They 
state clearly that distress often co-occurs with growth, and that growth does not equate 
to well-being. Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004, p. 2) write that, “Posttraumatic growth 
occurs concomitantly with the attempts to adapt to highly negative sets of circumstances 
that can engender high levels of psychological distress.” Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004) 
emphasize strength though suffering within their model.  
 PTG research risks romanticizing trauma or fostering tolerance for violence, on 
the basis that they can produce ‘positive’ outcomes in and of themselves. I encountered 
these kinds of attitudes many times after rape, including in the dialogue with Eli I 
discuss in Chapter 4. Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004) and Janoff-Bulman (1992, 2004) are 
consistent in reminding readers that coping successfully is what may yield growth, that 
growth is not inherent to trauma, and that pain and suffering coexist with growth 
possibilities, processes, and outcomes; they are careful to locate growth in a person’s 
struggle to cope, rather than in the inciting incident. Ford et al. (2012, p. 316) suggest 
that a new research framework is necessary that:  
neither reframes trauma as a growth experience nor tacitly encourages 
people to devalue their previous self or relationships in order to cultivate the 
illusion of having transcended trauma through growth. 
Ford et al.’s view offers a counterpoint to calls for research into positive outcomes (see 
Burt and Katz, 1987; Frazier and Berman, 2012; Hockett and Saucer, 2014; Thompson, 
2000). 
 Trauma theorist Janoff-Bulman is especially careful in her approach. She is 
mindful not to excessively emphasize the individual by attending more to cultural and 
social factors, including the ongoing realities of violence and the role of friends and 
family in recovery (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Her approach stems from an understanding 
that, after trauma, some individuals accommodate the realities of trauma and 
victimization into their assumptive worlds, rather than assimilating the trauma by 
morphing it to fit into a preexisting assumptive world. The accommodation of trauma 
information allows for growth of a different quality than what many PTG researchers 
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attempt to measure. Self-improvement, enhanced productivity, and functionality are not 
within Janoff-Bulman’s theorization. Rather, the process by which some people learn to 
accept, cope, and live after trauma is represented with a degree of compassion for 
suffering, and a more complex view of the consequences of trauma. 
 In concluding her book, Shattered Assumptions, Janoff-Bulman (1992, p. 174) 
notes that many trauma victims develop a more balanced perspective through suffering:  
They know they are not entirely safe and protected, yet they don’t see the 
entire world as dangerous… The world is benevolent, but not absolutely; 
events that happen make sense, but not always; the self can be counted on to 
be decent and competent, but helplessness is at times a reality. Survivors are 
often guardedly optimistic, but the rosy absolutism of earlier days is gone. 
Her assessment is qualified, nuanced, and complex—based in ongoing research with a 
range of trauma victims. Her work stands apart in that she resists advancing growth as 
an imperative. For Janoff-Bulman, the reality that traumatic experiences are possible,—
and ensuing confrontations with powerlessness, vulnerability, and another’s malicious 
intent—sit in tension with pre-trauma assumptive worlds. If trauma is already viewed as 
possible, then subsequent traumas or losses will not shatter their assumptive world, 
because they already fit coherently inside it.  
 In short, becoming ‘better’ or achieving self-improvement is not in any way 
central to her research. Rather, Janoff-Bulman keeps distress and suffering in view. She 
writes in the tone of a seasoned clinician as opposed to a detached theorist, and does not 
make claims about how people should frame trauma and recovery. She offers an 
important alternative conceptualization to keep in view when engaging with PTG 
research. 
Excerpt from article published in 2017 
 All I wanted, in the most treacherous phases of my recovery, was for people who 
care about [this spiritual tradition] to say, “This isn’t your problem to fix, it’s our 
problem. We’re going to do something about it. And when you’re ready to give us input, 
we’ll listen.” 
 Within that conversation, the input of survivors is vital: we have valuable 
knowledge, insight, and guidance regarding sexual violence resistance, prevention, and 
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response. However, we are not obligated to stand on the front lines of the struggle. 
Communities everywhere have to work together on this issue — church communities, 
schools and universities, professional networks. Anywhere there is power to be abused 
and potential victims to be exploited, people need to work together to stop sexual 
violence, and to react appropriately when the unthinkable happens. Survivors need 
support, not pressure to find the solution or recover in a tidy way that makes everyone 
else in the community feel comfortable… 
 Communities, and the individuals that constitute them, need to educate 
themselves about victim blame. Working with survivors can be a minefield, and even 
people with the best intentions can say the wrong things when they aren’t sensitive to 
the dangers of the territory. That level of sensitivity takes work. That works begins in 
communities (Ross, 2017). 
Misplaced onuses 
 In a problematic study, Silver, Wortman, and Crofton (1990) take aim at 
understanding how a victim’s self-presentation impacts the support they receive. Their 
lab-based study evaluated verbal and non-verbal responses to victims of life crises 
based on how well or poorly they appeared to be coping. Their conclusions include 
suggestions for how victims ought to present their suffering and coping to elicit the 
most support, thereby placing the onus on victims to manage a support provider’s 
feelings and reactions in ways that may or may not be realistic or feasible for a person 
in the thick of suffering. They conclude that “by minimizing the support provider’s 
feelings of helplessness in the face of distress, the victim can maximize the likelihood 
that support will be forthcoming” (Silver et al., 1990). I suggest an alternative 
orientation: that support providers be better prepared to face the distress and diminished 
coping abilities of those suffering from some form of victimization or illness.  
 To a large extent, Silver et al. (1990) undermine their own conclusions by noting 
that no matter how well someone is coping, visible suffering presents a challenge to 
others. They write that: 
That is, there appears to be no self-presentation that is effective in making 
potential support providers feel as comfortable as they would be if they 
were interacting with a person without cancer. (Silver et al., 1990, p. 416) 
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Their insight bolsters my argument that the onus should not lie with those suffering 
(whether from violence, victimization, or illness) to present or perform in a particular 
way to elicit support. Rather, people should have access to resources that foster healthy 
and adaptive responses to those who suffer. This approach would expand and dissipate 
the web of responsibility and care. 
 Pressure to present growth and positivity, and to perceive oneself as improving, 
can be harmful. According to Sumalla et al., 
In a worst case scenario, posttraumatic growth in cancer patients could 
interfere with doing something about [the] problem, falsely raise 
expectations, encourage dissociation as people are feeling negative 
emotions… and, finally, pressure people to expect that they not only need 
survive, the [sic] need to grow and change your [sic] identity. (2009, p. 32) 
Dissociation, denial, repressing emotions, resisting taking action, and striving to better 
oneself can become malignant to those who suffer. The above insight resonates with the 
argument by Kelly et al. (1996) that the language of recovery is not realistic, and that 
seeking recovery or resolution can lead to hindrances, desperation, preoccupation, and 
frustration for being unable to recover. Instead, Kelly et al. (1996) advocate for a more 
realistic assessment that acknowledges the processual and lifelong nature of working 
through sexual violence.  
 Watson et al. (1999) challenge the popularity of positive thinking as a panacea 
for physical and other ailments. In finding no correlation between a fighting spirit and 
cancer prognosis, Watson et al. (1999, p. 1335) conclude that “our findings suggest that 
women can be relieved of the burden of guilt that occurs when they find it difficult 
to maintain a fighting spirit”. Their conclusion foregrounds compassion for those 
suffering (in this case, from cancer), and acknowledges the risks presented by popular 
ideologies of positive thinking. Neoliberal discourses, including the fixation of agency 
in neoliberal victim theory, can induce guilt and a sense of responsibility for one’s own 
suffering, as a result of failing to cultivate and adhere to a positive, growth-oriented 
outlook (see Ehrenreich, 2009; Stringer, 2014). Surely, such foci impede a more 
political and social orientation toward the creation of a wise, more compassionate 
world. 
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Recovery as a personal choice 
 While there is a difference between locating positive opportunity in the adversity 
itself, versus in a person’s response to it, both approaches risk minimizing the real harm 
done, and both place excessive emphasis on individuals to overcome or survive in a 
particular, socially acceptable manner. The notion that victim/survivors are defined by 
how we respond to adversity further individualizes the burden of coping with trauma; 
we should keep responding well by maintaining personal safety, managing risk, and 
mitigating violence well when it occurs. Following sexual violence, a victim/survivor is 
directed to cope effectively and seek out adequate support in service to their own health, 
well-being, and functioning.  
 My argument is not with individual coping generally, and I do not challenge 
individual victim/survivors for their pursuit of wellbeing. Rather, I suggest that 
individual coping is over-emphasized and mandated in dominant discourse, to 
deleterious affect. According to Baker (2010a, p. 193), “Because young women can 
now ‘be anything’, they must also be able to ‘get over anything’.” In the case of sexual 
violence, the negotiation of victim and survivor identities is tied into an expectation to 
overcome. The positioning of survivorship as the destination at the end of a journey of 
transformation partially constitutes pressure on victims to ‘get over it’. 
 Further, valorizing strength and ‘getting over rape’ fails to account for instances 
in which the experience may be insurmountable. Survivorship is treated as a choice. 
Viewing it as a choice perpetuates the notion that victim identity is a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, that presenting as a victim to others incites their responses and thereby fosters 
ongoing identification as a victim. 
 Joseph (2011) is especially hostile toward those who, he alleges, choose not to 
overcome the suffering engendered by trauma. In concluding his book, he cautions 
readers about PTSD diagnoses as self-fulfilling prophecies that can “stop recovery in its 
tracks” (Joseph, 2011, p. 166–167). With regard to clients who don’t make progress, or 
even abandon therapy, he suggests that:  
deep down, the clients are relieved. Diagnostic labels can become part of 
people—and the truth is, many people are reluctant to give them up. 
Unfortunately, the dominant professional discourse of trauma tends to 
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position people as ‘helpless victims with a lifelong condition’, so it is not 
surprising that many people latch on to this way of thinking. 
Here, Joseph (2011) situates those suffering from PTSD as lacking the will and desire to 
overcome in the manner he suggests is empowering and positive: he chastises the 
‘victim mentality’. He does not grapple with the lack of treatments for PTSD, nor the 
situations in which PTSD is treatment-resistant, nor the overwhelming distress that can 
accompany attempts to confront and process trauma. Nor does Joseph  (2011) entertain 
the notion that his positive approach to treating trauma may be a poor fit for a number 
of clients, who may be annoyed by his framework. 
 In another example of allegations that victims choose not to overcome, Hockett 
et al. (2014) discuss the approach of a therapist named Rose Harrison. Harrison 
encourages clients who have experienced rape to use the survivor label which is 
“especially useful for clients who indicate that they perceived themselves as victims in 
order ‘to be excused from life, or to be viewed as ‘special’” (Hockett et al., 2014, p. 95). 
I argue that this is coercion; Harrison is in a position of power and authority as a 
therapist. She demands that victims engaging in recovery on her terms, rather than on 
their own, and she uses her position as a therapist to mold victims in a manner she sees 
fit. She directs clients toward survivorship. Harrison’s approach, which Hockett et al. 
(2014) seem to endorse, leaves little room for the many repercussions of PTSD or other 
sequelae of sexual violence, which require sensitivity and attention. She overrides her 
clients’ self-identification and self-determination. 
 The approaches advanced Joseph (2011), Hockett et al. (2014), Rose Harrison, 
and Silver et al. (1999) deflect from oppressive realities and social responses to these 
realities. According to Baker (2010a, p. 194), “positive accounts of overcoming 
difficulty can obscure and therefore work to continue oppression”. Without attending to 
the social and material realties that shape individual experiences, fixating on the 
individual enables the persistence of these realities. 
Supportive responses to disclosures  
 There are a few studies that deal with peer and family disclosures. D i s c l o s u r e 
studies consider the larger social complexities and factors involved in how people 
respond to disclosures, rather than emphasizing the individual. Disclosure studies 
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address the stakes and the repercussions of poor responses for victim/survivors. 
According to Ullman (2010, p. 26), 
sexual assault disclosures may be shocking and upsetting to the support 
provider and make that person less able to respond empathetically if he or 
she is caught up in his or her own reactions. This may occur because people 
are not always aware of or willing to acknowledge their attitudes, especially 
if those attitudes are negative, such as endorsing discriminatory beliefs 
about rape. 
Research into patterns of disclosure demonstrates that friends are often first points of 
disclosure. College-aged individuals who have heard disclosures report feeling unsure 
about how to help or what to do, and feeling angry or distressed about the disclosure, 
even when they felt they could help (Banyard et al., 2010; Paul et al., 2013).  
 Paul et al. (2013) find that those who hear disclosures felt they could help, but 
were worried about responding well and indicated distress, suggesting that they also 
need support. According to Paul et al. (2013)  
The relatively high numbers of women reporting receipt of a rape disclosure 
further highlight the importance of refinement, evaluation, and effective 
dissemination of psycho-educational interventions addressing appropriate 
responses to a sexual assault disclosure. 
This sits in contrast to the notion that victim/survivors are responsible for behaving in a 
manner that elicits support. Instead, Paul et al. (2013) recommend awareness-raising to 
create more supportive environments, including rape-related education, increasing 
empathetic listening skills, and coping or emotional self-management skills. Banyard et 
al. (2010) suggest offering information to potential disclosure recipients, including 
suggestions around helpful language, and active steps to help victim/survivors. 
 These approaches help inoculate against further harm to victim/survivors who 
disclose. Orchowski et al. (2013) find that negative responses increase the severity of 
PTSD, diminish health, increase drug and alcohol use, enhance characterological self-
blame, and encourage avoidance coping strategies. They also find that 75% of the 
women they studied had endured a negative response, including blame, stigma, not 
being believed, or the other person trying to take control of the situation, and that 20% 
regretted disclosing (Orchowski et al., 2013).  
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 Most work on disclosures addresses the context of therapy, and offers guidance 
for how therapists might manage disclosures. The therapeutic emphasis overlooks the 
insight that victims and survivors disclose first and foremost to friends and family—
people in their social world who are not trained professionals (see Banyard et al., 2010; 
Paul et al., 2013; Ullman, 2010). Further, the role of peers, community, family, and 
friends is seldom discussed in PTG research. According to Joseph (2011, p. 123), 
“Social support is probably at its most valuable when it motivates people to take 
responsibility for their lives.” His framework around PTG may mention support from 
others, but the overarching thrust deals with individual overcoming and growth, which 
is achieved via personal responsibility, and is thus consistent with neoliberal ideology. 
Unfortunately, the clinical approaches advanced by Joseph (2011) may foster self-blame 
for being unable to satisfactorily overcome and cope. 
Troubling clinical recommendations 
 While an exhaustive consideration of clinical recommendations for trauma is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, I wish to engage with clinical recommendations from 
some of the most prominent PTG researchers and proponents. The emphasis on personal 
responsibility in clinical practice is most overtly stated by Joesph (2011), whose 
suggestions are confusing and often contradictory. His recommendations are formative 
to the field of PTG due to his popular book on the subject.  
 Joseph (2011; Jospeh and Linley, 2006) argues for subtle interventions on the 
part of the therapist and for trust in the traumatized client’s self-determination to foster 
growth. Joseph’s (2011) comments that, “If posttraumatic growth is to take place, we 
must be active agents in the creation of our own lives” (Joseph, 2011, p. 140); 
“survivors must steer themselves in the right direction using active coping 
strategies” (Joseph, 2011, p. 129); “Trauma survivors must accept that the direction of 
their life is their own responsibility” (Jospeh, 2011, p. 130). These comments are central 
to the posttraumatic growth framework. 
 This advice is undermined by other claims by Joseph (2011) and Joseph and 
Linley (2005), where they advocate for a non-forceful approach to growth facilitation in 
clinical settings. They remind readers that growth cannot be forced (Joseph, 2011); that 
it can be facilitated but not created (Joseph and Linley, 2006); that rosy encouragements 
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to find silver linings are unhelpful to those in crisis (Joseph, 2011); that subtlety on the 
part of the clinician as well as the self-determination of clients are critical (Joseph and 
Linley, 2006); and, that the pace must be set by the client (Joseph and Linley, 2006). It 
seems that personal responsibility is foisted onto clients, and a growth mindset is 
encouraged subtly and consistently throughout treatment, whether or not the client bears 
such an orientation. 
 Joseph (2011) evades responsibility for the inefficacy of his approach for some 
clients; he explains the empty waiting rooms as the result of clients who secretly wish to 
hold on to their PTSD diagnosis. To manage these tensions, Joseph (2011, p. 148) 
suggests that “for this reason, [clients] must be gently led to believe that they, and only 
they, are responsible for their own journey toward reconfiguration.” It seems to me that 
Joseph is advising dishonesty; his guidance bears the appearance of manipulation rather 
than trustworthy therapeutic advice. He risks undermining the very self-determination, 
agency, and control over their sense-making process that he champions elsewhere. 
 Frazier and Berman (2012) also offer recommendations for clinicians, 
specifically those treating rape victims. They suggest that early positive changes are an 
important consideration for clinicians “who may focus exclusively on the more 
recognized negative effects of trauma (e.g., PTSD), and ignore potential positive 
changes” (Frazier and Berman, 2012, p. 174). They also suggest that rape crisis 
counselors assess for positive changes and perceived benefits early on, but caution 
against pressuring or implying that victims should find rape beneficial. They do not, 
however, offer concrete guidance on how to walk this tightrope. Frazier and Berman 
(2012, p. 175) conclude that: 
these findings suggest that counselors should help clients to find or create 
benefits out of traumatic events, but also that counselors should work to 
bolster whatever positive changes clients identify soon after a rape, so that 
these are not ‘lost’ over time. 
Their conclusion is consistent with Thompson (2000, p. 341–342), who suggests that 
clinicians “adopt a conscious focus on growth”, including “hope for the future”. 
 What is missing in these clinical recommendations is the responsibility that sits 
with peers, clinicians, and other non-victims regarding traumatic victimization. 
Sidestepping social support is a gaping omission, especially in light of Brison’s (2002) 
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insight that recovery from trauma, especially trauma incited by another human’s 
intentional actions, is a relational process. I contend that there is a great need for careful 
consideration of the relationships and social contexts that counter victim hostility and 
inoculate against secondary victimization. I hope to have taken a step in advancing 
critiques of dominant discourse around growth directives and considering their 
manifestation in recommendation for clinical practice. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I problematize posttraumatic growth and consider its resonance 
with the survivor imperative and neoliberal victim theory. Proponents of PTG frame it 
as a radical response to a ‘trauma industry’ which, they suggest, overemphasizes the 
negative sequelae of trauma. The definition of PTG hinges on improving oneself and 
one’s life through traumatic suffering. I find conceptualisations which orient toward 
trauma as an opportunity troubling, as they locate trauma as a site for self-improvement. 
I build on the arguments of critics of PTG and examine the discourses which help 
constitute expectations to grow following adversity. I suggest that growth directives are 
consistent with neoliberal values; the dominance of neoliberal victim theory, the 
survivor imperative, and the promulgation of PTG discourse in media campaigns all 
influence research into PTG. 
 My concern is that PTG sets unrealistic expectations and misrepresents some 
outcomes as positive that are may be negative, including women’s enhanced safety 
measures after sexual violence. I contest several researchers’ take on constitutes positive 
changes, since working to enhance safety suggests increased fear and decreased trust, 
and may impose limits on women’s choices. Further, PTG fixates on individual positive 
changes and overlooks the need for social or cultural change to prevent traumatizing 
events from occurring in the first instance. I argue that PTG research also slips into 
romanticization of trauma, which may lead to justifying violence on the basis that it 
leads to positive gains. Finally, I find that the clinical recommendations put forth in the 
PTG framework are manipulative and contradictory, and downplay the role of others in 
helping victim/survivors cope with trauma. 
 I argue that PTG, resilience, and the survivor imperative are constructed as 
escape hatches from eternal victimhood; their performance is a means by which 
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victimized people can assert they do not have a ‘victim mentality’, and thereby distance 
themselves from ‘pathetic’ victims. I argue that that these growth and strength-oriented 
frameworks perpetuate the myth that victimhood is a totalizing identity, and contributes 
to victim stigma. PTG and the survivor imperative place the onus on victims to present 
as coping well to others from whom they seek support. I contend that focusing on 
victim presentation is problematic, and that it overlooks the potential to disperse 
responsibility across the social world. It reduces scope for educating the public such that 
friends, family, and peers are better equipped to respond to victims in an informed 
manner.  
 In this chapter, I argue that dominant discourse fosters an excessive emphasis on 
individual coping with the burdens of social problems. My dispute is not with individual 
victim/survivors who seek well-being after violence, nor their accounts of their own 
experiences. Rather, my dispute is with the survivor imperative and NVT, which 
influence researcher and pressure victim/survivors to prove that they are stronger than 
social oppression which has caused them harm. 
 In concluding this thesis in Part III, I gesture toward alternative frameworks that 
take seriously the social and political dimensions of victimization and recovery. Instead 
of focusing on personal solutions, safety, and heroic overcoming, I advocate for a 
socially-based approach that values the knowledge of victims and endeavors to foster a 
social climate that is not permissive of rape, and is compassionate, rather than hostile, 
toward victims of sexual violence. My goal is not to erase the possibilities that victim/
survivors have for agency, nor to evacuate any modicum of personal responsibility; 
indeed, research suggests that control over various post-rape processes, such as help-
seeking, are adaptive and necessary. Instead, I wish to move toward the possibility of 
dispersing responsibility across the social world, and challenging the survivor 
imperative, NVT, and PTG. 
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Part III 
Chapter Seven: Autoethnographic reflections 
Chapter Eight: Conclusions  
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Chapter Seven 
Autoethnographic reflections: dispersing the burdens 
Solidarity 
 I’m not sure what possessed me to go to New York in February, the bleakest of 
winter months in the northeast, except that the invitation was compelling. I was asked to 
speak on a panel dealing with gender-based violence in the same community that had 
scapegoated me after the rapes. The individuals running the event were among the few 
who had maintained my trust and respect. They shared my concerns, and were working 
to make visible the pervasiveness of gender inequity across the social and professional 
networks that we had once shared, before my moment of feminist snap.  
 By accepting their invitation to participate on the panel, I would necessarily step 
back into a domain of my injury. I was being paid to speak on a topic that I had once 
been shunned for voicing. I was slated to encounter supporters and critics. Yet, 
somehow, invitations into the lion’s den have always had an enticing glimmer, and I 
knew I would be in good company—it sounded like an adventure. 
 We had dinner before the panel, which would take place with an audience of 40 
people and be broadcast later online. I noticed my anxiety mounting during dinner. It 
was difficult to sit around, talking about the pains of the past, talking about friends of 
Eli and Georgina, being asked to reiterate traumatic stories to new listeners. Dinner 
involved a tougher conversation than what would occur at the formal event. I had hoped 
that having a conversation beforehand, over Ukrainian food, would be a way to ease 
into the topic. In reality, it set off distress and anxiety, which I would have only a few 
blocks on foot to shake before the cameras started rolling.  
 The room was packed when we got started. People were engaged, and audience 
comments and questions—from the problematic to the ‘woke’—were responded to in a 
clear, no-nonsense manner by panelists. Having six of us on hand to handle questions 
simplified matters and dispersed any stress or sense of burden. As part of the 
proceedings, I was asked to retell my story—the rapes in the Amazon, the return, the 
response. It is a task that I am loath to perform. I heard new stories as well, horrific 
stories that sickened me for their familiarity, their banal predictability. People were 
moved; people were thinking through hard questions. All up, the event was fine, save 
for my throbbing headache. 
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 Despite all the challenges of the night, the experience elucidated an insight about 
what it means to disperse responsibility for sexual violence and responses to it across 
communities. The evening was an exercise in solidarity. The hosts had brought together 
a company of feminist-inclined individuals, working in tandem to raise the issues of 
sexual violence, gender inequity, and misogyny in the wider community. We were a 
panel of six. We worked as a team to manage the room. We told our stories together. In 
doing so, we brought a room of 40 people—and later, 1,000 people on YouTube—into 
dialogue around these difficult realities and how we might begin to address them. 
 Following the event, the organizers and some of their allies began making public 
posts, stating that I deserved a public apology. They reached out to some of the figures 
whose treatment of me had been most harmful. They stood up for me, and requested 
that organizations that had caused harm consider contributing to my travel expenses for 
the New York event. I did not ask for any of this. Other friends reached out to me, 
stating that if they had known what kind of treatment I’d endured, they would have 
done more—they were disgusted, they wanted to make it right, even now. When raising 
the issue of the consequences of sexual violence at various events, they note my name 
among those of other women who have left the community because of the pervasive 
problem of gendered violence, and urge others to recognize not only the human costs, 
but the costs to the community when dedicated women cannot remain involved due to 
violence. 
 My experience of solidarity in New York taught me a great deal about what it 
means to share the burdens of sexual violence and its sequelae across communities. I 
was given space to share what I had gone though, and what I had learned. Nothing more 
was asked of me: those who invited me to speak continue to agitate and raise the issue 
of sexual misconduct. I offer input when asked, where I can and feel able to. There are 
others carrying raising the issue. They share my outrage, offer compassionate ears, and 
support my decision to remain disengaged, mostly, with the site of my own injury and 
secondary victimization.  
 In the context of this event and my relationships to those involved in it, there 
was no pressure to grow, make good on, or heroically overcome the experience. There 
was no insistence that I cope in a particular way, no resistance to my labeling the event 
as victimization or labeling myself as a victim. Their response to me was informed by 
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feminist thought, by thinking through the issues, and by a deeply ingrained resistance to 
victim blame and rape myths. Solidarity with them was not enough to entice me back 
into the larger community we once shared. However, it gave me a taste of alternative 
possibilities to the survivor imperative and individualization of the problem of sexual 
violence. 
#MeToo 
 It is no coincidence that the organization of the panel where I spoke and the 
support I received took place in the context of the #MeToo movement. The #MeToo 
movement not only exposed the prevalence of sexual violence and harassment, it also 
implicated organizations in mishandling these harms. I suggest that in the #MeToo 
context, various people were able to see patterns and articulate them with greater ease, 
to a more receptive audience. A sense of solidarity was more immediately available, 
thus facilitating collective organizing. The conversation was reinvigorated. Past 
transgressions—including callous responses to my victimization, based in the 
promulgation of rape myths and victim blame—were recast in a different light. 
 One of the more poignant moments I recall from the panel involved an older 
gentleman who identified himself as an adult survivor of child sexual abuse. He was 
earnestly engaged in the Q&A. He was speaking up to request compassion and 
consideration from everyone in early discussions of the topic of sexual violence: after 
all, he claimed, it was a new conversation we were only just learning to have.  
 I took the microphone to respond. In a tone as even and gentle as I could muster, 
I reminded him and the room that feminists have been raising the issue of sexual harm 
and having conversation about gendered violence for several decades. I gestured toward 
research and consciousness-raising efforts, naming the legacy of finding words, creating 
spaces to listen, and rendering sexual violence and its effects visible. The #MeToo 
movement, and our panel as part of it, did not emerge from the blue: they are the latest 
surge in decades of writing, speaking, and agitating. I was attempting a general, 
sweeping form of feminist citation (see Ahmed, 2017, p. 16): it seems that the legacy of 
the feminist struggle continues to be overlooked and erased, even as it surges again in 
public consciousness.  
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 That evening in New York, we were a feminist company. Together, we were able 
to advance our collective understanding. For those among us who continue to resist 
forms of violence and misogyny, who offer ongoing support to victim/survivors in the 
wider community, it was a refuge to recharge before we all went back out into the world 
to hit walls, to learn, and to report back.  
 Things had changed significantly since I first raised the issue of sexual predators 
and sexual violence in the community. The most prominent change was that more 
people now share a systemic, political, and social analysis of the issue of gendered 
violence. In contrast to earlier experiences, my current feminist companions resist 
saddling individuals with the task of solving the problem, or else heroically healing 
themselves to move on with their lives and get past the violence. I attribute much of this 
change to the #MeToo movement, which exposed patterns of systemic injustice, 
implicated organizations, and set a new tone for conversations around sexual 
misconduct. As the analysis broadened, it seems that notions of where responsibility lies 
for creating change have been partially dispersed. In New York, I got taste of that 
change. It tasted like relief. 
Still a victim (and still doing it wrong) 
 I stopped in the west coast after the New York event, where a lunch date with an 
old friend offered a stark and painful contrast to the solidarity I had experienced in the 
northeast. I was catching up with Beth, a woman I’d known before the rapes and 
through the aftermath. At times, Beth had been a comfort. At other times, she left me 
feeling tense and defensive of my position that I’d been victimized, that sexual abuse 
was a salient issue in our midst, that people weren’t doing enough to stop the pattern. 
She seemed to take a similar stance to Eli: that I had manifested my experience of rape, 
that my soul had sought it for the sake of growth or higher purpose.  
 At lunch with her, I began to notice the splits around victim identity in various 
domains of my life and relationships. In her company, I remembered how I had felt, all 
those years before, fighting to have my story, and the stories of others harmed in a 
similar manner, taken seriously by our community. 
 Being with Beth, in the same geographic location where the majority of 
scapegoating had occurred, I found my anger again. I wanted justice; this time, it was 
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not for the man who had hurt me, but for the community that didn’t take my concerns 
(or my story) seriously. My stint in New York had driven home that sexual harm persists 
across our networks, that the pattern continues. I was on edge talking to Beth, missing 
the solidarity I had felt in New York. I forgot that, with Beth, I did not have a 
sympathetic ear. I was not talking to someone who consistently shared my feminist 
values or analysis. Beth’s response was cheap: “The topic is difficult and triggering for 
everyone, there are many perspectives and ways to look at it.” Her comment functioned 
to shut down further engagement. I felt I had been thrown back in time. Her resistance 
to even having the conversation—let alone taking action—was familiar, and it left me 
fuming. 
 Sitting across from Beth, in the corner table of a trendy little café, I felt 
inarticulate, defensive, frustrated, hindered in my efforts to communicate. The more I 
spoke, the less understood I felt, and feeling misunderstood effectively barricaded my 
attempts at clarification. With Beth, I was not an expert, or at the very least not treated 
as such. The considerable time and thought I had put into the topic did not seem to 
matter. Inside that space, I became a crippled version of my usually sufficiently-
articulate self. I was a stereotypical victim: I felt broken, meek, unable to stand up for 
myself, and at fault for the pain I was experiencing by broaching the subject. I felt a 
sense of proximity to my injury, that victimization had leaked into who I was and was 
now leaking out of me into the conversation at hand. I was trying to get through a 
conversation that had turned painful; I was surviving. 
 Outside of west coast, away from the people who denied me the victim label and 
created a context of secondary victimization, I am able to articulate the intricacies of the 
various dynamics at play, and analyze their sources and effects. I have some insight into 
the bigger picture, and I am in command of the narrative. Challenges to my narrative or 
analysis seldom throw me; I feel steady in the face of confrontation, and considered and 
measured in my response. This occasion was different. Sitting with Beth, I was struck 
by the dissolution of our friendship. Her response to me had always been inconsistent. 
Her response was hurtful. Trust was rupturing, and I realized that I was losing someone 
who had been with me on a long journey through dark terrain. We were both survivors, 
in a fashion, and we wore it in totally different styles, neither one fitting to the other. 
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 As we said goodbye, she said we may not meet again, with my living so far 
away, and to take care: who knows where our paths will take us. As had happened so 
many times before, the story I carried, and my passion for justice and understanding 
around it, led to the loss of a meaningful relationship. 
  Around the time I met with Beth, some of my New York friends began to update 
me about the rumors and criticisms in circulation about myself and other survivors. I 
was forced to face the fact that harmful responses were still happening. Little of 
substance has been done to prevent violence against women or to foster compassionate 
responses to victims. I was, to many, still a scapegoat. 
 I was wary and exhausted by the end of my U.S. visit. I was warmed by the care 
of some and sensitive to the criticisms of others. I revisited my grief for the 
relationships that crumbled and the community and opportunities I’d lost. I felt a need 
to safeguard myself in future, cautious of placing myself in potentially revictimizing 
situations or relationships. I have less fight in me now than I did in the years 
immediately after the rapes. I know my limits, and I try to avoid them. I don’t want to 
feel what I used to feel, the urgency, the futility, the triggers: the undertow.  
Inverting the gaze 
 I chose autoethnography as a method because it allowed me to intervene upon 
established norms pertaining to the meaning of victimhood and victim identity. As I 
reviewed a wide range of research on sexual violence, its sequelae, and secondary 
victimization, I began to realize that victims are an object of analysis and scrutiny by 
others. Scholars in sexual violence rarely situate themselves as victims and make their 
victimization a topic of study. Others claim victim identity, but seek to achieve a 
distancing of the personal from the professional; victim is object, not subject, gazed 
upon by external others. It limits the scope of victim subjectivity, and limits 
investigation. 
 I came to understand my thesis as an attempt to invert the gaze, and to view the 
complexities of inverting the gaze as a finding of my research. I claim a victim 
subjectivity and identity, and gaze upon the topics of my research from that situated 
vantage point. The topics I consider include the victim label and victim experience, but 
extend beyond them to include how non-victims and co-habitants of the social world 
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conceive of and respond to victim/survivors, and the discourses that foster those 
understandings and behaviors. Instead of being an object of study, I decided to make an 
object of the ideas that were perpetuated by others, which did further violence to me 
during some of the most difficult periods of my life after rape. I used my experience to 
sensitize me, to foster further engagement with the lived ramifications of rape myths 
and dominant discourses that partially formulate the cultural scaffolding of rape. 
 In many existing models for research, I would have been, to some extent, an 
object of study, although I would have been called a research subject. Even a radical and 
skilled researcher would have been trying to work within the limited data I could 
provide in a range of long, in-depth interviews. For example, had I been interviewed, I 
would have presented myself necessarily more simplistically than I have scope to do in 
my daily life, and with less nuance than is possible in a project of this length. The 
constraints of time and trust in an interview limit the scope of what can be shared, and 
risk flattening multiple dimensions into one. Such research is still useful. However, it 
would necessarily involve someone who is not me and does not necessarily inhabit 
victim status, working through and analyzing the data that myself and other subjects 
could provide. Their analysis would have been done in relation to data provided by 
many people, and would diverge from my own analysis. Autoethnography has afforded 
me an opportunity to sit within victim identity and gaze outward and inward in a 
sustained manner, shaped by the tools and approaches of the autoethnographic method. 
 I find that inversion of the gaze has felt playful, and at times radical. It has 
provided opportunities to throw off the burdens of a prescribed subjectivity and engage 
theory on my own terms. I was able to draw from the theorizations and insights I 
developed as I lived through complex experiences that took place over a period of 
several years. Engagement on my own terms has been specially important in terms of 
managing self-care while engaging a topic that could have been risky or, perhaps, 
dangerous for me. The nature of the topic, in light of my life experiences, necessitated 
careful consideration from the outset of what I would endeavor to study and how, so as 
to maintain sufficient control, distance, and safety at various intervals. The process of 
carefully considering my topic has been an opportunity for learning and theorizing 
throughout the research process: my life is entwined with the research, and the learning 
is ongoing. 
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 I argue that it is inherently political to claim authority on the grounds of victim 
identity. From the early stages of this thesis, I have endeavored to make a case for how 
an approach that centers the knowledge of victims might be intellectually rigorous and 
politically significant. I have tried to play on the notion of the “knowing victim”, which 
is centered in the title of Stringer’s (2014) book. Endeavoring to engage and deploy the 
knowing victim has emboldened me in my everyday life, as it has opened further 
avenues for engagement with theory. There has been, for me, a feedback loop between 
my self, my life, and my research, which has been consistent with Ahmed’s (2017, p. 
10) statement that, “We might then have to drag theory back to life, to bring theory back 
to life.” My approach has been explicitly feminist, and much of the theoretical basis for 
this thesis has been feminist writers. The project has affirmed and deepened my own 
commitment to a feminist life. Ahmed (2017, p. 7) tells us that “feminist theory is 
something we do at home,” and that “To learn from being a feminist is to learn about 
the world.” For me, learning has been ongoing. 
 In writing this thesis, I have wanted to keep in view the extent to which the 
material is personal as a way of maintaining an inverted gaze. There are stakes in these 
ideas, in these discourses, and in my analysis, which come to bear on my daily life in 
meaningful ways. There is vulnerability in this project, and risk (see Page, 2014). 
However, I entered into this work with a foundational assertion permeating this thesis: 
the victim perspective matters. It is with this assertion in mind that I have sought to 
challenge dominant discourses that undermine the credibility and value of victim speech 
and accounts; I have also sought to articulate the importance of unburdening the victim/
survivor of unrealistic and harmful expectations and responsibilities. As I have argued 
through this thesis, the grounds on which our knowledge would be dismissed are 
problematic. By using my own perspective as a basis of study, I have found that the 
knowledge of victims is powerful, if limited and human. We deserve compassion, rather 
than hostility, and we have so much to say.  
Victim/Survivor  
 Reflecting upon and narrating these recent experiences sheds light on how I 
continue to navigate my own identity as a victim and a survivor in relation to the 
community and the individuals whose attitudes and actions impeded my recovery. I 
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occupy different aspects of my story and my identity in different spaces. Living and 
working in New Zealand, far (11,500 kilometers) away from where it all happened, and 
working with others who are amenable to a feminist analysis of gendered violence and 
secondary victimization, has reaffirmed a fluid process of self-identification on my own 
terms. Returning to the west coast, where I met with Beth, enabled me to remember a 
version of myself who felt under attack from those I trusted most. I suspect that no 
amount of time will change my association with that place and the hurt that happened 
there. At best, I can limit my time in that space, generally avoid that milieu, and 
strategize methods of self-care well ahead of any sojourns to the landscape of my 
previous suffering. Even my engagement in New York was exhausting, for all the 
benefits of solidarity and all the insights it yielded.  
 What’s more, who I am when backed into a corner, and how I approach those 
situations, is radically different at this stage of my life. I find it easier to maintain a cool 
stability now. When I returned to an old setting, surrounded by faces I have come to 
associate with pain, I found myself less able to stabilize, and less agile. I was hot under 
pressure. I felt both defensive and defenseless, prone to bite. It was unpleasant, and 
likely as unpleasant for Beth as it was for me. 
 There is a paradox here that gets at some core insights I have sought to develop 
in this thesis. One thread in the story of my secondary victimization is that I was urged 
not to do anything that would make me a ‘victim’ in the eyes of others. When I sought 
council on the public sharing of my story, I was urged not to speak out because I would 
publicly cast my victim identity in stone. When I sought to recover, I was hindered by 
others who discouraged me from claiming victimhood and directed me toward a form of 
survivorship: to move on, to get away from victimhood, to learn and grow from the 
situation, to transcend it. The directive to grow was contrary to my politics and my 
values.  
 My peers and mentors treated victimhood as an eternal identity status, a 
perpetual thing that would dictate the rest of my life and the evolution of my character. 
By their measure, the word victim might forever govern the ways other people saw and 
treated me. Therefore, the legitimization offered by those who endeavored to keep me 
silent was that they were doing it to protect me from victimhood, as though I had not 
already been—and was not continually being—victimized. Now, it is solely in my 
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relationship to those exact people that I notice myself becoming precisely the kind of 
victim they hoped to prevent me from becoming. In those contexts, retreating into anger 
and defensiveness feels like a kind of survival; I felt unable to access the ability to 
communicate lucidly, and therefore disjointed from a primary source of power. In that 
space, I am trying to survive, hence my associating survivorship with moments of 
intense struggle, rather than moments of heroic overcoming. 
 The fluidity with which I use the terms victim and survivor prompts 
reconsideration of the victim/survivor binary and its untenability; the terms, as I see 
them, are imbued with potentially diverse meanings in use and practice. In the life I 
have now, and in new spaces, I inhabit the knowing victim more readily. Survival is not 
even in the picture: I have long outlived a struggle to survive, and I have won. I did so 
by embracing the victim label, viewing the injuries I sustained as social in nature, and 
extricating myself from those who did violence and harm through secondary 
victimization. I embrace being a victim in this new space with greater ease. I know my 
limitations and triggers, and I understand how to manage and seek support around 
PTSD as it arises—I have not eschewed agency or personal responsibility; rather, I have 
broadened my analysis. I understand there are long-term emotional and psychological 
ramifications of my life experiences, and I have chosen to engage these more often than 
suppress them. I have learned a great deal about how to discern and maintain 
relationships (of all kinds) in which I feel safe.  
 In light of my academic inquiry and personal experience, I have no fear of 
having or developing a ‘victim mentality’. This stance is a radical departure from how I 
felt years ago, when those around me seemed preoccupied with preventing my 
devolution into eternal victimhood. There are several valences to my perspective. I have 
engaged an ongoing critique of the notion of a ‘victim mentality’, such that I find it a 
problematic social construct of little utility in most circumstances. Most importantly, I 
do not fear being a victim. This is not to say I imagine myself as immune to victimizing 
events: no one is immune. Rather, I do not fear admitting to the possibility of being 
rendered powerless by circumstances outside my control. Such possibilities sit 
comfortably within my worldview (see Janoff-Bulman, 1992). I have integrated my 
intellectual work into my assumptive world such that, on a personal and day-to-day 
level, the word victim has no natural association with an internal state of mind; it stems 
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from external events. I have achieved perhaps a heroic level of overcoming, but I have 
done so by unfolding, understanding, and rejecting dominant discourses regarding the 
untenability of victim identity, the survivor imperative, and posttraumatic growth. I 
have done this work in and through relationships to others, some of whom have 
contributed to harm, while others have helped alleviate it.  
 I claim victim status, and I continue to unpack and explore what I learned in 
living this story. I do so because I believe it is a political statement, a tiny act of 
resistance, outside the norms and bounds of what is often understood as victim identity. 
These terms, victim and survivor, were those set out for me in making sense of my 
experience and myself in relation to them. They are the material I have to work with, 
delimiting what it is possible to say and think. While there are limits here, there is also 
scope for novel articulations and tightrope talk. These are daily, ongoing processes, 
which resolve and rest and wake again for reconsideration over time. 
Wisdom through suffering 
 The explorations and arguments developed in this thesis have been motivated by 
an effort to dispel ideas that, I argue, do harm. What I find most frustrating about the 
survivor imperative and PTG research is its cheapening and distortion of something 
beautiful. In looking at the horrific and distressing realities of trauma, there are ample 
examples of human creativity, resilience, and endurance. The fact of human’s ability to 
continue living in the face of ongoing distress, to make sufficient meaning of it to carry 
on, is remarkable. 
 I contend that isolating individual responsibility, and excessively promoting 
personal growth in the face of suffering, cheapens the remarkable feat of continuing to 
live in the face of trauma, tragedy, and pain. It minimizes and undercuts collective and 
interpersonal possibilities for care. At its worst, it slips into blame for victims who are 
unable to rise and become the heroes of their own stories. If not blamed for the 
victimization itself, then victims are blamed for their suffering in the aftermath. It is 
framed as an individual fault if one is unable to overcome adversity, as though that 
adversity is not linked to the common, longstanding, and shared human realities of 
suffering and oppression. 
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 There is a range of human writing—religious, philosophical, and literary—that 
deals with growth through suffering. Yet there are also swathes of writing in the same 
domains that deal with the human struggle to endure suffering. The Book of Job, for 
instance, considers seemingly meaningless suffering and pain and the limited ability of 
friends to know how to respond to such suffering. In the 2014 Billings Preaching Prize 
competition at Harvard Divinity School, Sarah Lord offered a compelling take on the 
Book of Job. She examines the inability of Job’s friends to say anything helpful or 
particularly meaningful to Job (Lord, 2014). At the start, she makes jokes about what 
mediocre friends they are. However, by the end, she offers a resounding insight: few of 
us know how to respond to immense, senseless suffering and trauma. What matters is 
that we try to show care, in the human and often flailing ways we can. We try to love 
each other and accompany one another through terrible struggles. These dimension of 
struggle, and the limits we all share in facing them, are overlooked by PTG researchers 
and those seeking a positive valence to traumatic suffering. 
 In the years since the Amazon, I have engaged with a huge amount of media 
which deals with questions of human suffering—books, film, television, talks, and 
essays across a range of genres spanning academic, nonfiction, fiction, theoretical, and 
lyrical. In these various media, I have noticed several patterns in terms of how they 
resonate, how my feeling self responds. When dominant discourses are uncritically 
mobilized and heralded, I used to feel inspired, and then tense. I wanted to believe that 
heroic overcoming was possible if I only worked hard enough. However, falling short of 
this was a frightful prospect. It didn’t bring comfort. It obfuscated complex social 
dynamics. Now, when I encounter these dominant discourses, I get annoyed. 
 However, there are rare texts and media in which these norms are laid aside, and 
harsher, starker realities are given breath: Janoff-Bulman’s (1992) conclusions about the 
changed assumptive world of trauma survivors; Kushner’s (1987) confessions about 
being willing to give up any growth to have his son back; Des Pres’ (1976) cautious and 
tragic accounts of survival, solidarity, and nearly impossible suffering in the Nazi 
camps. These texts need not relate specifically to my experience—indeed, it is quite rare 
for any one account of suffering to map onto another. Yet these texts maintain a 
complexity that feels more apt and appropriate than texts that attempt to be uplifting. 
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 In Kushner’s words about his son’s death, there is a palpable grief, a sense that 
nothing could make him ‘okay’ with what he’s lost. He does not endeavor to paint the 
experience pretty, or find a silver lining. The sadness is alive in the text. The socially 
acceptable notion of growth is cast aside in favor of a starker truth: he wished for none 
of it. 
 Des Pres (1976) writes extensively about the creative structures that enabled life 
in the World War II death camps. Such accounts of suffering are unparalleled. What he 
cautiously celebrates as the outcome of staying alive is the simple fact of being alive, 
and remaining human through it all. This is a notion to which I have returned over and 
again throughout the many years since the Amazon. I lived: I’m still here. That’s as 
inspiring a story as any, to my mind.  
 In closing her memoir When Women Were Birds, Terry Tempest Williams (2012, 
p. 224) writes:  
I want to feel both the beauty and the pain of the age we are living in. I want 
to survive my life without becoming numb. I want to speak and comprehend 
words of wounding without having these words become the landscape 
where I dwell. I want to possess a light touch that can elevate darkness to 
the realm of stars. 
Tempest Williams offers the kind of thinking and perspective I can relate to, that offers 
something poetic, realistic, and useful in facing difficult realities.  
 Des Pres contends that a political person is aware of connections between 
people. The political person develops compassion through knowledge of shared human 
suffering and what it takes to stay alive through it. To be political is to have compassion 
that extends to all who suffer at the hands of power in various ways. Compassion is part 
of what gives rise to the survivor’s moral authority. It also provides a powerful 




 In this thesis, I used autoethnography to advance feminist theory. I have written 
as narrator, author, subject, protagonist, and analyst. The thesis I have produced has 
been situated in my identity as a white, middle class, queer, immigrant woman from the 
USA and living in New Zealand. It is contextualized by the social and political realities 
of neoliberalism, especially the emphasis of self-improvement and individual 
responsibility. In light of limits of autoethnography as a method, which I discussed in 
Chapter 3, my findings are of limited generalizability. Yet, as Brison (2002) writes, it is 
important not to undergeneralize, either. I do not speak for all victims, but my position 
as researcher and victim/survivor affords unique depth to inquiry. I hope that my 
findings might provoke further discussion and inquiry by other methods.  
 In this thesis, I explored secondary victimization and rape myths as they came to 
bear on my lived experience after sexual violence, with an emphasis on how the 
dominant discourses related to victims and survivors influenced interpersonal responses 
to my victimization. Expanding on Stringer’s (2014) neoliberal victim theory and 
discussion of survivorship, I have developed the survivor imperative, which is based on 
my experience of the untenability of victimhood and bears heavily on discourses of 
posttraumatic growth.  
 In each of the previous chapters I have considered different aspects of my two 
research questions: (1) How are the discourses of victimhood and survivorship deployed 
in making sense of sexual victimization, and how are they related? and (2) How do 
these discourses affect social and interpersonal relationships, and how is this 
experienced by a victim/survivor over several years? In concluding, I wish to directly 
answer these questions in light of the findings and arguments I have developed 
throughout the thesis, which are based on lived experience and feminist theorization of 
my experiences. In addition to answering these questions, I summarize my key findings, 
arguments, and contributions below. 
 Discourses of individual responsibility and internalization inflect use of the 
victim and survivor labels. I argue that these discourses saddle victims with the burden 
of overcoming suffering caused by social injustices, and cast victimhood as a 
characterological failure. I have found that these dynamics manifest interpersonal 
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contexts as a form of secondary victimization. My findings have led me to conclude that 
further efforts are required—in research and practice—to disperse responsibility for 
preventing and responding to sexual violence across the social world. 
(1) How are the discourses of victimhood and survivorship deployed in making 
sense of sexual victimization, and how are they related? 
 The discourses of victimhood are often deployed to highlight how one should or 
should not behave or identify oneself subsequent to sexual assault. The victim label is 
necessary for obtaining support and help, while also undesirable for all the negative 
characterological connotations and stereotypes associated with it. Victims are expected 
to be weak, meek, passive, and forgiving; failure to embody these attributes risks 
reactive victim scapegoating (van Dijk, 2009). However, victims are also judged 
negatively for having a “victim mentality”, and victimhood is often constructed as 
originating in the victim, rather than in worldly events (Stringer, 2014). Therefore, 
victimized individuals are urged to avoid meekness, passivity, or brokenness, in order to 
assert their strength and agency and evade victimhood (Baker, 2010a). This is fostered 
by neoliberal victim theory (Stringer, 2014).  
 I have found that, as a victim, I was socially directed (see Ahmed, 2017) to forgo 
claiming victim status and evade victimhood. The onus was on me to prove that I did 
not have a ‘victim mentality’. These conflicting discourses were apparent in 
conversations, and had significant, deleterious effects. 
 Further, use of the victim label is deemed to be a source of harm in and of itself. 
In considering the social climate of victim hostility supported by rape myths, I have 
found that victim identity is constructed as problematic and totalizing. I experienced and 
studied how victimhood has been stigmatized as a self-fulfilling prophecy; if I claimed 
the victim label, any subsequent suffering, or tarnishing of my reputation or my self, 
would be something I had done to myself. This discourse fosters victim blame. 
 To evade the victim label, I was encouraged to take personal responsibility as 
per neoliberalism’s volitional imperatives (see Baker, 2010a), and transcend victim 
status. However, as I demonstrated strength, the volition to overcome, and a desire to 
help others, my requests for support were negated, and I was subject to reactive victim 
scapegoating (van Dijk, 2009). There was no way to move within the agglutinative web 
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of contradictory imperatives. In my own experience, I have found that the victim label 
is untenable, due to how it is socially constructed, and how that construction came to 
bear on interpersonal interactions and relationships. 
 I also found that discourses of survivorship were deployed as an aspirational 
imperative following my experience of sexual violence. Survivorship is associated with 
positive coping styles, with successfully ‘getting over’ sexual assault, and satisfactorily 
evading or transcending the victim label. The survivor is discursively constructed as 
active, agentic, strong, and capable. She refuses to let what has happened to her define 
her or take over her identity and her world. She has successfully achieved a healing and 
transformational journey and become a survivor. 
 The problematics of the survivor label are not cause for interrogating individual 
victim/survivors who may embrace the survivor label. My quarrel is with the social 
imperative to become a survivor, and the dominant discourses that direct victim/
survivors to move toward survivorship and comport themselves as growing, self-
enterprising, and self-improving subjects. I argue that this as an unfair burden to place 
on a person who is coping after sexual victimization. Further, I suggest that this 
particular emphasis on individuals to overcome the consequences of a social problem 
obscures the social nature of the problem and hinders addressing it. 
 In unpacking the narrative arc and examining the victim and survivor categories, 
I have found that victim and survivor are not mutually exclusive. In my experience, and 
in the literature I consider, they are not a binary. Rather, the language of each is often 
drawn upon in McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance’s (2011) ‘tightrope talk’ to forge novel 
articulations about the experience of sexual violence and its sequelae. Further, I suggest 
that the language of survivorship is utterly contingent on the language of victimhood. 
Without something to resist or escape—without a pathetic or undesirable identity label 
to evade—survivorship does not hold the same discursive power: it is defined by what it 
is not. 
 In 2019, in the context of the #MeToo movement, I am concerned about 
discourses of posttraumatic growth, which suggests that there is growth, inspiration, and 
benefit to be gleaned not in spite of trauma, but because of it. Where growth is not 
achieved, victims are blamed for failing to self-improve (Joseph, 2011). I have also 
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found that posttraumatic growth is based in the logic of the survivor imperative, and 
thus provides an illustrative example of the survivor imperative and its mechanisms.  
 In sum, the discourses of victimhood and survivorship are deployed in everyday 
conversations in a manner that forecloses claiming the victim label and constructs 
survivorship and posttraumatic growth as imperatives. I experienced how these 
imperatives were communicated in relationships and everyday interactions. These 
discourses contribute to how victim/survivors and those in relationship to them make 
sense of sexual victimization. One consequence of these discourses is that they may 
contribute to secondary victimization and enact further harm, including by damaging 
the relationships in which they are articulated. 
(2) How do these discourses affect social and interpersonal relationships, and 
how is this experienced by a victim/survivor over several years? 
 The effect of these discourses on my experience, over several years, has been 
multilayered and complex. By and large, it has been deleterious. My own relationship to 
victimhood and survivorship has shifted and evolved in the years since the rapes, and 
since taking up study of the terms. Despite ongoing pressure to evade victimhood in the 
years immediately following my victimization, I remain unwilling to do so. Stringer 
(2014, p. 160) claims that: 
If we do not move to visibly use and revalue this term, we corroborate its 
neoliberal reorganization as a ghettoizing term unless it is naming a 
protected party—the Real Victim; and we fail to obstruct the dominant place 
of market logic in the available language of social suffering and complaint. 
I have come to agree with this statement. I believe that claiming the victim label has 
political power: it maintains focus on the harm that was done, instead of on the ability 
of a victim/survivor to satisfactorily cope. While this position has allowed me to resist 
certain rape myths and victim hostility, that resistance has had social consequences. It 
has created strain and tension in relationships generally, as well as in specific 
conversational settings. 
 In the years immediately after the rapes, I experienced the contradictory 
imperatives of survivorship and expectations around victimhood as tension, as a 
barrage, as a trap. My attempt to unpack and examine the rapes—to understand what 
 241
they meant for me and my life—were constantly subject to pushback, pressure, 
reanalysis, and reinterpretations that felt inaccurate, unhelpful, and at times violent.  
 Therefore, the effect of the discourses of victimhood and survivorship over 
several years was irreparable damage to relationships that had once been sources of 
refuge, insight, and strength. This did not happen overnight. In this thesis, I have 
provided snapshots of critical moments with friends, acquaintances, mentors, and 
teachers. Most of these relationships declined gradually and then precipitously. I was 
not given space to deal with victimization on my own terms; rather, I faced social 
directives, through these relationships, to adhere to dominant discourses to evade 
victimhood and establish myself as a survivor achieving posttraumatic growth. 
 In light of the findings of this thesis, I suggest that my listeners forced novel 
articulations into preexisting frameworks (see McKenzie-Mohr and Lafrance, 2010; 
Page, 2017). In analyzing conversations for this thesis, I have found several instances of 
tightrope talk. My tightrope talk was a form of vulnerable speech, prone to 
misunderstanding. In retrospect, I contend that my listeners were unable to take my 
account as a whole, including the tensions and contradictions. 
 As a secondary effect, these discourses prompted me to consider my use of the 
victim and survivor labels. My use of the terms inverts dominant meanings of the labels, 
and therefore forms a novel articulation and alternative subjectivity. I identify as a 
survivor on the days I struggle most, when the task at hand is to get through the day, 
when living with the events of the Amazon feels like hard work. I am a victim on the 
days when I feel most able to state what was done to me with little emotional charge, 
when it feels least immediate. This use of the victim and survivor labels diverges from 
the dominant frameworks used both in colloquial conversation and scholarly 
conceptualizations.  
 Eventually, I left the social world in which secondary victimization occurred. 
This was a direct consequence of the strains created by dominant discourse as it 
manifested in my relationships. I reached the point of “feminist snap” (Ahmed, 2017). 
Ahmed’s framework reframes this break as a part of living a feminist life. When the 
secondary victimization became too much, I snapped. The moment of snap had built up 
over years. Then, in what seemed like an instant, I cut all ties. I removed myself from 
email lists, ended relationships, broke away from a career path I had been forging for 
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seven years. I took up a writing residency on Cortes Island, in Canada. Not long after, I 
decided to pursue a PhD in gender studies.  
 The snap was enabled by two factors: (1) it was a consequence of rape myths, 
victim hostility, and victim and survivor discourses, all of which irreparably damaged 
meaningful relationships; (2) it was nurtured by a sense of possibility provided to me by 
feminist theory. Further, feminist solidarity gave me a place to land after breaking free 
of hostile and harmful relationships. Snapping opened up new possibilities.  
 My life took a sharp turn as a result of secondary victimization. The directive to 
avoid victimhood, the warnings that it would become totalizing, has defined my 
academic work over the last half-decade. I did precisely what I was encouraged not to 
do: I focused on victimization and victimhood. I sought to understand the roots of these 
directives, as fodder for continued resistance. 
Key findings, core arguments, and contributions to gaps 
 From the outset of this thesis, I endeavored to bridge feminist theoretical 
approaches with autoethnography to produce a piece of feminist theoretical work. Thus, 
I deployed elements of analytic and evocative autoethnography to advance theory 
through the use of personal story, and to test theory against personal experience. I have 
found that much scholarship around victims and survivors of sexual violence diverges 
significantly from my own experiences, and have used my experiences to challenge 
dominant sense-making structures and propose a new, critical framework. 
 I have also worked to advance the theories of Brison (2002), Stringer (2014), 
and Ahmed (2017). I explored Brison’s (2002) assertion that the aftermath of sexual 
violence is relational, and expanded on her revaluing of victim knowledge and 
epistemology. I took up Stringer’s (2014) neoliberal victim theory and juxtaposed it 
with van Dijk’s (2009) reactive victim scapegoating to elucidate the agglutinative web 
of contradictory imperatives that render the victim label untenable. I also considered 
how NVT contributes to the survivor imperative. Finally, I applied Ahmed’s (2017) 
approach of bringing theory back to life, and considered how feminist snap, feminist 
company, and social directives played out in my experience of secondary victimization. 
 I used autoethnography to examine the contours and effects of rape myths and 
victim hostility in relationships as a form of interpersonal secondary victimization. I 
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have found that victim hostility involves hostility toward the concept of victimhood, 
and manifests in hostility toward people who have been victimized. Victim hostility 
fosters directives to achieve posttraumatic growth and survivorship, as if by evading 
victimhood a victim can mitigate victim hostility and salvage strained relationships. 
 I analyzed the metaphor of a journey from victim to survivor, and suggested that 
it constitutes a directive. In light of my analysis, I agreed with Kelly et al. (1996) that 
the survivor label has contributed to the further denigration of the victim label. In 
developing a feminist critique of PTG, I argued that PTG and resilience are constructed 
as mechanisms by which individuals prove they have overcome a ‘victim mentality’, 
and to distance themselves from victimhood, thus mitigating victim hostility. Further, I 
suggested that the survivor imperative and PTG construct the problem of rape as an 
individual pathology to be resolved by victims. Internalization erases social and external 
causes of harm, fosters victim blame and other forms of secondary victimization, and 
hinders collective action against sexual violence.  
 Wisdom involves care and consideration for others beyond the individual self. It 
is political. Therefore, it is wise to resist individualistic approaches to sexual violence 
prevention and response. Part of my approach to resistance involves removing the 
burden of coping with sexual violence from the shoulders of victims, and distributing it 
across society. 
Dispersing responsibility 
 In the era of #MeToo, challenges and critiques are being leveled against the 
social context of victim hostility, rape myths, and the cultural scaffolding of rape. I 
argue that it is not the sole responsibility of victim/survivors to deal with the 
consequences of sexual violence; rather, I suggest that making the world safer for 
women and gender minorities is a collective obligation, and responsibility should be 
dispersed across the social world. It is a collective task to ensure that the risk of 
victimization is diminished, that those who perpetrate rape face justice, and that those 
who endure rape are met with a climate that is compassionate, not hostile, toward 
victims.  
 There are ample avenues for realizing a compassionate social world, and for 
reconceptualizing social responsibility in the context of gendered violence. These 
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avenues include upskilling and educating communities about these issues—not only to 
prevent and resist violence, but also to enhance the likelihood that victims will be 
responded to in a compassionate and informed manner. Possible interventions include 
evidence-informed educational initiatives in schools and across communities. 
Throughout writing this thesis, I have worked as a developer and facilitator of research-
based consent programs, disclosure training programs, bystander trainings, and 
resistance education. These are concrete examples of how responsibility may be 
dispersed. 
 I have also worked with several media outlets, including TVNZ, Quartz, Stuff, 
and New York Magazine, who are amenable to feminist consultation to avoid harmful 
tropes in covering sexual violence. These collaborations are a powerful step forward, as 
the media continues to shape public opinion and sense-making on the issue of sexual 
violence, and new approaches to stories may help to counter harmful stereotypes about 
victims. 
 In light of the findings of my thesis, I suggest that there is scope for resistance 
through developing a more victim-compassionate social world. This aim would be 
served by an increase in analytic autoethnographies and feminist theorizations dealing 
with sexual violence and secondary victimization. I suspect that discourses that 
stigmatize victims and delegitimize victim knowledge hinder autoethnographic 
approaches to sexual violence and its sequelae. In the wake of the #MeToo movement, I 
hope to see more feminist autoethnographies dealing with sexual victimization to 
augment research done by other methods. I suggest that learning from victims is part of 
the way forward in ameliorating and preventing secondary victimization, and creating a 
more critical and informed society. 
 Dispersing responsibility across the social world includes recognizing that 
victim/survivors should not be directed to overcome social ills on an individual basis. I 
know one victim/survivor who is only comfortable in public if she can sit or stand with 
a wall at her back, to survey the room; her friends and family facilitate her habits to 
enhance her sense of safety. This example demonstrates the manner in which victim/
survivors may come to depend on others to navigate ongoing issues after sexual 
violence. Her approach is social and relational, and undermines individualistic, 
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therapeutic frameworks or notions about heroically overcoming adversity as a solitary 
enterprise. Adversity persists, and it takes the care and support of others to navigate it. 
 I hope that the autoethnographic data and analysis in this thesis have provided 
some insight into the lived consequences of victim hostility. I have attempted to 
elucidate the complex web that victim/survivors are often forced to navigate following 
sexual violence. I wonder, at the close of this project, about the preventative value that 
fostering a victim-compassionate social world might have. There is much to be gained 
by collectively challenging rape myths, victim blame, and the cultural scaffolding of 
rape.  
 The overall goal, as I see it, is to create an environment where no one has to 
navigate the realities of victimhood in the first place. In the meantime, there is more 
work to be done to understand secondary victimization, victim hostility, and their lived 
consequences. The more we know about how things go awry, and the more thorough 
our diagnosis, the more sophisticated our remedies may become. 
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